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PREFACE 
Since this sub-thesis is based largely on archival 
materials available at the Australian Archives Office in 
Canberra and the Reserve Bank of Australia in Sydney, should 
like to express my indebtedness to officers of both organizations 
for their assistance: Most especially, to Elizabeth Nathan of 
the Aus tra 1 i an Arch i ve·s Dffi ce and A 1 ex Stewart of the Reserve 
Bank. I am grateful to the following persons for granting me 
interviews: ·Dr. H. C. Coombs; Emeritus Professor L.F. Crisp; 
Mr. j,Q. Ewens; Dr. L.J. Hume; Sir Leslie Melville; 
Sir John and Lady Phillips; the Honourable E.G. Whitlam; and 
Sir Roland Wilson. I should also like to tha~k the following 
persons for answering my correspondence:· The Lady Casey; th_e 
Right Honourable Sir John McEwen; and the Right Honourable Sir 
Percy Spender. I also express my gratitude for conversatio:is 
with Sir Hermann Slack and Sir Percy Spender. Above a 11, I 
8Xpress my sincP.rest appn:ciation to Selwyn Co•·nish +'or his 
dedicated and inspiring supervision, and last, but not least, 
thank Anne Buchmaye1· for typing the sub-thesis. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On 18 January 1979, the Feder:§._l Treasurer announced the 
establishment of a Committee of Inquiry into the· Australian 
Financial System. Chaired by J.K. Campbell, Chairman and Chief 
General Manager of the Hooker Corporation ltd., the Committee was 
set up to investigate several aspects· of the monetary system; in 
particular, it was to inquire into, and report on, the structure 
and methods of operation of the monetary system and its regulation 
(l) 
and control. When establishing this investigation, the Treasurer 
noted that it was the first to be held in Australia in over forty 
years. It is the purpose of this sub-thesis to examine some 
of the principal aspects of the previous inquiry', the Royal 
Comrnissi9n on the Monetary and Banking Systems, which was _ 
officially constituted on 15 November 1935. Its terms of 
reference were: 
to inquire into the Monetary a::d S.3nking 
~ystems at present in operation in Australia 
an-~ to report whether any, and if so what, 
alterations are desirable in the interests 
of the people of Australia as a whole, and 
the manner in which ar.y such alterations 
should be effected. (2) 
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Prior to the creation of the Commission, there had been 
numerous and far-reaching changes in the economy and in theories 
concerning banking technique. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
this investigation, the first to be conducted following the establish-
ment of the Commonwealth, had very significant implications for the 
future of the banking and monetary systems in Australia. Indeed, 
the importance of the Royal Commission cannot be exaggerated, for its 
recommendations marked a turning point in the history of banking in 
Australia. Although none of its recommendations were incorporated 
immediately into legislation, the banking system was influenced by 
its proposals for the next forty years. Many of the powers advocated 
by the Commission were conferred upon the Commonwealth Bank under 
war-time emergency legislation in 1939 and 1941. In addition, 
the inquiry exerted a fundamental educational impact on bankers and 
upon Ben Chifley who, as Federal Treasurer during the Curtin Labor 
Government, prepared the 1945 banking legislation. Subsequently, 
these laws, which embodied most, of the Commission's recommendations, 
have formed the basis of Australian banking to the present day. 
Even when the ~eport was first released to the public in 
July 1937, several 
Casey, the Federal 
commentators emphasized its significance. 
Treasurer during the Lyons Government, and 
R.G, 
Lyons 
himself, expressed satisfaction that the Commission had confirmed 
"as the Government supposed, that the present system is fundamentally 
sound and,. under present conditions, is the best in the general 
. (3' interest of the community." ' The media, and the public generally, 
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similarly looked upon the Report with favour. On 21 July 1937, 
The Age stated that "even in summarised form the recommend2tions O·~ 
the Royal Commission on Monetary and Banking Systems are instructive 
and stimulating. It is clear at a glance that the full report is 
of prime importance, and that the Commission has thoroughly justified 
its appointment." (4) The Economist asserted on 16 October 1937 
that, of the four reports which had recently been produced by banking 
investigations in Britain, Canada, New Zealand; and Australia, the 
Australian report was "more sophisticated, and more academic in the 
arrangement of its full and precise survey of the Australian economy. 
It argues its points fully and fairly, even, in fact, a little 
pedantically." It said that all of the reports: 
inculcated the principle of monetary management and of 
the responsibility of Central Banking .... The British 
Macmillan Report stated the object of Central Banks 
to be "to maintain the stability of international 
prices both over long periods and over short periods". 
This report [une Australianj tells the Commonwealth 
Bank "to make its chief consideration the reductions 
of fluctuations in economic activity". In both cases 
the ultimate aim is, of course, identical, but the 
alteration in emphasis indicates a change in opinion 
about methods, interesting as a lesson taught by the 
past six years as well as a reflection on the special -
position of raw materials-producing countries. The 
rest of the report shows clearly why the change has come 
about, and gives it an interest of its own. In fact, 
in every way this is a volume worthy of its predecessors 
and to be read by anyone interested in contemporary 
economic life, (5) 
Various economists also commended the Commission on its efforts. 
S.J. Butlin, for example, wrote in The Australian QuarterZ.y in 
September 1937 that "as Royal Commissions go, that on the Banking 
" (6) 
System was worth the money. 
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The Royal Commission made recommendations on a variety of 
issues. For example, it informed the government that a mortgage 
bank, or banks, should be created to provide fixed and long-term loans. 
It also urged the government· and the Commonwealth Bank to look into 
the difficulty of establishing institutions to meet the needs of small 
secondary industries. Although bank nationalization, as such, did 
not receive much attention by the Commissioners, they discussed the 
relations between the Commonwealth Bank and the Commonwealth government, 
concluding as they did that if a conflict arose between the Bank and 
the government which could not be resolved by discussion, it was the 
Bank's responsibility to implement the government's policy. Here was 
a proposal of far-reaching significance. 
Although clearly not the only issue with which the Commission 
was concerned, the Commissioners did devote much of their time to the 
role of the Commonwealth Bank as a central bank. Since, in the 
perspective of history, th2ir recommendations in this respect seem to 
have been its most enduring aspect, the sub-thesis is mainly concerned 
with this issue. l4hereas the Campbell inquiry's interim report has 
revealed that a certain level of government control is necessary, one 
major, if not the most important recommendation of its final report 
will be for some measure of liberalization and de1·egulation.(7) In ,,,, 
,l.; 
,.,. contrast, the 1935-Jg37 Royal Commission strongly emphasized the ,~ 
I inadequacies of central bank powers of control over the Australian i -~: 
monetary and banking systems. Its main concern 1-1as to advocate greater I-~!;;-
1! 
"'""''°" of the mooet"y '"' b'"kiog 'YHem' by the mooetocy '"thmtiel£' 
l';ff 
- that is, by the 
government itself. 
to pub·l i c demands for a 
control which, in turn, were 
monetary and banking systems 
of the Great Depression: But these demands also derived in part 
the deep depression and bank failures of the 1890s. In addition, 
the emergence of new ideas concerning economic management were also 
important. Thus, the Commission aimed to prevent violent fluctuations 
in the financial system and to ensure, in particular, the stability 
of the banking system through stricter controls. The private 
banking sector, however, vigorously opposed government intervention, 
and hence sought to prevent the government from implementing the 
Commission's proposals. These, then, are the three main themes of this 
-~----· 
·sub-thesis, namely, the reasons why the Commission was established, 
..,,_-
its principal recommendations, especially those pertaining to the 
objectives of monetary policy and policy instruments, and the efforts 
of the private banks to thwart the government's attempts to translate 
these suggestions into legislation. 
The sub-thesis is divided into three parts. Part A deals 
1vith the origins of the Royal Commission: Chapter One examines the 
background to the establishment of the investigation, 1.:hi1e Chaptei-
Two attempts to sketch, briefly, the main features of the Australian 
monetary and banking systems at the time the inquiry was created. 
Part B addresses itself to the evidence presented to the Commissi,..-· 
and its subsequent recommendations. Although the Com~ 
",,,.-
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devoted themselves to the entire range of problems besetting the 
Australian financial and banking systems, the sub-thesis has taken 
a more narrow approach, necessitated by limits of time and space. 
Thus, Chapter Three concentrates on the Commission's deliberations 
and the witnesses' submissions as to what constituted the desirable 
objectives of the monetary authorities, notably the central bank. 
Chapter Four focuses on the Co~ission's examination of the instrum-
ents of monetary policy. In view·of the inquiry's preoccupation 
with the Commonwealth Bank's need for two additional devices of 
control, namely, minimum reserve deposits and access to the London 
funds of the trading banks, this chapter will deal more or less 
exclusively with these most significant issues. Part C looks at 
the aftermath of the report: Chapter Five seeks to survey public 
reaction to the publication of the Commission's findings, as expressed 
by the media, various academics, and politicians; Chapter Six 
discusses the pressures which the private banks brought to bear upon 
the government to reject the recommendations; finally, Chapter 
Seven examines the government's moves to introtiuce legislation 
embodying the Commissioners' proposals, culminating in the ena.ctment 
of the 1945 banking legislation. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION 
The genesis of the Royal Co1TKJ1ission may be traced to a 
number c~ long-term and short-term influences. 
To begin with, 
long-te'1TI influences included the movement for banking reform 
dating ~ack to the depression of the 1890s, which became an integral 
part of the Australian Labor Party's (ALP) platform. 
In an 
intervi~w with the author Dr H.C. Coombs, who was Assistant Economist 
to the :ommonwealth B.ank, revealed that some Australians, especially 
in the _abor Party, were convinced that monetary affairs not only 
played =n important role in political and economic issues, but could 
also be 11anipulated to suit political ends. (l) It was these beliefs 
which L':derpinned Labor's attempts to promote the development of 
cent ra 1 banking. 
By 1919, the Labor Party had dedicated itself to 
the ain of bank nationalization. 
In an effort to gain supremacy 
over th= Bank of Nevi South 1-Iales, the Scullin Government attem..Qted 
in ]g3c to establish a strong central bank, but its efforts were 
thwarte: by an anti-Labor Senate majority. 
Another issue of longer 
term si;nificance was the interest of non-Labor parties in central 
bankin£ ~nich began in the 1920s. Underlying the legislation 
passed 'n 1924, during the term of the Bruce-Page Government, was 
the be~·::f that the Commonwealth Bank should acquire the functions of 
a centr;; bank. Additionally, world and Australian events and 
economi: policy increased general awareness of the inadequacies of 
I ;, 
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the Commonwealth Bank as a central bank. Various people, including 
Sir Ernest Harvey, who was Deputy Governor of the Bank of England 
from 1920 to 1936, and Professor D.B. Copland, Economic Adviser to 
the government from the Depression to 1945, called for monetary 
investigations and the development of central banking even before 
the Depression. (2) However, it was the bitterness aroused during 
and after these troubled years which initiated widespread criticism 
of banking and created demands for inquiries into, and reform of, 
the Australian banking and monetary systems, by.economists, members 
of the business community, and the public. Various monetary 
theories gained popularity even among some politicians, and many 
people desired an investigation into the validity of such ideas. 
The Depression marked the beginning of the upturn in 
Labor's campaign against the private banks. The banks were criticized 
for rejecting proposals by the Scullin Labor Government (1929-1931) 
which were designed to relieve the misery of the Depression. They 
were condemned for reducing advances and taking other inappropriate 
monetary measures which only served to worsen and prolong the~own­
turn in economic activity. In 1932, moreover, Labor became very 
antagonistic towards the private bankers who were held partly 
responsible for the collapse of the Labor Governments in New South 
Wales and in Federal Parliament. Party members realized, the1·efore, 
that unl:ess tihe monetary system was reformed, it could be used to 
defeat the Labor cause in the future. Their dedication to reform 
was not unique, however, and as the Depression lingered o~,· 
_/ 
increasing proportion of the community came to agre;/-
the ALP that it was time' to put an end to pr~.:03•·/ 
/ 
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domination of the economic system. Eventually, adherents and 
members of all parties, including those in power, joined the crusade 
for improved monetary and banking systems. The government finally 
decided to establish an inquiry to resolve the criticisms and doubts 
that had arisen. Also, the establishment of banking inquiries in 
Canada, Britain,and New Zealand raised the expectation that the 
Australian Government would follow suit. And the breakdown of the 
sterling exchange system in the· early 1930s, and the absence of a 
viable alternative, similarly made an inves~igation desirable. 
While these long-term issues provide a ba;Rground to 
the creation of the Royal Commission, the Commission owed its existence 
to other, more important events of a short-term nature. In short, 
the Commission was established principally as a result of political 
pressures, such as those exerted by the Labor Party - especially 
the strong initiating force provided by J.H. Scullin, Leader of the 
Opposition during the federal election campaign of 1934. But 
as well, members of the government parties thems~lves were a 
significant element, of which the role of the £ountry Party was_the 
most notable. Although the significance of political manoeuverings 
and debates cannot be over-emphasized, public opinion was yet another 
force with which Cabinet had to deal, and the media did not fail to 
capitalize upon the concern, confusion, and discontent of the 
community regarding banking and monetary affairs. 
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Bankin9·as·a ·Major Issue·ouring the Election carnpaign·of'1934 
When the economy finally embarked on the road to recovery, banks 
and banking continued to be scrutinized and discussed. Many 
people, and eventually even Casey, the Federal Treasurer during 
the Lyons Government (January 1932-April 193g), came to realize that 
there had never been any public examination of the Australian monetary 
and banking systems since the establishment of the Commonwealth. An 
investi<iatjon was perhap·s moi"e desirable in the 1 iqht of the many new 
developments in banking technique and important changes in the economy 
which had occurred during the preceding few years. There was a 
strong belief in the need for improving the system, and while all 
parts of the economic system came to be examined, no aspect seemed 
to receive more attention than the monetary and banking systems. 
As early as January 1932, some Cabinet members of the 
government party, the United Australia Party (UAP), admitted the 
desirability of preventing political interference with the Commonwea1tl1 
!Bank. Accordingly, on 31 March 1933, John Latham, the Attorney-
. \ 
General, informed the House of Representatives that although an 
inquiry was not necessary, the government hoped to consider the 
desirability of introducing legislation which would reorganize the 
Bank to some extent and equip it with all the attributes of a central 
bank. (3) It intended to examine the possibility of separating 
the trading activities of the Bank from the central banking functions,· 
which, interestingly enough, was v1hat E.G. Theodore, the Federal, 
Treasurer during the Scullin Government, had proposed in_,,. 
for reform were high, as shown by numerous calls fr· 
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which were expressed by various groups of the Australian Natives· 
Association (ANA} throughout Australia as early as 1932, and by the 
_Farmers Restoration League. Action was not taken, however, for 
fear of causing a loss of confidence. By mid-November 1933, Lyons 
was still procrastinating while claiming to be awaiting the results 
. . . (4) 
of overseas inqu1r1es. 
While the UAP seemed to be protecting the interests of the 
private bankers - its 1oya1 po 1 it i cal and financi a 1 supporters -
the intensity and ferocity of labor's criticisms of the banks and 
its demands for change reached new levels. According to Professor 
L.F. Crisp, "Labour was understandably bitter about both the 
economic and political roles of the banks generally ... Banking and 
currency reform proposals, indeed, were raised to the status of 
panaceas both within and beyond Labour's frustrated and divided ranks 
in the 1930's".(S) As early as December 1932, throughout 1933, and 
especially during the election campaign in 1934, Scullin condemned 
the banks in various articles, manifestos and sp~eches. Although he 
held the 'profit-hungry' banks mainly responsible for the Oepre.ssion 
and the consequent misery of the people, he ensured that the UAP 
government did not escape blame. Accordingly, on 31 March lg33, he I' 
initiated a debate in the House concerning "the necessity for an 
inquiry into banking operations, and their effect upon Australia's 
economic position;,~ 5 } The House immediately divided along party 
1 i nes. On the one hand, the members of the government defended, 
and opposed any interference with, the private banking system. 
Labor supporters, on the other hand, were strongly in favour of 
·~ 
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changing the system. In June 1933 , the Federal Labor Conference 
included the nationalization of banking in the Party's election plat-
form, apparently at Scullin's instigation. While he publicly 
advocated outright socialization of banking on 6 February 1933, this 
issue was rarely mentioned, however, in his later speeches on banking 
refonn\7l · It seems that 'nationalization by stealth' more 
accurately describes his intentions: He believed that government 
seizure of the banks would be unnecessary as the Commonwealth Bank 
would ultimately attract business away from them if all governments 
were forced to deal with the Bank. In view of his obsession "ith 
the monetary system before and during 1934, it is not surprising that 
the monetary question and banking became prominent election issues at 
the expense of other more immediate problems. Indeed, some sections 
of the Labor Party criticized the importance he placed upon an 
election pledge to hold a complete and unbiased monetary investigation. 
Some conservatives in the Party believed he used banking matters as a 
tactic to divert attention away from the policies of J.T. Lang, Leader 
of the New South Wales Labor Party and an advocate of nationalization, 
and to establish himself as the centre of the. Opposition.(B) 
The activities of the Labor Party, however, did not change 
the government's stand. On 4 July 1934, Lyons announced that there 
was no desire to establish an independent inquiry in Australia_(
9
l 
Apparently he feared that the appointment of a commission would be 
interpreted as an admission that something was amiss in a system he 
was defending·. In fact, Cabinet sought to avoid any invest}..ci"' 
which would cause a conflict of opinion between the b_aykr'...-
l 
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public, but the government's statements failed to pacify the large 
group of supporters who had responded most favourably to Scullin's 
promises. The resulting demands for an investigation which were 
communicated to Lyons by Labor sympathizers and members of the public 
were not easily cast aside. For example, the ANA informed George 
Pearce, the Minister for External. Affairs and Territories, who 
supported the idea of a Royal Commission, of its resolution asking the 
government to establish such a commission.('lO) The Legislative 
Assembly of ~lestern Australia, moreover, u.rged a similar investigation. 
By publicizing banking issues and public opinion, the media played 
a part in bringing about the creation of the Royal Commission. On 
9 August 1934, at the beginning of the election campaign, The Age 
advocated the appointment of a Royal Commission on banking, explain-
ing that certain unique features of the monetary system merited 
examination; a commission would be able to suggest ways of making 
the financial system more effective and responsive to changing 
circumstances; 
... the Government can hardly ignore the grip 
the matter now has on the public miAd. Men 
and women are groping for light amid the 
intellectual mist created by the mass of assertions 
and contradictions, criticisms and refutations, 
exact statistics and vague theories with which not 
only Australia, but the whole world, seems at 
present inundated. 
In such circumstances, the Federal Ministry has 
[the] opportunity to render the Australian people 
a valuable national service. It should at once 
make [the} offer to appoint a Roya 1 Commission for the 
purpose of a comprehensive and intimate inquiry 
into all phases of the nation's banking and 
monetary system. Such an offer would meet with 
general and even grateful acceptance by a great 
body of the Australian people, for these are 
;"'· 
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questions about which they are now greatly 
concerned, and about which many modestly feel 
they are extremely ill-informed. They are in 
no mood for precipitate action or revolutionary 
experiment. But, having regard to the tangled 
mass of thought and theory in which the question 
has become enmeshed, they feel a need for some 
independent and authoritative pronouncement. (11) 
In spite of these forces for action, some opponents of a 
Royal Commission downplayed the idea of clarifying the issues which 
were being discussed, saying the request for an inquiry was a covert 
attack on the system and existing institutions. In retaliation, 
Lyons, who was backed by the opinions of those groups who opposed the 
idea of interference with the monetary system, defended the banking 
system which, he claimed, had served Australia well during the 
Depression. He drew on the support of such groups as the United 
Bank Officers Association, which affirmed that the private banks 
continued existence\12) 
opposed nationalization as a direct threat to their 
On 11 May 1934, the Associated Chambers of Commerce also voiced 
apprehension at the prospect of an inquiry.(l 3) Yet, although the 
government was not receptive to the idea of a colnmission at the 
commencement of the election campaign, growing public agitation-and, 
more importantly, the influence of the Country Party, apparently 
induced Cabinet to review the government's attitude towards an 
. . . l 3 (14) invest1gat1on as early as August 19 4. 
The Role of the Country Party 
vJhile the Labor Party was 
the banks, both before 
Country Party (CP) had also 
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before the election. For many years it had reflected the discontent 
of its farmer constituency with the private banks. In 1925, the 
Treasurer, Earle Page, later Sir Earle Page, drew up the Commonwealth 
Bank (Rural Credits) Act which was aimed at assisting farmers. 
Responding to the farming communitY.'s increasingly strong demands for 
reform of the banking system, the Party continued to promise fanners 
both finance and debt relief. Proposals by the Party for the 
appointment of a Royal Commission on banking were discussed as early 
as March 1934, when the Oaylesford Branch of the CP held a conference 
at which a resolution was passed requesting the federal government to 
appoint a Royal Commissi.on to inquire into the monetary and banking 
systems in general,· and the_ long-term interest rate position in 
particular. On 30 August 1934, Page, leader of the 'Party, proposed 
to establish an independent committee of economic experts to examine 
the financial structure and to report on the validity of various 
theories of finance and credit. (l 5) 
Page's intentions were positive, but there was little chance 
of bringing pressure ·to bear on the government as long as his pa-_cty 
was excluded from governing the country. The turning point was, 
in fact, the formation of the UAP-CP coalition on 9 November 1934, 
which enabled Page and ot11er party members to use their newly acquired 
leverage to fulfill their desire to establish a banking inquiry. 
After realizing that the outcome of the general election of 1934 
precluded the UAP from controlling the House without the support of 
the CP, Lyons was eventually forced to make concessions to that 
Party in order to secure its participation in a coalition. Not 
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only did the UAP succumb .to Page's demands for greater Cabinet 
representation, which included the deputy prime ministership, and 
tariff reform, but it seems that Lyons was pressured into making 
a promise to establish a banking investigation as a further 
condition of CP participation in a coalition government. 
There is much evidence to suggest that the CP only gradually 
For example, 
persuaded the government to accept its conditions. 
it is evident in Hansard that on 1 November 1934, during the Address-
in-Reply to the Governor-General's speech, an inquiry was clearly 
on the minds of the CP and the issue was discussed during numerous 
During the ensuing 
midnight negotiations between Lyons and Page. 
debate, several members coITmented on the private negotiations that 
Scullin criticized the government for not 
of a banking investigation, and he, together 
were taking place. 
mentioning the issue 
with F.M. Forde and J.A. Beasley, agreed that unless the government 
immediately, it would never live down its 
appointed a commission 
The fact that an inquiry.was not mentioned in 
policy of inaction. 
Forde maintained that 
the election, the pending formation of a coalition was mel lov1ing 
desire for reform, and causing it to fall silent on the matter. 
H.K. Nock, a member of the CP, confirmed the existence of political 
manoeuvering when he replied, "not at all." 
Interestingly enough, 
members of the CP and government supporters, especially the members 
of Cabinet, did not engage in this discussion on the banking issue. 
18 
Forde accused the CP of altering its policy to obtain greater 
Cabinet representation and, thus, lacking the courage to stand up 
in the House to urge the immediate establishment of an inquiry. 
The relative silence of the CP strongly suggests, however., that 
Lyons and Page were just about to conclude the details of an 
agreement concerning the banking_ issue. 
When the CP finally entered a coalition government with 
the UAP, Page became Minister for Corrunerce and Deputy Prime Minister, 
with Tom Paterson as Minister of the Interior, and J.A.J. Hunter 
and Vic Thorby as Assistant Ministers. Once the coalition was 
formed, Lyons effectively lost the option of avoiding an investigat 
ion into the banking and monetary systems: To maintain a public 
impression of unity within the coalition, he was forced to yield to 
the strong pressure that was exerted not only by the strong CP 
elements in Cabinet but also by other government supporters. Page's 
personal influence in the appointment of a commission cannot be 
over-emphasized. It will b~ recalled that Page was involved in 
alterations to the banking system in the 1920s: He was both ah 
uncompromising and determined party leader, possessing an extra-
ordinary ability to carry his ideas through Cabinet. It appears that 
as one of Lyons' main assistants in the framing of policy, his voice 
in banking affairs was decisive. On 8 April 1935, he confessed 
that "no one has done as much to carry out any election promises 
he has made as I have during my ~ihole career." (l 6) 
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·Lyons ·changes ·His'Mind 
Stil i, as the election ca(llpa}gn progresse·d, it would appear that 
Lyons' attitude towards a financial inquiry also underwent something 
of a change. He became convinced that a statement regarding the 
possibility of setting up an inquiry was necessary in view of 
growing public and political support for an investigation and 
the publicity that the issue was attracting. The media revealed 
that people were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the 
government's determination to accept the existing monetary and 
banking systems. On 20 August 1934, The Age criticized the 
government's delay in establishing a commission, drawing attention 
to the increasing number of UAP and CP politicians who were 
becoming favourably disposed to the idea:-
The Government will be gravely lacking in election 
strategy if it fails to take such action. It is 
significant that the leading rival parties have 
given assurances that such [an] investigation will be 
made. The Government cannot be blind to the fact 
that many U.A.P. and U.C.P. candidates are giving 
their personal pledge that, if elected, their vote 
will be cast in favour of a Royal Commission being 
appointed. Ministers are doing themselves an 
injustice in maintaining an attitude that is 
mentally obscurantist and seems politically 
obstructive. (17) 
Against this background, Lyons stated on 25 August 1934 
that the Ministry would not object to establishing an inquiry into 
a specific aspect of the monetary system if a majority of the 
members of the new House of Representatives desired such an 
. . . (18) invest1gat1on. He recalled that during the last Parliament, 
W .M. Hughes, the former Prime Minister, had brought to his attention 
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a request by the London Chamber of Commerce to the· British 
government that there should be a further study of the British 
monetary system. Hughes had suggested that the Commonwealth 
government might institute a similar inquiry. In this statement, 
and again on 13 September 1934, Lyons said that while he saw no 
reason for an investigation, the government would, if Parliament 
wished, arrange for a banking i~quiry to be held.(l 9) Hence, 
when he was re-elected, it was believed by many that an investigat-
ion would be conducted; however, there was considerable delay before 
the government finally announced that a Royal Commission would 
be established. Some people, such as H.V. Hodson, believed that 
the electoral success· of the government removed a great deal of 
the political urgency from the problem of relations between the 
government and the banks and, consequently, public interest in 
the issue would wane; however, it is likely that the public 
became even more concerned with banking matters~ZO)More importantly, 
The Sydney Morning Herald and The Argus, by reflecting the bankers' 
attitude and clearly supporting the existing system, enabled 
the government to procrastinate due to tile apparent weight of -
opposition to reform. The Al'fi"S opposed a banking inquiry and 
feared the serious repercussions that an investigation might have. 
On 27 September 1934, it explained that during such an investigat-
ion there was likely to be much uncertainty, which would have an 
adverse effect on business activity. (Zl) Such an inquiry would 
not only be costly, but futile. It added that "one of the 
strongest reasons against holding an inquiry is that the only kind 
of inquiry that would be of any value wou 1 d be unacceptab 1 e 
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to those who have asked for it. " On 16 October 1934, The 
HeraZd published a statement by J.B. Pease, Chairman of Lloyd's 
Bank, in which he applauded the sanity of the Australian people 
who had not allowed banking policy to become a political question. 
It, also, seemed to represent the ~nterests of the banks by 
printing statements by various ban~nagers, such as Ernest 
O'Sullivan, Chairman of the Associated~Banks of Victoria> 22 ) 
Yet the press served to maintain keen public interest in 
banking issues. It is not surprising, therefore, that when the 
new Parliament convened on 23 October 1934, J.A.J. Hunter, of the 
CP, placed a motion on the notice paper which indicated his support 
for the establishment of a Royal Commission on banking to investigate 
the internal and international aspects of the system, and make 
recommendations that would assist trade and industry and reduce 
unemployment. Although Lyons stated that he would arrange an 
appropriate time for a discussion of the motion, no action was taken! 23 ) 
It was expected that proposals for an inquiry w9uld be discussed in 
Parliament during the following weeks. But.when Hunter was appojnted 
an assistant Minister, he sought leave in the House of Representatives 
to 1~ithdraw the motion to meet with parliamentary procedure. Labor 
membe;s, however, did not grant the leave required, but when the 
notice finally came before the House for discussion, Hunter was 
absent and so the motion lapsed. 
Be that as it may, there was considerable discussion of 
the banking system in the House of Representatives in the months 
following the election. Some of the government members and many 
>\. 
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other government supporters expressed the desirability of both an 
investigation and banking and monetary reform; M.V. McCall, of 
the UAP, for example, acknowledged on 31 October 1934 that the 
monetary system could be improved~ 24 ) Members of the House 
were never called upon to vote on the matter, but the attitude 
of many of them towards Hunter's. motion revealed widespread support 
On 6 December 1934, Scullin asked Lyons for such an examination. 
in Parliament whether the government intended to establish a 
committee of inquiry into banking. Lyons replied that an investigat-
ion would be conducted if Parliament demanded. Forde, of the Labor 
Party, remarked how very actively the CP had campaigned for a 
commission. The Pr1me Minister acknowledged that the CP would 
probably continue to be active, the matter would receive consideration 
by the Ministry, and a statement about an examination would be made 
at an early dateS 25 l Yet once again, Lyons appears to have stalled 
for time. 
Before the end of 1~34, John McEwen, of the Country Party, 
tabled a notice of motion for the appointment of a Royal Commission 
on banking, which some people believed was inspired by a leading 
Cabinet Minister. (26 ) As McEwen later explained in a speech to 
the House of Representatives on 11 April 1935, when proposing 
terms of reference. for the Commission, a large proportion of the 
electors had indicated a desire for some 
least for an inquiry into the system. 
radical change, or at 
Many doubted whether 
the .;System had kept pace with social evolution and industrial 
change, claiming that the banking system was "either wholly or 
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partly responsible for our present cond~tion. Some believe that 
I 
the system is fundamentally wrong, while· others maintain that it 
has merely lagged behind our industrial progress. If it is wrong, 
the sooner we establish the right system, or improve the existing 
one, the better for us all -~( 27 ) Numerous expressions of doubt 
concerning the system were also being voiced by financial and 
economic experts and, thus, he believed an investigation was even 
more necessary. The motion as initially tabled by McEwen in 
December 1934 was subsequently challenged on 14 December 1934 by 
McCall, who proposed an amendment to the terms of reference suggested 
by McEwen. These proposals, however, were not debated, as 
Parliament soon after went into recess. The Herald reported that 
there were indications that the Ministry intended to set up a committee 
during the recess~ 2B) Cabinet, hOl~ever, was still undecided on 
the issue, and no announcement was made. Several reasons for this 
indecision can be advanced. First, the Commonwealth Bank did not 
encourage the government to act, as it lacked a~y strong feelings one 
way or another on whether a commission should be appointed. ~lthough 
it made no decision as to whether an inquiry should be set up, and 
played no formal part in the government's decision to hold an inquiry, 
some Board members favoured the creation of a committee, while others 
did not. In an interview with the author Sil" Leslie l·\elville, who· 
was the Economist to the Commonwealth Bank, revealed that Sir Claude 
Reading, Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank Board of Directors, was 
not enthusiastic about the idea, and generally opposed it. (zg) He 
tended to fear any interference with the existing system. On the 
other hand, Melville himself backed the proposal wholeheartedly, 
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be1 ieving that stro.nger central bank powers were essential. Coombs 
also noted in a personal interview that the Bank was not really an 
initiator of the Royal Comrnission.(30) Supporting the idea only 
reluctantly, the Bank came to believe that an examination of the 
system was appropriate, expressed its viewpoint, and then went along 
with the government's announcement. Second, even Roland Wilson, 
later Sir Roland Wilson, Economic Adviser to the Treasury and 
Commonwealth Statistician at the time, provided no impetus to govern-\ 
ment decision-making on the issue, as he was neither dedicated to, nor\ 
actively opposed to such a study. (3ll Thirdly, and most importantly, 
it seems that Lyons delayed the official announcement of an inquiry 
as a response to pressure applied by the private banks, which 
deplored any inv~stigation of, and interference in, their affairs. 
Again, in an interview with the author, Melville said that while the 
bankers did not use any special tactics to influence the government, 
certain individuals had influential contacts with various Members 
of Parliament and Ministers. (3Z) Such links between the Lyons 
Government and the banking community were, incidentally, not lightly 
set aside as financial interests carried considerable weight ir1Lyons' 
mind. The United Bank Officers Association ·revealed its position 
towards the question of an investigatory committee when it was 
reported in The Sydney Moraing Hernld on 13 December 1934 and again 
on 21 December 1934, as opposing the idea .( 33 ) The Australasian 
Insurance and Banking Record thought it was "difficult to see that 
any good purpose 1~oul d be served by the appointment of a Royal 
. . "(34) Cornm1ss1on. It appears that the bankers felt that an invest-
igation would open the viay for changes in the system and might threaten 
25 
their interests and present operations. from the bankers' view-
( 
point, the decision to hold an examination ~ffectively assumed what 
a commission would try to prove: The fact that an inquiry might 
occur insinuated that serious faults existed in the system. On 
21 December 1934, The Australasian Insurance and Banking Record 
reprinted statements made by E.H. Wreford, Chief Manager of the 
National Bank, concerning proposals for a banking investigation. 
He did not understand the reasons for an operation which might reduce 
confidence in the banking system, and this development could not be 
risked. He said there seemed to be a mania for Royal Commissions, 
adding that "it was all very harassing to honest business men who 
simply asked to be allowed to carry onl:treir lawful occupations 
. h . "(35 ) h d h f th wit out any undue interferencG. He ope , t ere ore, at 
Parliament would meddle as little as possible with banking. As 
late as 21 January 1935, The Australasian Insurance and Banking 
d h · · d d( 36 ) Af M" . Recor stated t at an inquiry was not nee e . ter the in1stry 
announced on 19 February 1935 that a Royal Cornrnis;ion would be 
appointed, The Melbourne lleraLd.published the following statemeri_t by 
'G.b· .. Healy, Superintendent of the Bank of. Australasia and O'Sullivan's 
~}' successor as Chairman of the Associated Banks of Victoria: 
-~;:·~ . 
'· '':\ \.::...A;-) No commissi?n at all woul? be the best arrangement. .. 
··· / ;rJ 1After a 11, 1 f any Austra 11 an system has weathered the 
~ V" J;Jf~ bad times, our banking system has, mag111f1cently. In 
.E \' ~' J ~ed Au~9-~ (37) \ \ 
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I _ '\L~\\., a sense, it is not too much to say that the banks r~ - Even as late as January 1935, however, some Ministers still 
lj.l\ -., .. :~ "· .'~~" ,,;~ opposed the appointment of a commission as a waste of public money, but, accordi·ng to The HeraLd, they admitted that a degree of 
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financial reform m.ight be introduced, or at least the idea of reform 
should be debated! 38 ) The Age reported that party leaders, many 
of the successful candidates of the UAP, and public bodies, such as 
. . . 1 (39) the ANA, were expressing increasing support for the proposa . 
McCall, for example, on 23 January 1935, asked the government what 
steps had been taken towards the .creation of a Royal Commission_(40) 
Cabinet, however, remained in a quandery. Casey's papers reveal 
that, by 22 January, nothing definite had been decided on the issue 
of whether or not a Royal Commission should be created, as the matter 
had not yet been raised for practical consideration_( 4l) Cabinet was 
apparently impressed by the fact that McCalls amendment to McEwen's 
notice of motion would induce some parliamentary action before 
Parliament went into recess. But Cabinet had still not made a 
decision by 12 February 1935, and The Labor Daily suggested on 19 
February that some of the most influential Cabinet Ministers strongly 
disapproved of the idea of establishing any examination whatever, 
on the grounds that the Labor Party would be able to use the results 
of an inquiry to its advantag~ during the next e,"ections.( 42 ) There 
may be some element of truth in this statement, in view of Lyons' 
defense of the system and Casey's admission to S.M. Bruce, .Australia's 
High Commissioner in London, in September 1935 that he was rather 
'horrified' at first by the prospect of an investigation. (43 l 
The forces making for change, however, eventually 
outweighed those causing postponement of action. As one of many 
pro-inquiry pressures, pubJ.i c unrest, which vias often conveyed through 
the media, appears to have influenced the government's thinking. 
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On 20 October lg35, Ca~,ey publicly stated that the Commission had 
been set up to satisfy a certain number of critics' and to see 
whether or not they were correct~44 ) He added that it was not 
created because "the Government suspected any 'underhand work'. 
would be useful even if it only showed whether or not the present 
It 
systems could be improved ... (45 ) In a draft outline of "Notes for 
the Commonwealth Bank Bill", which was drawn up in lg38, he explained 
that the Commi·ssion was appointed because banking affected everyone 
. . (46) 
and it was desirable to be assured of the soundness of the system. 
Apart from these belated explanations for the establishment of the 
inquiry, the government did.not give any fonnal justification for 
its change in attitude and would not admit that supporters of all 
parties doubted the adequacy of the system. Without waiting for 
Parliament to rea-~semble and debate the issue, Lyons decided to submit 
the proposal for an investigation to the Cabinet which met on 28 
January 1935. It seems that he and any other opponents of change 
in Cabinet were no longer able to withstand the political pressures 
thlt were applied by each party, especially the ~p which, it will be 
rtalled, was making strong criticisms and demands for action within 
the Ministry. In interviews with the author, both Coombs and · 
M lville agreed that political forces eventually assumed priority II\\ \V/J_; 
o/er the considerations of the banks~ 47 l Lyons seems to have 
rLalized that evasion would no longer suffice in view of mounting 
parliamentary requests for the appointment of an investigating 
lady. He was persuaded that it was time for everyone to gain a 
/better understanding of the system and that a thorough examination 
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might reveal directions in which improvements could be made. On 
20 February 1935, The Age revealed that "in recent months members 
of all political parties have made it plain to Mr Lyons that 
Par.liament would demand the inquiry, and without waiting for 
Parliament to discuss the question, thereby incurring unnecessary 
.. '(48) delay, Cabinet has agreed that it should proceed." The 
minutes of the Cabinet meeting of 18 February 1935 indicate that 
Cabinet, and Menzies in particular, feared that a majority of 
Members of Parliament might support the establishment of a Royal 
Commission and thus it was decided to announce the following day 
that the government would appoint a commiss·ion, rather than a 
parliamentary committee, to investigate the Australian banking and 
monetary systems. As the mi nut es record: 
Proposed Banking Commission - Prime Minister says 
all parties committed to it. AG [Attorney-General] 
agrees, but says it will not be possible to get a 
High Court Judge as Chairman and Commission cannot 
therefore be selected before Prime Minister 1 eaves 
for England and hostile motion in the House must 
be anticipated and therefore agreement ought to 
announce definitely that a commission 'would be 
appointed - Agreed. (49) 
It is likely that the Cabinet Ministers realized that 
by making an announcement, they would no l anger be required to 
comment upon monetary and banking issues, or answer any questions 
relating to such matters. Any attempts by the Opposition to put 
the government on the spot could be countered by statements such 
as "the experts will be more qualified to deal with and ·explain such 
matters." Wreford himself believed the Royal Commission was set up as 
an expedient to satisfy Labor and CP politicians who had attacked the 
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banks, (50) 
idea at first, 
Even Casey, who was not very en thus i as tic about the • 
resigned himself to the holding of an inquiry, and 
told S.M. Bruce on 30 September 1935 
possibly do some good. 11 ( 51) 
that the Royal Conunission "may 
even 
The.Personnel ·of.the·Royal Collili1ission'anct·rts ·rerrns ·of'Reference 
Cabinet's decision was reported immediately in detail in 
most newspapers and in the financial press, including The Age, 
The Sydney Morning Herald, The AustraZ.asian Insurance and Banking 
Record, The Labor Dail~, and The MeZ.bourn.e Herald, though The 
Argus mistakingly claimed that the form of inquiry had not yet 
been decided. ( 52 ) Accardi ng to ·The ?-Je, the Ministry had 
finally recognized that the wish for an examination came from 
"-conscientious citizens ·searching for causes of weaknesses, remedies, 
and truth amidst discontent, fallacies, and manifold difficulties. (
53
) 
On 20 February 1935, The Age added that the announcement had 
received approval in industrial, political, and financial circ~s. (54 l 
Once the government had committed itself, many Members of 
Parliament desired to have some part in the final selection of the 
Commissioners and the terms of reference. Various names viere 
canvassed in the House of Representatives, and attempts we1·e 
made to in.fl uence the government's dee is ion; Lyons, however, 
sought at every opportunity to confirm Cabinet's responsibility. (s5) 
', 
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The time lag of nearly eight months which occurred between 
Cabinet's resolution to appoint a Commission in February 1935 and the 
actual announcement of the Commissioners and terms of reference in 
October 1935, was unique in itself. Cabinet members took considerable 
time to decide both the personnel and terms of reference of the 
Royal Commission, perhaps because. the Ministry itself chose the difficult 
task of selecting the most appropriate Chairman and number of suitable 
Commissioners. The Labor Daily claimed on 19 February that 
Cabinet had agreed to shelve the issue while Lyons was overseas and 
to pending elections in three States. C56 l But it seems clear, 
however, from the Cabinet minutes of 18 February, that the selection 
of the Commission was held up because an unbiased Chairman could not 
be located before Lyons' departure: Acting perhaps on the advice of 
the banks and a section of the business community, Casey suggested the 
appointment of a High Court Judge, preferably Justice Dixon, who could 
be considered impartial. This could not be arranged, however, and 
Cabinet did not have time to find a suitable alternative. C57 l The 
absence of other Cabinet members over the period "from April to August 
also meant that the details of important issue·s could not be pr&perly 
settled. Parliament was, moreover, effectively out of action at 
this time, as some of the most senior Ministers were overseas. C5s) 
On 20 February, The J'..ge reported that the personnel and 
terms of reference would not be finalized until after Lyons returned 
from abroad in September, at which time the inquiry would proceed 
almost immediately'.( 59 ) It was revealed in The Mel,bourne Heral.d 
and The Canberra Times, however, that the terms of reference would 
::,.;:;. 
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(60) 
be drafted during Lyons' absence. In any event, the pr,epara-
tion of the terms of reference required careful consideration: They 
had to be wider in scope and more comprehensive than just an appraisal 
of the value of one monetary system compared with another if the 
resulting recommendations were to carry conviction. On 20 February, 
The Age quoted Lyons as sayi1ng the inquiry would possibly be 
conducted along lines similar to the Macmillan Committee of enquiry 
into the British monetary system. (61 ) In addition, the actual 
process of designating Commissioners was time-consuming, as many 
prospective candidates were not available, or were unwilling to 
offer their services. Cabinet had to choose the Commissioners 
carefully to ensure that the public would have complete faith in 
their impartiality. The government sought as much as possible to 
appoint members who were not associated with banking institutions. 
It seems the CP was influential in this decision. A.C. Davidson, 
\Genera T Manager of the Bank of New South Wa 1 es , would have been 
:\~\ruled out because he was a 1 eadi ng banker and personality whose 
··!ties with the government were perhaps too close'. Australia's 
shortage of economists posed a problem v;hen the Ministry 
attempted to select men who had not been involved in recent policy 
controversies. D.B. Copland, for example, was probably considered 
. to be too 8 to the government, and he had been prominent in the 
financial debates during the Depression. Perl1aps more relevant 
"' 
is the fact that he was abroad at this time, though this fails to 
explain \'/hy he did not submit any written evidence. The names 
of other prominent men, such as E.C. Dyason, a Melbourne stock and 
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share broker, were also mentioned in the press; however, according 
to The Labor Dail.y, Cabinet was "afraid of political repercussions 
if any of these are entrusted with the commission. ,,(G2) 
Part of the delay was due, moreover, to the government's 
attempts to appoint a Chairman from overseas who was not only free 
from any controversy surrounding the subject, but also knowledgeable 
of Australian conditions. Casey spoke to Sir Claude Reading of 
the Commonwealth Bank Board in mid-January regarding the personnel 
of the Commission and asked him to submit a list of names for 
consideration. Reading favoured the selection of a foreign 
11'.hairman, "somebody from the other side of the world of well known 
repute and abi1ity°."( 53 l He listed his choices in order of prefer-
ence: R.H. Brand, who had been a member of the Macmillan Commit.tee 
in England; Lord-Macmillan himself; D.H. Robertson, a lecturer 
in Economics at Cambridge University; Bertil Ohlin, a widely known 
Swedish economist; O.W.M. Sprague, formerly Economic Adviser to 
the Bank of England; and Edwin Kemmerer, an Ameri'can with a sol id 
financial background. He indicated his preference for Macmillan 
over an American or a Swede if Brand was unable to accept the 
invitation: "It will probably be much more possible to get him 
[Macmillan] than to get No.l. If he was appointed it would be 
advisable to give him some sound economist to assist him." Reading 
apparently believed Brand and Macmillan would make the right decisions 
so far as the Bank was concerned. He hoped the government would 
choose wisely, adding that the Commissions' recommendations might 
mean radical changes in the Bank. Casey then asked Bruce to 
,.n ·-"'"i·" 
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make enquiries and report back on Oh.l in. On 25 February, Casey 
informed Bruce that he had a particularly good impression of Ohlin, 
"until I got your cable praising him with faint damns": On the one 
hand, Ohlin was criticized for writing in the press too often, but 
on the other hand, he was described 
and objective Swedish economist~64 ) 
as possibly the most level-headed 
At a 11 events·, Casey seems· to 
have excluded him from further consideration. 
Likewise, despite 
nomination of one Cabinet sought the 
assertions by the press that 
or more British authorities, Casey did not think that a British 
"except possibly Lord Macmi1lan Chairman would be acceptable, 
if we could get him. ,,( 55 ) Lyons 
himself and I expect it is doubtful 
that, during his absence, every effort 
continued to tell the press 
would be made by the a·cti ng ·Prime Minister to find a competent 
Australian Chairman, yet it is very likely that he approached Macmillan 
during his visit to London in the hope of securing his services 
·as Chairman.(55) It appears, however, that Macmillan declined the 
offer, due to the demands of his legal commitments, and, subsequently, 
the government decided to appoint an .C\ustra1 ian' as head of the 
Royal Commission, thus putting to an end reports that Lyons woold 
recruit overseas experts to undertake the investigation. 
Similarly, the private bankers, not easily discouraged 
by the official decision to establish the Commission, sought to 
bring p~ssure to bear upon Lyons regarding the membership and 
the number of Commissioners to be chosen.. ~n fact it ~eems thaJ 
pressure applied by the banks was a contnbutrng factor in the 
delayed announcement of the personnel and terms of reference. __... 
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Apparently Cabinet believed at one stage that three members would 
be sufficient: The ·press stated that Cabinet favoured the selection 
of an impart1al Chairman from abroad and two Australian members, 
one representing Labor and the other representing industry. The 
bankers, on the other hand, desired more than three Commissioners 
and joined several business representatives from Sydney and 
Melbourne in advocating the appointment of a member of the Australian 
judiciary as Chairman. In February 1935, The Australasian Insurance 
and Banking Record, reflecting the viewpoint of the bankers, stressed 
the desirability of at least five Commissioners and questioned the 
advisability of a foreigner filling the Chair. (6?) After the 
Mi·nistry revealed its intention to initiate an investigation, Healy 
indicated that the Associated Banks of Victoria disliked the idea 
of a British Chairman. To him, "the chairman should be a man with 
a close knowledge of Australian conditions .... [and] an English 
banker without knowledge of our peculiar conditions would be a 
futile appointee. Secondly, three is too small a number: The 
commission s hou 1 d be composed of at least five ~embers. " ( 6B l _The 
bankers naturally hoped to have as many bankers or representati·ves 
sympathetic to their interests as possible on the Commission. On 
several occasions, the United Bank Officers Association asked Lyons 
to designate a representative of the Association_( 59 l In August 
1935, The Argus and the Herald stated that Cabinet was likely to 
take cognizance of the qualities of three men: Sir Osborne Smith, 
Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Sir Lennon Raws, Vice-
Chairman and Managing Di rector of lmperia 1 Chemi ca 1 lndustri es of 
Austra1 ta and New Zealand Ltd., and W. vJarren Kerr, Chairman of 
·~-·;.Poi.:-
35 
Commissioners of the State Savings Bank of Victoria~JO) Again, 
the bankers criticized this selection. Davidson quite explicitly 
opposed the engagement of anyone who was associated with the Bank 
of England or who was pursuing overseas business interests. He 
asserted that Raws, Kerr,and especially Smith, were unsuitable and, 
hence, there would be no respect for a committee containing such 
men Fl) The bankers' reasons for v:anting suitable representation 
were obvious; not so clear was their wish that there should be 
more than three Commissioners. Perhaps they aimed to reduce the 
likelihood of strong consensus in order to diminish the impact of 
the Commission's recommendations. As it turned out, Lyons appears 
to have realized that an unbalanced Commission could have unfavour-
able political repercussions. It might also be suggested that the 
preservation of unity within the coalition, particularly in the eyes 
of the public, required deliberative consideration of the choice of 
personnel. After eight months of intermittent bickering, the 
fi na 1 compromise was decided upon: The government was content 
with its choice of supposedly unbiased men, and the bankers seemed 
satisfied with a Commission of s.ix Australians. 
Political problems encountered within Cabinet itself 
would also help to account for the late announcement of the personnel 
and terms of reference. Even after Casey finally submitted a 
roster of names of proposed Commissioners to Cabinet on 20 
September, the matter was referred to a Sub-Committee of Cabinet 
which represented both CP and UAP interests and, consequently, an 
immediate decision was not forthcoming. For. the most part, Lyons 
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and the UAP supporters were searching for a group of men who they 
believed would not be critical of the government, and therefore 
"safe" with respect to the government's public esteem. Thus . 
Casey took keen interest in, and may have been persuaded by McCall'~ 
remarks concerning the public's opinion of prospective Commissioners~ 
On 17 September 1935, McCall had said that the appointments of ·-
Smith, Raws, and Kerr would receive a very unfavourable public 
reception from all sections of the community: 
rendering abortive any conclusions at which the 
Commission may arrive ... Time has proved the 
financial authorities in Australia were right 
and experts overseas LSir Otto Neimeyer, Professor 
Gregory, and Sir Ernest Harvey] wrong .. . The 
appointment. of Sir Osborne Smith would be looked 
upon as an indirect appointment from the Bank of 
Engl and reviving controversy,. charging the Bank of 
England with dominating Australian financial 
affairs... 1 think it would be better to abandon 
the idea of a Commission than to hold one which 
would produce political repercussions and unsatis-
factory results generally. (72) 
He believed that an Australian Commission would be useful in helping 
to tone down many of the calls for reform, expl9ining that an 
"Australian Corr.mission comprised of men with .liberal views.on 
economics and banking would be acceptable to the majority and 1·1ould 
materially assist in changing the views of many who are inclined to 
favour the discontinuance of the present system."( 73 ) The CP,on \ 
the other hand, 1-1as motivated by the voices of its constituents to J 
advocate the selection of a group of men who were more critical of 
the existing system. And the Labor Party, which disliked the 
idea of a foreign Chairman, would. no doubt have made requests similar 
to those of the CP. 
,-~~;····· 
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Despite a 11 the forces maki.ng for delay, the. govern-
nt embarked on the final stages of deliberation towards the end of 
At this time The Age reminded the government that it 
·wed a significant proportion of its general election majority to 
th.e understanding that a Commission would be established if 
arliament requested it, and urged Cabinet to announce immediately 
.the p~rsonnel and terms of reference. (?4) On 2 September, one 
week after Cabinet formally resumed work, The Age asked the 
. Ministry to make the terms of reference as wide as possible, and 
./! 
to secure the services of competent, open-minded, and representative 
-··Australians. (? 5) While the pressure exerted by the media cannot 
, be overlooked, it merely reflected the views of various people and 
organizations that were communicating directly with the government 
and the Treasury. Indeed, it appears that the CP and its 
supporters made a strong impression on Casey and H. Sheehan, Secr~tary 
to the Treasury, who were deeply engaged in preparing a draft of 
the terms of reference and a list of personnel . 
-/ 
Although Casey and Sheehan devoted a considerable amount 
of time to the preparation of the terms of reference, perhaps even 
more time and effort was spent in determining the Commission's 
personnel. By early September, however, tl1e selection process 
was in its final stages, and the names of many recommended men had 
been scratched. While it was impossible to suit everyone, Casey 
was looking for a group of commonsense Australians who would 
gain the confidence of the public as "outside appointments to 
the Commission would rev'erse the objects we're trying to achieve."(76) 
-") 
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Casey told Sheehan that since the services of a High Court Judge could~·_! 
not be obtained for the position of Chairman, he favoured the appoint-/.: 
.; 
ment of L.F. Giblin, Ritchie Professor of Economics at the University'l!i 
of Melbourne. Although Casey recognized that Giblin ''could.aemirably. 
l.; fill the position", it seems that he was not chos.en because he was !/\ 
regarded as being too close to the Commonwealth Bank and the govern- I\ 
( 77 ) It . l . k l th t h . . . . . ment. 1s 1 e y, moreover, a 1s part1c1pat1on in 
banking controversies, and the subsequent publicity which his views had 
received, ruled out his nomination. Casey then decided that a 
Supreme Court Judge would best fit the bill of a neutral Chairman. 
engagement of a man with suitable qualifications proved difficult The 
and time-consuming, however, and thi:s also accounts for a large part of 
the delay in the announcement of the personnel of the Commission. 
Even though H.S. Nicholas, a 
to accept the invitation, he 
N.S.W. Supreme Court Justice, was unable 
suggested the appointment of H.D. Macrossan, 
a Justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland, J.M. Napier, who had 
become a Puisne Judge of the South Australian Supreme Court in 1924, 
or E.A. Douglas, a Just·'ice of, the Supreme Court of Queensland. He 
believed that Macrossan was probably more admi'red and competent-:__than 
Napier, who was, nevertheless, a "good man". Douglas was described 
as a conservative judge with business experience.(78) 
In making his 
and Douglas but replaced Macrossan with list, Casey included Napier 
John Davidson, a N.S.YJ. Supreme Court Justice. 
that on 20 September, a roster of names was referred 
It wi 11 be rec a 11 ed 
Sub-Committee which consisted 
to a Cabinet 
of Lyons, Page, Casey, and Senator A.J. 
Mclachlan (UAP), who was Postmaster-General 
and Minister in Charge of 
Scientific and Industrial Research. As late as Development and 
~.;.--~,_,.,,,., 
3g 
30 September, however, Casey informed Bruce that although the process 
of selecting the Commissioners was nearing an end, the Sub-Committee 
was finding it very difficult to get ·a "decent" judge as Chairman. (79 l 
As for the other members of the inquiry, Casey set out to 
locate a reputable academic economist, a public accountant to represent 
the business corrrrnuni ty of Me 1 bourne, and one representative each 
from the rural sector and the Labor Party. Casey probably decided 
to include a Labor man partly in an effort to satisfy Labor's demands, 
and partly to ward off accusations that the inquiry was "rigged". 
Initially, he considered the appointment q!._S'.:E. Martin, the Lang 
Party representative for Orange and a member of the previous Labor 
Government, but the name of Ben Chi fl ey of New South \!lales, who 
had been Minister for Defence in the Scu11in .Government, appeared 
several times in discussions and was ultimately chosen instead. 
Chifley had lost his seat in Parliament at the 1931 general 
elections, and it is likely that it was Scullin who first proposed 
him as a Commissioner. He had always been invblved in working 
class politics and public affairs in New South Wales and was -:_ 
interested and self-educated in the theory of money and government. 
finance. Casey and other government supporters may have favoured 
his appointment because they believed he v1as a more moderate Laboi-
man than the other Labor po1iticians available. The real 
significance of his appointment became evident in later years: After 
becoming a power in Federal Parliament again,. as Commonwealth Treasurer 
in 1941, he began working, in June 1944, on the form of legislation 
which would incorporate the main principles of the Royal Commission's 
Report. 
! 
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In contrast, the selection of a Country Party represen-
tative was relatively easy, as only one name was nominated. J.P. 
Abbott, pastoralist and President of the Graziers Association of 
New South Wales, was selected not only because of his dedication to 
pastoral affairs, but because Page pushed for his appointment both 
outside and within the Cabinet. Sub-Committee. lowards the end 
of 1934, the Executive of the Graziers Association obtained an 
assurance from Page that he would support Abbott's nomination in 
(80) Cabinet. Abbott himself wrote to Page on 10 January 1935, 
explaining that it was very important for the pastoral industryi 
to be represented on the inquiry, as any change in the financiai 
system would greatly affect the rural sector. (81) He then 
asserted that he was qualified to fill the position: He had 
been involved in an intensive study of Commonwealth financial matters 
over the last four years, and he believed that he could adequately 
express the views of pastoralists. On the other hand, the se 1 ect ion 
of an expert economist was somewhat more complicated. 
that Casey considered nearly all the major economists in Austr~li_a, It appears~] 
including Melville, T. Hytten, Giblin, G.L. Wood, Copland, R.C. 
Mills, F.R.E. Maulden, and J.B. Brigden, at one time or another. 
Reasons why Giblin and Copland were not nominated have already been 
suggested. As for the others, most of them, apart from Professor Mills,_.,. . .,,,,..,. 
Dean of the Economics Faculty at the University of Sydney, had explicit] 
-J; .t;•. ·.-'.•'·~·~ 
published their views on reform of the financial system. There is 
one additional factor which helps to explain whyBrigden was excluded: 
He was an economist from Queensland, and Casey may .have acted upon 
Hunter's advice that no one in Queensland was suitable enough to 
(82) 
serve on the Commission. 
41 
Casey apparently thought that Mills 
was almost unique in that he was not a self-professed advocate of 
-~eform. In this sense, he was a "safe" economist "who has not 
~ nailed his opinions to 
: others have done." (83 ) 
Sir John Phillips, the 
the mast in the press, as Practically all the 
In a personal interview with the author 
Commission's Assistant Economist who later became 
Governor of the Reserve Bank, added that Mills was chosen because 
he was a likable, fair, and gentle man. (84 ) It is very 1 ikely 
that Casey was influenced more by the fact that Mills was highly 
qualified academically to be the Commission's Economist. Before 
1936, he had been a member of several inquiries into financial and 
economic issues. He was currently the Chainnan of the Professorial 
Board at the University of Sydney, and was widely known for his 
historical and contemporary works; in addition, he was acknowledged 
as an authority on Australia's financial history, having written among 
other publications on aspects of money, monetary policy, banking, 
foreign exchange, currency, taxation, commerce, and public finance. 
Similarly, the accountant member of the Commission, E.V. Nixon,'a 
ver.y prominent and respected chartered account in Melbourne, seems to 
have been chosen because Casey felt confident that just as he had been 
an asset to the government while serving on the Royal Commission on 
Taxation, so he would aqain act in the government's interest on the 
banking inquiry. Casey himself told Bruce on 30 September 1935 
that r/ixon "did us extremely well on the Taxation Royal Commission. 
He may be Chairman if we can't get a Judge.',(85 ) And even though Alex 
Stewart, a Scottish-born accountant in Melbourne, was also considered, 
he was quickly ruled out; perhaps Casey was unconvi need that he 
... \ 
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would do a good job for the government, and he may have suspected that 
the banks would object to his Scottish background. 
Athol Lewis, 
Secretary of the Commonwealth Bank, added to Casey's doubts when he 
said that Stewart had "many and wide interests. ,,( 86 ) It seems 
moreover, that Stewart was suffering from a prolonged illness and was 
unable to accept the position. 
While it is not clear whether Casey 
suggested any specific names, it appears that the Sub-Committee 
discussed the desirability of appointing a young and active 
or some government official who had a thorough understanding of public 
administration and the financial system. 
Accordingly, at the end 
of September, the names of H.A. Pitt, Director of Finance in the 
Victorian State Treasury, and R.R. Stuckey, Director of Finance in the 
South Australian State Treasury, were reviewed. 
Page would have 
expressed his preference for Pitt, who had a strong interest in 
primary industry, having been YBnager of the Australian Wheat Board 
from 1916 to 1922; Casey,_Mclachlan, and Lyons probably went along 
with his appointment because they thought he would defend the current 
monetary and banking systems·. 
No doubt they were impressed that 
he was the Victorian State Representative on the National Debt -
Commission and was first President of the Institute of Public 
Administration (Victorian Regional Group). 
In vie1·1 of the g1,eat influence exercised by the Country 
Party, and Page in particular, during the personnel selection process, 
it was to be expected that a similar force would be brought to bear 
upon Casey and Sheehan in the determination of the terms of 
reference to be submitted to Cabinet. 
Page apparently campaigned 
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'for very broad terms of reference in response to requests for a 
comprehensive Commission by different groups of primary producers, 
such as the Australian Wheat-Growers federation. Hunter was also 
·consulted during this preparatory stage. It will be recalled that 
-he had previously introduced a motion in the House which proposed 
the desirability of conducting the Australian Commission along lines 
similar to the Canadian and British inquiries and he now took this 
further opportunity to restate his view. Although Sheehan's 
first draft was based on the ideas which were embodied in Hunter's 
motion and the terms of reference of both the Macmillan Committee and 
the New Zealand Monetary Committee, Casey apparently believed that 
this draft might unduly narrow the Commission's scope. Accardi ngly, 
he sought the advice of other members of the government, such as R.G. 
Menzies, the Attorney-General, and officials, such as Wilson who 
submitted a draft which spe~~~~aims that were broader than any 
previous terms of reference~Reading also pressed Casey to avoid 
any undue restriction of the inquiry's scope. (88 ) Hence, Sheehan 
and Casey decided to delete phrases such as "to improve the conditions 
of i·ndustry and the unemployed" and made the reference sufficiently 
general to allow the Commission to deal freely with all the truly relevant 
and important issues and aspects of banking. (sg) It might even be 
suggestc;d that Sheehan and Cnsey, who \'/ere very perturbed by Davidson's 
anti-Commonwealth Bank campaign, attempted to lay the groundwork for 
an inquiry into the issue of whether the trading banks, especially 
the Bank of New South Wales, e_xervised too much power at the expense 
of the Commonwealth Bank. Given the pressures on the government, 
together with Lyons' proc_rastination, one might have expected Cabinet 
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to reject the Treasurer's proposed draft ,)f terms of reference. This, 
'however, was not the. case, and the 
. emb.er .. ~. 9 °. J .. Even . .if..L.Yons .. teou ired 
submission was adopted on 20 Sept\::· 
somf? P.r_od\]iQq b.v Ca?ey, ;;i.,np espgciaJly 
by Page and the CP Ministers, Cabinet was very fair in giving the 
Commissioners terms of reference which allowed the greatest scope 
possible and did not attempt to limit the investigation in any way. In 
fact. a i I.those 'who -des'ired. to e?<firess 'c'rfHCi sms ~ fact~.~. ~~n~ _s.~~gesti Oh!( 
were e.Qcoura9.ed. l() __ Com_e· for~ard freely. ..!~.~.terms Of reference 
fi na} l.\-'._ a9.r.e~d .. upon w~r_e as· fo 11 ows: 
To inquire into the Monetary and Banking Systems 
at present in operation in Australia, and to 
report whether any, and if so what, alterations 
are desirable in the interests of the people of 
Australia as a whole, and the manner in which 
any such alterations should be effected. (91) 
In early October 1935, it seems that the Sub-Committee 
finally tied up loose ends with regard to the personnel issue and 
secured the services of Napier as Chairman; consequently, on ....., 
I 3 October, Lyons announced bo~h the terms of ref~rence and the I 
personnel of the Royal Commission.( 9Z) He averred that the _ 
-~· Commission would not be restricted in any way in performing its 
important task, and the government felt fortunate in engaging men of 
such high status and wide experience. The Commissioners ~1ere to 
be Napier, Nixon, Abbott, Mills, Chifley, and.Pitt. Although the 
Prime Minister had intended to assure the public that the Commissioners 
were not associated with existing banking 
ment was later deleted from the speech. 
organizations, this state-
But it was true that none 
of the six men had voiced strong views during the heated arguments 
~;-;<: - 1 
~~ll:<•·, 
45 
surrounding banking and monetary issues during the Depression, nor 
did they represent specific banking i'nterests . Nevertheless, each 
Commissioner had an interest in, knowledge of, or connexion with 
some aspect of finance and possessed a special affiliation 
public affairs. 
In the final analysis, it is fair to say that the outcome 
was the result of the "tail wagging :the dog", in that, for the most 
part, the CP seems to have secured the sort of men it had been looking 
for, much to the dismay of many in the UAP. The only factor which 
seems to have been neglected in the selection process was the 
independent state of mind which each man was capable of exerting. In 
this sense, the result of the government's decision was unpredictable. 
When the personnel were first revealed, McEwen himself appeared to 
underestimate the capabilities of the Commissioners. He was one CP 
member who believed that the Commission would prove to be too conservat-
i ve: It seemed to be dominated by theorists and actuaries, whi 1 e 
commercial interests were not represented. Th~ banking question, 
moreover, he thought, would not be removed from the arena of po~~tics, 
as "the appointment of a former Labour Minister can be regarded only 
as a sop to Labour." (93 l 
\·!hi le each of the members contributed to the work of the 
Commission, albeit in different ~1ays, some ~1ere naturally more 
(
influential than others. Before examining the roles played by each 
ommissioner, one general point is appropriate. The Commission's 
final report was the result of an independent inquiry, as neither the 
overnment nor the Commonwealth Bank had a direct part in drafting it.( 94 ) 
·-----· .... ~-·~:m.:,.">"•:::;:,..-g>'>f;"" . ,,,,./;!!.l<t~ 
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Although Napier, Nixon, and Pitt were not the most influential Commiss 
ioners, their roles, both collectively and individually, are worthy 
of notice. Napier was, above all, important for his impartiality as 
a judge. When the Commission first began its. formal sittings, some 
differences of opinion understandably arose, and he was able to fulfill 
his natural role of adjudicator, On one occasion, for example, 
Nixon and Chi fl ey were engaged in an argument which was ended when 
Napier pulled Chifley into line. (95 ) As a matter of course, each 
Commissioner was involved in drafting questionnaries and parts of the 
Report which were then discussed, amended, and approved by the Commiss-
ion. Napier was responsible, moreover, for preparing the section 
of the Report covering the Douglas Social Credit proposals for 
monetary reform. Nixon's background in accountancy would have 
him in drawing up the questionnaires that were submitted to the 
insurance and trustee companies and to the stock exchanges. He 
the basis of the chapter on "the ca pi ta l reserves and profits of 
the trading banks 1893-1936". His most important contribution, 
however, was his sketch of the Commonwealth Bank's powers and its 
relations with all the other financial institutions. Pitt drafted 
the section on the relations of the Commonwealth Bank with the Common-
wealth and State governments, and he and Mills wrote the history of 
government finance for the reri0d 1928-1935. (96) 
It is of some 
interest that Napier, Pitt, and Nixon appear initially to have been 
at odds with the other Commissioners in believing that the existing 
system was adequate. 
But, as the Commission progressed, the evidence 
of the private bankers seemed to raise doubts in their minds, so much 
so that in the end they d~d not dissent from the general thrust for 
additional central banking powers. 
:l'~.1.;<'.~.-
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Mills, on the other hand, exercised the greatest influence 
the Commission in general, and the structure of the Report owed 
ch to him. In fact, not only did he prepare the questionnaire 
sent to the trading banks, but he and Chifley drew up a] 
.st of questions for the economists and other banks to answer. 
J! 
~ 
C6"·1""-l. 
~11//s r the UAP had endorsed Mills' appointment primarily because it 
onsidered him less of a threat than the alternatives, its expectatiohs 
'roved wide of the mark. Mills pursued the important issues, such 
desirability of granting the central bank additional powers, 
11,,,,l. 11 c 
~ l)c./, 
"Ph 
and in the questionnaires. He did not hife 
the Commonwealth Bank, ahd 
central bank controls in the fonn 
London funds. Although he had an 
over divergent viewpoints, he did not 
:·But his views were not unique, for he 
discussions with other economists, such as 
convictions. He was also the author of large parts of the body of 
the Report, writing as he did the chapter on the Australian eco;;my. (f7l 
banking system 1901-1~6, In outlining the operation of the monetary and 
he was assisted by Abbott, Nixon, Pitt, and especially 11.T. Harris, 
the Commission's administrative sccretai·y, 1·:ho 11as chosen by Casey 
and Mclachlan, and approved by Cabinet in mid-November 1935. The 
Commission forma1ly endorsed his appointment on 7 December 1935. :t 
appears that Harris, who was an accountant in the Commom1ea 1th Sub-
Treasu ry in Melbourne, was more than just an admi,nistrator. Mot 
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only.did he participate in discussions of the Report and the 
Cmnmission's. recommendations, but he 
drafting process of the Report. 
exercised some influence in the 
In an interview with the author 
Coombs said that Harris was more of a searcher than an innovator! 98 ) 
Similarly, Chifley was a significant force within the 
Commission. Like Mills, he did not live up to the 
~-, 
of a "safe" Commissioner. 
government's 
Crisp wrote that Chifley 
i deal
1 
accepted his -··· 
nomination after ensuring that his membership would not contravene 
ALP polic}?
9
l On a few occasions, he was quite sharp with witnesses, 
especially with G.D. Healy, who was Superintendent of the Bank of 
Australasia and Chairman of the Associated Banks of Victoria from 1931 
to 1932 and 1935-1936; by ~aintaining his tough line of questioning, 
he got the better of Healy and managed to get at the truth of the 
current situation. 
Although he asked many questions on competition, 
especially on lending rates, he prevented these and other political 
issues from becoming bogged down in technicalities. 
discussion with the author Sir John Phillips sai~ that, even though· 
Chifley wrote a minority report on Labor's behalf, this did not stop 
In a personal 
him from participating in any of the debates; 
important in the drafting in fact, he was vitally 
process, and was a strong advocate of the 
recommendations for additional central bank po11ers~lOO) 
Abbott satisfied the intentions 
Party by pushing for the demands of the 
of Page and the Country 
pastoral sector. He wrote the questionnaire 
to the section of 
applying to the Pastoral institutions, and contributed 
the Report dealing with the history of the pastoral 
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. · . (l 01) M . . l h finance companies. ost important y, owever,. he: fought for a 
c{ ::i_ 0 
't+-18" _I _ 
, recommendation relating to the establ islTilent of a mortgage bank. 
In addition, the Commission was assisted by both a permanent 
·and a temporary typist, several messengers, a Counsel, and an 
: Assistant Economist. It seems that Mills was largely responsible for~ 11 
the selection of Phillips in November 1935 as an addi tiona 1 economist. ~ 
His appointment was subsequently approved by Napier, and later endorsed 
by the Commission on 7 December. Phillips, a student of Mills, was 
Economist to the Research Committee of the New South Wales Retail 
Traders Association from 1932-1935. He later became the Governor 
of the Reserve Bank of Australia in 1968, having worked in the Economics 
Department of the Commonwealth Bank from 1937 to 1951, and as Investment 
Adviser to the Commonwealth Bank from 1954 to 1960. As Assistant 
Economist, he prepared the draft suggestions for the statistical 
tables which were published with the Report. It is likely that he l 
played some part in the formulation of the Report, and he agreed 
with Mills and Chifley that the central bank req~ired stronger powers-· 
of control. Again, in an interview with the author, he revealed that 
important issues and parts of the Report were discussed informally 
outside the meeting room by Mi 11 s, Chi fl ey, Abbott, Harris , and 
himself. (l02) It seems that these deliberations formed a significant 
part of the drafti rig process. In Janua1·y 1936, the Commission 
approved Napier's request for legal assistance. The Chairman then 
conferred with the Attorney-General, and Edward Reynolds, a Victorian 
solicitor, was appointed as Counsel. His appareance as Counsel, 
however, was not received with enthusiasm by the majority of the 
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Commission, and his functions were restricted from the outset. 
banks apparently told the Commission that they did not want to be 
The 
cross-examined by the Commission's Counsel and unsuccessfully asked 
for legal representation on their own behalf. 
was not a 11 owed to question representatives 
Reynolds, however, 
of banks in Melbourne. 
The Labor Party also disapproved of his appointment, but i l: too was 
On 7 May, the Commission passed a 
Counsel's employment was no longer 
necessary and his services were terminated on 3 June! 103 l 
denied legal representation. 
resolution which stated that 
The Committee's Modus Operandi 
Towards the end of October 1935, ·there was talk that the inquiry 
would begin early in the New Year, after Napier was rel eased 
from his judicial duties on 2 January 1936. Although the Cormiiss"ion 
was offi ci a 11 y appointed by Letters Patent dated 15 November 1935, 
Cabinet decided that its first meeting should be postponed until 
7 December, for two reasons .. First, it feared.that press coverage 
of a meeting scheduled prior to 7 December wo~ld adversely 
affect §overnment loan prospects. Secondly, the delay would al 10~1 
the Commission ample time to complete its staff arrangement/104 ) 
On 7 December, therefore, all of the Commissioners, apart from iic;piE:r, 
met in Melbourne to make preliminary arrangements. Apparently, 
the headquarters of the Commission were established in Melbourne 
because it was considered the most central city. All correspondence 
to the Secretary was addressed to "Shell Corner", Bourke and t<illiam 
Streets, Melbourne. Taking control of its affairs, the CommissioJn 
opened its first public in'quiry in Melbourne on 15 January 1936 
':i~":C1;";~ 
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at 10.30 aJlJ. Both oral and written evidence was taken, the oral 
evidence being presented at one hundred and five sessions lasting 
until 17 November 1936 . Witnesses were examined in Sydney, Melbourne, 
. .....:.----
cBrisbane, Adelaide, Perth, Hobart, and Launceston. Interested 
individuals and organizations were also invited to correspond with 
the Corn:nission. 
Napier announced the general plan of the investigation on 
{l 05) 
.the opening day of the public hearings. The Commissioners were to 
collect infonnation concerning the organization .arid wor\ing of the 
existing system from those institutions and organizations involved 
in the supply of credit. Evidence was also to be accepted from 
.economists, representatives of industry and commerce, and the general 
public. Before the Commission commenced its sittings in each city, 
the press carried an invitation to the public to express ideas, 
~.criticisms, and proposals. A person was allowed to appear before 
the Commission only if the latter believed that the statements which 
were to be submitted merited consideration. Most witnesses were 
sent detailed questionnaires which had been designed according .to 
the background of witnesses. Overall, the Commission took oral 
evidence from one hundred and forty witness.es and written memoranda 
from another seventy people. Several sessions, including some held 
with private bankers and the Commom~ealth Bank, were held in camera. 
In spite of the Commissioners' efforts, the inquiry did 
not always proceed smoothly and their work was sometimes derided. For 
example, although the Chairman of the Associated Banks of Victoria 
wanted to present a single statement on behalf of all the banks, 
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several bankers objected to this suggestion. Davidson, in 
strongly opposed the idea by stating that any investigation of the 
banks should be on an individual basis. The debate was settled, 
however, when the Corrmission sent a separate questionnaire to each 
bankI1D6) In addition, the bankers had deep reservations about 
disclosing various sets of figures but the Comnission eventually 
persuaded them to supply all the infonnation it requested. While 
some statistics were treated confidentially on two separate occasions, 
the Commission resolved, with Nixon and Napier dissenting, to publish 
aggregate figures of inner trading bank reserves amidst loud protests 
by the banks. The Commissioners, themselves, were publicly 
criticized by the Premier of Tasmania, who claimed that the Royal 
Commission would not coerce some bank managers into producing certain 
facts and figures relating to the banking system_(lO?) Napier 
refuted this statement, confirming as he did that every bank had 
complied with the Comnission's requisitions.(l08 ) The members and work 
of the Commission were also reproved in an article published in The 
Neui Times on 18 January 1936,- a matter that was s'ubsequen.t1y dealt 
with under the provisions of the Royal Commission Act relating tB 
defamatory criticisms of such bodies.(l09) 
In Table I .1, the one hundred and forty witnesses who gave 
evidence have been classified according to their background, the table 
having been constructed from information presented in the Minutes of 
Evidence of the Commission. 
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TABLE. I. I 
BACKGROUND OF WITNESSES ·w110 GAVE ORAL EVIDENCE 
Economists 
lacademicl 
Bankers 
Pastora1 Finance 
Companies 
Insurance Companies 
NUMBER 
OF 
WITNESSES 
8 
34 
11 
9 
Trustee and Investment 12 Companies 
Building Societies 8 
Other Finance 5 
Companies 
Chambers of Commerce 
and Manufacturers 10 
Stock Exchanges 
and Stock Brokers 6 
3 
PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL 
WITNESSES 
5.7 
24.3 
7.9 
6.4 
8.6 
5.7 
3.6 
7 .1 
4.3 
2 .1 
10. Government Offi ci a 1 s 
11. Primary Producers 
and Farm 
Organizations 5 
1 z. Othe: Witnesses 
29 
--------
3.6 
20. 7 
TOTAL 140 
100.0 
---
Source of information: 
M-~nv.-:;.es of Evidence of the Royai C:::mmission to Inqufr•e intc 
the Monetm'!! and Banking Systems a;; Present in Operation i.11 Aus~t>a"lia, Volumes I and II, Canberra, 1936. 
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A fair cross section of the community was represented by 
persons who gave evidence before the Cammi ss ion. One government 
official examined was H.J. Sheehan, Secretary to the Commonwealth 
Treasury. Although Wilson was similarly classified as a government 
official, both he and Melville 1vere qualified to provide their services 
in a dual capacity. It will ~e recalled that not only were they 
trained economists, but they also held prominent positions in public 
institutions; 
consequently, there was some uncertainty as to whether 
these men would appear as individuals or as public officials. 
cleared up any confusion so far as his evidence was concerned by 
asserting that his statements reflected his own personal views as I: 
distinct from those of the Commonwealth Bank(.llO) On the other hand, 
there were accusations that the evidence prepared by Wilson as the 
Commonwealth 
These claims 
Statistician had been censored by Casey and Sheehan. 
were based on the fact that Wilson sent a rough draft 
of his answer to a question concerning the· technical procedure for 
obtaining statistics of capital flows from overseas to Casey and 
Sheehan in order to obtain th.eir opinions. Apparently, Sheeha~ was 
more knowledgeable than Wilson on these data collection methods. 
Casey, moreover, was very interested in such matters, which he often 
discussed with Wilson. In fact, he had previously requested a 
memorandum on-the possiblity of tracing capital movements in greate1· 
detail. In his covering letter to Casey, rlilson wrote that he 
had enclosed a copy of his ans1ver to Sheehan, and joked that Sheehan 
would "no doubt exercise a blue pencil where necessary. ,,(lll l Sheehan, 
however, did not alter Wilson's reply. But, as it turned out, a 
~-~··.~~~'·"'-' 
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essenger inadvertently handed the documents to a Labor Member of 
arliament whose name happened to be the same as Casey's private 
and the Labor Party sought to blow the issue out of all 
.~roportion in Par1 i arnent by asserting that the government frequently 
tampered with the evidence of Commonwealth government officials. 
Casey retorted that Wilson and Sheehan hwd neither been pressured 
nor influenced by the government and that the Labor members should 
···have regarded the communication as confidential. (.11 2) When he 
later appeared before the Commissibn, Wilson removed all doubt 
surrounding the integrity of his evidence, saying that apart from 
·matters affecting finance and staff problems which had to be approved 
by Sheehan, he had always been "entirely free to direct the statistical 
organization of the Commonwealth, and to publish statistical results 
in accordance with the dictates of my own judgment."(l1 3) 
O_ther witnesses included reputable economists such as 
A.G.B. Fisher, Professor of Economics at the University of Western 
Australia, E.R. Walker, Lecturer in Economics 'at the University 
of Sydney, and Giblin. Some distinguished bankers and advisers 
to banks were T. Hytten, Economic Adviser to the Bank of New South 
Wales, Sir Claude Reading, Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank Board, 
Sir Ernest Riddle, Governor of the Commonwealth Bank, A.F. Bell, the 
Acting Chairman of the Commonwealth Bank Board,. G.D. Healy, Chairman 
of the Associated Banks of Victoria and Superintendent of the Bank 
of Australasia, L.J. McConnan, Chief Manager of the National Bank 
of Australasia, E.O'Sullivan, Joint General Manager of the English, 
Scottish and Australian Bank, Davidson himself, A. Cooch, General 
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Manager of the State Savings Bank of Victoria, and C.R. McKerihan, 
President of the Rural Bank of N.S.W. The Commonwealth Savings 
Bank of Australia was represented by R. Sabeston, Chief Superintendent 
Bell, and A.H. Lewis, the Secretary of the Commonwealth·· of the Bank, 
Bank. There were al so repres-entati ves from various Trustee and 
Investment Companies, Pastoral Finance and Insurance Companies, 
Chambers of Commerce and Manufacturers, Building Societies, and 
Stock Exchanges and Stock Brokers. In addition, primary producers 
and farm organizations, Social Credit theorists, and the Free 
Economy Movement presented evidence. Various organizations and 
individuals also submitted proposals for banking and monetary reform. 
After hearing all of the evidence, the Commission drafted an interim 
report, the terms of which were approved on 17 June 1937. There-
after, a long process of deliberation and discussion was followed 
by the presentation of the final report to the government sometime 
between 15 and 19 July 1937; the document was made available to 
the press soon after, and 
volumes of evidence. 
published in August along with two lengthy 
·~.-§:··-·-
CHAPTER TWO 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE AUSTRALIAN BANKING AND MONETARY SYSTEMS 
\~hen the Royal Commission began its investigation of 
the Australian monetary and banking systems early in 1936, it 
immediately expressed apprehension about the lack of sufficient 
central bank control. Indeed, its overriding conclusion that 
additional central bank powers were required to regulate money 
and banking derived principally from its discovery of a spontaneous, 
loosely organized, and essentially haphazard monetary and banking 
network in Australia. 
The Structure of the Banking System circa 1936 
At the time the Royal Commission was established, there was in 
Australia a rather strong private banking sector, with a Jong 
tradition, but central banking was comparatively weak and immature. 
The banking system comprised four main elements. To begin with, 
it is evident from Table 2.1 that the system was dominated by the 
private trading banks, of which nine formed the major part of the 
bankin~ structure. Each of thes12 large banks catered to its O\<n 
interests and possessed a large, usually nation-wide, network of 
branches and agencies. Four other banks which performed trading 
bank functions on a limited scale were the Ballarat Banking Co~pany, 
the Bank of New Zealand, the Comptoir National D'Escompte de Paris, 
and the Yokohama Specie Bank Ltd. From Table 2.1, it can 
58 
TABLE 2. 1 
BANKS' SHARE IN AUSTRALIAN BUSINESS IN 1936 
(DEPOSITS PLUS ADVANCES) 
MAJOR PRIVATE TRADING BANKS. PER CENT OF BUSINESS 
Bank of New South Wales · 
The Commercial Banking Company 
of Sydney Limited 
The Bank of Australasia 
The National Bank of Australasia 
Limited 
The Union Bank of Australia Limited 
English, Scottisn and Australian 
Bank Limited 
The Commercial Bank of Australia 
Limited 
The Queensland National Bank Limited 
The Bank of Adelaide 
27.34 
14.46 
11. 62 
11. 62 
l 0. 98 
l 0. 54 
7.93 
3.46 
2. 04 
100.00 
SHARE IN BUSINESS OF ALL MAJOR CHEQLJE'..PAYH!G BANKS 
Major Private Trading Banks 
Commonwealth Trading Bank 
TOTAL 
89. 01 
l 0. 99 
l 00.00 
* 
* Note that only the Commonwealth Bank and the nine major private 
trading banks are included. 
Sciur:_~_Qf_Iriforma ti on: The Report of the Royal Comm·ission to I11qici1°e 
Into the Monetary and Banking Systems at 
Present in Operation in Australia, 
Canberra, 1937, pp.286-7, 292, 371-2. 
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be seen that the largest and most influential of the nin~~.;'pi-[r 
trading banks, in terms of advances plus deposits, was·ttie';~nk··'!".' 
of New South Wales. Its sum of deposits and advances accounted 
for the largest share in the total business of the major trading 
banks, and indeed, of all Australian commercial banking institut-
ions. Apart from the ~omrnercial Banking Company of Sydney, the 
second· largest of the major trading banks, the approximate order 
of business importance for the remaining seven is shown in 
Table 2.1. 
The second component of the banking system was the 
Commonwealth Trading Bank, which was relatively small in the business 
it handled at the time. Its share in the business· of all cheque-
paying banks, including both the Commonwealth Bank and the nine 
private trading banks, was only 10.99 per cent in 1936, compared 
with the private banks' share of 89.01 per cent. 
The banking system also included various savings banks, 
and other banking institutions operating under state law. -_Jhe 
Commonwealth Savings Bank of Australia, under the control of the 
Commonwealth Bank Board of Directors, was the largest of all the 
savings banks. Operating in all states, it was the only savings 
institution in N.S.W., Queensland, and Western Australia at the 
time the Commission sat. In the re~aining states, however, it 
competed with the following savings banks: The State Savings 
Bank of Victoria, the Savings Bank of South Australia, the Hobart 
Savings Bank, and the Launceston Bank for Savings. In addition 
to these state and Commonwealth savings institutions, there v1ere 
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five s·tate; or rural and ·a<:iriculituraJ., banks, namely the State· 
Advances Corporation of Queensland, the Agricultural Bank of 
Tasmania, the Agricultural Bank of Western Australia, the Rural 
Bank of New South Wales, and the State Bank of South Australia. 
These organizations were primarily established to provide fixed 
loans for primary producers. 
Finally, there was a diverse array of non-banking 
financial institutions. Twenty major pastoral finance companies, 
among which were included some of the largest public companies in 
Australia, supplemented the rural credit 
provided by banks. 
facilities that were 
Other financial services were provided by 
investment companies, such as life assurance societies and 
companies, trustee companies, building societies, and finance and 
cash order companies. In the supply of mortgage credit for 
housing and general business finance, these institutions ranked 
roughly in order of importance as follows: The pastoral finance 
companies, life offices, building societies, an,d trustee companies. 
The Development of Banking Before the Establishment of the 
Commonwealth Bank 
The history of banking in Australia is one of disjointed growth, 
with periods of over-rapid expansion followed by reconstruction 
and consolidation when activity was decidedly more subdued. 
This sequence of accelerated and then more moderate growth 
both induced fluctuations in the expansion of the economy, 
and was itself influenced by trends in economic activity. 
• 5; 
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The origins of the Australian banking system may be said 
to have commenced in 1817 when a group of Sydney merchants created 
the Bank of New South Wales, their objective being to rectify an 
unsatisfactory currency situation and to encourage a sense of 
thrift among the small European community. Although banking in 
the eighteen twenties was .still relatively undeveloped, it seems 
that the local authorities had made significant headway towards 
the creation of a dollar standard by the middle of the decade. 
Then, however, the British government directed that English money 
would become the monetary unit of account and British coins would 
be used. This decision facilitated both the growth of internal 
and international trade. By 1830, a number of savings banks were 
conducting business, together with seven note-issuing banks. 
After 1830, the banking system experienced its first phase 
of rapid development, which was then succeeded by a slower tempo 
of growth in the 1840s. The spurt in banking activity in the 
1830s resulted largely from the great upturn in economic activity 
based largely on the export of wool and the import of capital. 
Additional banks were formed, and most of the banks which had been 
established in the tl~enties grew at a fast rate throughout the 1830s . 
It was during this period that banking in Australia developed many 
of the characteristics of the British banking system; by 1840, 
there were about twelve dominant banks with many branches, and 
a number of related banking institutions in mainland eastern Australia 
and Van Diemen's Land. During the 1830s, tl1ese banks conducted 
banking business on a much larger scale than before, without being 
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restrained by government regulations. The thirties also saw 
the establishment of competitive British banks in Australia. By 
providing a channel through which British capital could be 
transferred to Australia, these banks faci1itated the growth of 
the Australian economy and enabled Australia to exploit 
ional capital market. I_n ·addition, the operations of the banks 
and a booming trade sector led to the emergence of a 
exchange market. The arrival of the British institutions also 
encouraged the rapid expansion of deposit banking and, consequently, 
promoted the rise of a domestic capital market. Although the role 
of the banks and other financial organizations in the process of 
economic growth should not be over-emphasized, the ban~ng activity 
of the thirties did ensure that capital markets were firmly 
entrenched in the Australian colonies by the end of the decade. 
The rapid development of banking activity was, however, 
temporarily suspended with the depression of the early 1840s, which, 
in turn, was partly the result of unrestrained .IJ]onetary forces. 
During this decade, there were not many changes in the struC':ture of 
the banking system. There were some attempts, however, to advance 
loans on the security of tangible property and, in fact, such activit 
constituted an important advance in the banking system after 1850. 
In addition, the implementation of the provisions of the Lien on 
Wool and Livestock Act of 1843 was important, not only because 
pastoral is ts in New South 14ales were permitted to use livestock 
and unshorn wool as security for loans, but the new system repres-
ented the first major break with British banking tradition. 
.,.,, ..... 
~~~">.i~~ .. ~~-
63 
In the years after 1850, there were further important 
alterations in the banking system. For a start, the gold rushes 
provided the groundwork for a rapid, more complete implementation 
of a gold standard. And the abundance of gold in Australia 
gave rise to the establishment of a branch of the Royal Mint in 
Sydney in 1855. Henceforth, the activities of the Sydney Mint 
effectively fixed local gold prices. Much more significant, 
however, was the fact that the gold rushes marked the beginning of 
another period of banking expansion, which continued to about 
1890 
when the banking sector once more entered a phase of subdued 
activity. Growth in the banking system in this period consisted 
of an increase in the number of branches of existing banks 
and the creation of a number of new banks. Hence by 1890, 
there were twenty-eight banks of issue; by this time, all the 
private trading banks in operation in 1936 had been established. 
l) 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
7) 
8) 
9) 
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TABLE 2.2 
----
THE NINE PRIVATE TRADING BANKS IN 1936 AND 
THE YEAR IN WHICH THEY WERE ESTABLISHED 
Bank of New South Wales, 1817. 
The Commercial Banking Company of Sydney 
Limited, 1834. 
The Bank of Australasia, 1835. 
The Union Bank of Australia Limited, 1837. 
Engiish, Scottish and Australian Bank 
Limited, 1852. 
The National Bank of Australasia Limited, 
1858. 
The Bank of Adelaide, 1865. 
The Commercial Bank of Australia Limited, 
1866. 
The Queensland National Bank Limited, 1872. 
Source of Information: 'Fhq, Report a.;.!' i:he Royal C:o:r;i1i~:_;0{.on tu 
----------·-- Inqui1'e into the Monetary and Banking 
Systems at Present in Operation in 
Australia, Canberra, 1937, p.153. 
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Before the 1850s, bank lending had taken the form principally of 
discounting commercial bills of exchange - that is, banks bc,uqht bills 
of exchange on the money market prior to maturity, having allo~1ed 
for the interim compound interest. After the gold ruslles, ho\'/-
ever, the new growth in advances to pastoralists, which VJere secured 
by mortgages on real property, contributed to a high level of 
pastoral investment. It led, moreover, to the increasing involve-
ment of the banking system in the economy. A 1 though they 1vere 
largely concerned Vlith deposits, the banks became very active 
in dealing in exchange and making advances to those engaged in 
local trade, industry, and commerce. In addition, they took a 
considerable interest in providing overseas trade finance. 
A system of interlocking, yet diversified, financial 
institutions developed to mobilize and distribute domestic funds, 
and to attract overseas capital. Various stock exchanges emerged 
in the major cities, and a large number of residential and urban 
land financing institutions were also created. After the 1850s, 
and especially after the mid-l870s, many specialized pastorirl 
finance companies were established to serve the pastoral industry 
by raising British capital. In fact, these institutions and 
the banks, which ectively sought to secure British deposits, 
channelled massive sums of investible funds into a booming pastoral 
industry. 
Despite outward appearance of prosperity and the 1 ong 
phase of economic and banking expansion which lasted to the early 
1890s, the capita-I mar,ket had over-reached itself and became 
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markedly unstable. Indeed, the financial system contributed in 
several ways to a destabilizing process of economic growth which 
occurred especially after 1880; the uneven development of non-
bank financial institutions, lending and reserve policies, and 
attempts to attract overseas capital all resulted in a grave 
misallocation of investible ·funds. In the absence of a central 
bank to regulate the leve·l and distribution of domestic credit and 
prevent fluctuations in economic activity; the banks and financial 
1nstitutions were free to pursue policies which made them very 
vulnerable to serious economic disorders. They over-invested in 
various sectors of the economy, and allowed a substantial amount 
their loans and, hence assets, to become potentially illiquid. 
The banks, moreover, did not take action to prevent a long-term 
decline in their reserve ratios. Thus, the inappropriate policies 
of banks and other financial institutions magnified the deep-seated 
economic causes of the general depression of the 1890s; these 
developments culminated ~n the financial crisis of 1893, which 
itself served to deepen the economic slump. 
During the crisis, banking activity was greatly 
depressed. All the major banks 11ere in severe difficulty; many 
of them closed during April-May 1893, as they were unable to CODf' 
with the wholesale run on deposits without the assistance of a 
lender of last resort. Banks such as the Bank of Australasia, 
which had adhered to more conservative lending and reserve policies 
during the period of expansion, 1·1ere not forced to suspend payment. 
Al though some banks never reopened, the reconstruction programs 
that were introduced ailm•1ed many banks eventually to 1·eopen for 
; =9ffi-«~'.-,;':,_..,:.,,,..;: ... ; 
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bus.iness. In order to remain in business, bank' officials 
generally had to persuade depositors to freeze deposits, or convert· 
a certain amount of their deposits into preference capital. The 
lack of government intervention to assist the plight of the banks 
meant that reconstruction was not completed until after Federation. 
·once achieved, the ban ks then experienced recovery and further 
growth from 1901 to 1914:(2) The collapse of the 1890s, 
however, marked a crucial turning point in Australian financial and 
banking history. Since that period, there has been an almost 
complete absence of bank failures. Much more importantly, it 
was from this time that serious calls commenced to be made for 
increased regulation and control - by way of central banking - over 
the Australian banking system. While some persons advocated 
,·· 
voluntary cooperation between the banks, many farmers, wage earners, 
and, in particular, the labour movement, demanded 
through the establishment of a government bank. 
government control 
A 1 though Labor 
traditionally desired to change the banking system, the banking 
crisis of 1893 raised the priority of banking reform in its yol icy 
platforms. In New South Wales, for example, the creation of a 
national bank was included as a plank in the first platform adopted 
by the Party in 1891, and the issue was increasingly emphasized in 
subsequent pla':.forms. ln addition, various com111issior:s and 
select committees in several colonies began to consider the idea 
of a state bank and made recommendations on it. By the mid-l890s, 
state government banking was included on the parliamentary agenda 
in four colonies. In New South Wales and Victoria, a select 
committee and a Royal Commission, respectively, favoured the 
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establishment of a state bank. 
The recommendations of the 
Victorian commission were translated 
was extensively 
and the press. 
into draft legislation which 
discussed in the Victorian Legislative Assembly 
In fact, part of it - that relating to the 
establishment of a mortgage bank - was passed as an Act. 
South Australia, a state banking bill was debated at great length. 
and again a section of it became law. In addition, a state 
government note issue was adopted in Queensland in the 1890s. 
Deliberation of the idea of direct government involvement in the 
banking system was not, however, confined to colonial parliaments. 
Indeed, while the 
In 
Victorian commission was conducting its inquiry 
in 1895 and 1896, a conference of bankers met in Sydney under the 
chairmanship of J.R. French, General Manager of the Bank of New 
South Wales, and agreed on suggestions for reform on the note 
. . . 1 (3) issue in particu ar. 
Federation in 1901, however, gave banking 
and financial powers to the Commonwealth Parliament and thus 
curtailed attempts by colo~ial politicians to establish state banks. 
After 1901, the most important event was the creation of the 
Commonwealth Bank in 1911. 
The Functions and Activities of Private Financi~_ Institutions 
Clearly, at the time the Commission began its investigations, 
the Australian banking system was not a tightly knit 
organization; 
nor were the duties of the separate financial 
institutions the same. Indeed, most of their various functions 
were neither regulated nor coordinated by a central banking 
authority. 
But before an examination is made of the specific 
activities of the different institutions, a word about the 
~t;t:,-.... ::.·_ 
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general functions of the banking system seems appropriate. One 
of its functions is to maintain business stability. Another 
responsibility is the provision of both short-term and long-term 
loans to individuals and to government. An additional object 
of the system is the efficient channelling or mobilization of 
community savings. Finally, satisfactory relationships 11ith 
other monetary systems jn the foreign exchange market should be 
preserved. 
Apart from these general activities, the private trading 
and savings banks and other financial institutions performed 
specific duties since the degree of specialization had proceeded 
some considerable distance by the 1930s. At the time the 
Commission was sitting, the private trading banks dominated trading 
bank activities. Their main function was to provide current 
account and cheque facilities, accept deposits, and make advanc~s; 
they also controlled a large proportion of Australia's foreign 
exchange business. Interest rates, moreo~er, were determined 
largely by the private trading banks operating in concert. In 
addition, they regulated the money supply by manipulating the 
availability of domestic credit in response to movements in the 
volume of "London funds" - the country's overseas reserves, which 
were held in the banks' branches in London. When these fc;r,cis 
rose, the banks acted to encourage domestic credit expansion and, 
thus, increased the domestic money supply by expanding advances and 
reducing interest rates. On the other hand, if the level 
of such funds was considered to be too low, the banks reduced 
advances and increase,d interest rates, which would then r·educe 
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the money supply. Other responsibilities included the 
of finance for co1m1erce and industry and special services 1·1ere 
offered to attract and maintain business; for example, the 
banks acted as trustees for their customers, created facilities 
for safe custody of valuables, provided finance for Australia's 
overseas trade, and assisted in underwriting public loans. 
Similarly, the savings banks engaged in 
ies. Many people deposited considerable sums at 
of interest with these institutions as a profitable investment, 
and, in fact, the savings banks competed with trading banks for 
short-term deposits. They accumulated sizable sums on fixed 
deposit, which were then invested in mortgages, fixed and long-
term loans, and government or municipal securities; often 
savings bank deposits were re-lent to other financial institutions, 
notably the trading banks. 
So far as other financial corporations were concerned, 
the state institutions were established primarily to provide 
fixed loans for primary producers. Pasto.ral finance companies 
supplied primary producers, and wool growers in particular, 
with both short-term and long-term capital. The influence of 
life assurance companies 2nd societies upor, the financial system 
stemmed from the sheer size of their funds, which were invested 
to provide for the subsequent payment of life and endowment 
policies. Their investments largely took the form of government 
securities, loans on mortgages, and loans on policies. In 
addition, trustee companies usually invested trust funds in either 
government securities or upon mortgages. The responsibility of 
.. s~~:~,~.:: .. -
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building societies, on the other hand, was to assist in the 
acquisition of private homes or business premises for occupation 
or investment. The major duty of finance and cash order 
companies was to supply relatively short-term credit for various 
purposes. Finally, stock exchanges were important in providing 
a meeting-place for buyers and sellers of government and private 
b d d 
. . \4) 
on s an securities. 
The 'Australian Monetary System 
Just as the private trading banks dominated the Australian 
banking system at the time the Royal Commission was established, 
so they largely governed the Australian monetary system. 
Prior to the creation of the Commonwealth Bank, the monetary 
system was to a great extent based on the unregulated activites 
of the principal trading banks, the most important financial 
Even after the Commonwealth Bank institutions in Australia. 
was established, it did not possess sufficiently st rung 
central banking functions to influence the activities of the 
private trading banks. The colonial governments, too, had 
lacked firm control over monetary policy. \ilhi le they had l'ften 
acted upon various economic policy issues which had an indirect 
bearing on the monetary situation, they were usually reluctant 
to interfere directly with monetary matters except in times of 
extreme crisis. Before 1914, therefore, and to a lesser extent 
until 1931, monetary policy remained securely in the hands of 
the private trading b~nks, "1hose operations ultimately 
determined the volume and distribution of the system's credit, 
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and hence money supply. These banks held the vast majority of 
deposits and supplied virtually all physical money unt"il 1910, 
when the Commonwealth Treasury became the sole note-issuing 
authority; this duty was subsequently transferred in 1920 to the 
Note issue Department of the Commonv1ealth Bank. Even so, the 
note issue was only a minor component of the money supply, the 
major part remaining the deposits. of the private trading banks. 
The trading banks' dominance over the monetary system 
extended beyond their control of the money supply. It wi 11 be 
recalled that they had a substantial influence over the determin-
ation of interest rates, colluding as they did to fix common 
levels of bank interest rates which, in turn, significantly 
affected the entire structure of interest rates. 
their activities viere not inhibited by the need 
In addition, 
to maintain firm 
ratios of cash to deposits and liquid assets to liabilities. 
There were, moreover, no positive, conscious open market 
operations - that is, the purchase and sale.of government 
securities by the monetary authorities. 
also inoperative due to the absence of a 
Oiscount policy was 
treasury bills. 
market for short-term 
Although the Commonwealth Bank sought to 
establish an open market for treasu1'y bills in 1936, the Bank 
of New South Wales frustrated this attempt by raising its 
on fixed deposits, thereby demonstrating the Commonwealth 
rates 
Bank's 
inadequacy as a central bank. The Bank's lack of control over 
the operation of the system was also reflected in the fact that 
Australia's international reserves were held principally by 
the private trading banks. Apart from the temporary abandor.ment 
i°'-~ 
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of a fixed exchange rate system from 1914 to 1925, Australia had 
operated traditionally within the framework of a sterling exchange 
standard - Australia was nominally on the gold standard, but her 
currency was in reality tied to sterling from 1855 to 1930. 
During this period, until 2 December 1931, the private trading 
banks, generally through consu1tation, had determined the 
exchange rate, whic'1 remained fixed except for small adjustments 
within the gold points. Australia's remoteness from London and 
the dominance of the exchange market by banks with head offices 
in Britain resulted in the development of a system in which the 
banks held and manipulated their international reserves in London 
- the so-ca 11 ed London funds so as to maintain exchange rate 
stability. In order to prevent large movements in the exchange 
rate, it was necessary for the banks to purchase, or sell, 
sterling in unrestricted amounts at the prevailing rates. 
do this, they permitted their London funds to decline when 
To 
sterling was at a premium; when sterling was at~ discount, 
London funds were allowed to rise. Hence, by maintainili:g 
adequate reserves in London, and by a 11 ovli ng the London funds to 
fluctuate in the appropriate manner, the banks were able to 
stabilize the exchange rate. The task remained, however, to 
ensure a sufficient supply of London funds and, consequent:y, 
the banks were prompted to devise a special technique v1hich 
enabled them to achieve this objective. To provide for seasonal 
requirements, they contrived to build up 1arge London reserves 
during the export season, and permitted them to fal1 slowly over 
the remaining :nonths'of the year. 
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As mentioned earlier, movements in London funds, 
however, had domestic consequences both for advance policy and 
interest rate policy. In short, a decline in London funds, 
unaccompanied by a corresponding increase in Australian reserves 
would reduce the liquid resources of the banks; therefore, they 
would contract domestic credft by raising interesj; rates and 
decreasing advances. Conversely, when London funds increased 
without a corresponding decline in Australian funds, they would 
lend more and, hence, the money supply would b,e enlarged. If 
export receipts were low, government overseas borrowing reduced, 
or imports high, the liquidity of the system was reduced which, 
in turn, led to a contraction in the credit supply. If move-
ments in London funds altered the banks' ratios in such a way 
that control over the exchange rate was threatened, the banks 
were able to maintain the rate of exchange by adjusting the domestic 
credit volume. For example, a fall in export receipts reduced 
the banks' London funds; jt also reduced domestic deposits or 
raised the advances of the banks' customers. Hence, the ratios 
of advances to deposits increased, and the ratios of cash to -
deposits and liquid assets to liabilities declined. A suffic-
iently large alteration in the ratios caused the banks to restrict 
their advances and increase their interest rates, and thus, the 
advance-deposit ratios were lowered. This credit contraction 
lowered aggregate money income and reduced imports; consequently, 
London funds were restored, and fluctuatfons in the exchange 
rate were minimized. (S) 
.;.,,,._,,.--, 
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The foregoing description of the monetary system in 
"operation serves not only to illustrate the great extent to which 
the private banks dominated the system, but it also explains why 
-.they were partly responsible, in the eyes of many, for Australia's 
'\ 
n 
recovery from the Depression of the 1930s. When the 
~ownturn began, general economic circumstances and the decline in 
resulting from lower export values and the 
of overseas borrowing - forced the banks to contract 
the interests of their customers and their own solvency. 
Such action served, however, to intensify the Depression. As 
a result, many people realized that a more efficient central bank 
was necessary to exert stricter control over the banks and their 
activities, and calls for a stronger national monetary authority 
gained momentum. Thus, in 1931, the Commonwealth Bank sought 
o assume control of the exchange rate; however, since the bulk 
of the London funds continued to be held by the private banks, 
the Commonwealth Bank did not gain effective control of the 
rate of exchange. The exchange mobilization scheme - a 
. voluntary arrangement which was entered into in August 1930 by 
\
the Commonwealth Bank, the trading banks, and the government to 
ensure the provision of funds to meet government commitments 
overseas gave the Commonwealth Bank somewhat g1-eater control 
of the exchange rate. But still, on the eve of the Royal 
Commission's deliberations, the Australian monetary system was 
the largely devoid of regulation by the monetary authorities; 
private banks had lost a little of their autonomy perhaps, but 
not much. 
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The Creati6n 6f tlie Commonweal tli Bank and its Acquisiti6n of 
Central ·Banking·Foneti6ns 
Systematic argument in Australia relating to the need to create 
a centra 1 state bank dates back to the federa 1 conventi OMS of the 
early 1890s. At much th.e same time, the labour movement 
to th_e banking disaster:s and the depression of the 1890s by 
increasing its demands for the creation of a government-owned bank. 
Similarly, various publicists, pamphleteers, officials, and ordinar. 
citizens commenced to express their desire for a go11ernment bank. 
In fact, from the establishment of the Federation, there were two 
main forces that" led to the formation of the Commonwealth Bank in 
1911. One was the advocacy by politicians, and the realization 
by some bankers, that a central bank was necessary. Associated 
with this movement was the question of a central note-issuing 
authority. This latter issue was resolved with the Bank Notes 
Tax Act of 1910, by which the Commonwealth Treasury took the note 
. . 
issue out of the hands of the private trading banks and into its 
own. The second, more important strand was the labour movement 
in general, and the labor Party in particular From the very 
beginning, labor's platforms reflected the desire to create a 
national bank - in contrast to the concept of a central bank 
which would compete with, and ultimately eliminate, the private 
Indeed, the ALP Federal Conference supported the 
creation of a Commonwealth Bank as official party policy from 
~n~. 
1905, and 
force. 
ary Labor 
henceforth the movement towards such a bank gathered 
In particular, King O'Malley, a member of the Parliament-
Party from 1901 to 1917, and a minister at intervals 
... ~.~· ,·· 
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during this time, made proposals concerning the establishment of 
a Commowealth Bank which would carry out normal banking business 
and provide the appropriate mechanism for Commonwealth-State 
financial dealings. In 1911, Parliament passed the first 
Commonwealth Bank Act - introduced by the Labor Government of 
Andrew Fisher - and the Commonwealth Bank of Australia commenced 
its operations in the middle of 1912. 
While the Bank was created both to compete against the 
private trading banks and to be Australia's central bank, central 
banking was still a vague concept in Australia. In fact, the 
Commonwealth Bank Act - giving the Bank only the combined functions 
of a savings bank and a trading bank - did not equip it adequately 
to perform the role of a central bank. Between 1911 and 1936, 
although the Conmionwealth Bank gradually acquired some central 
banking responsibilities, its ability to exert control over the 
Australian monetary and banking system was quite small. 
Over the period 1911 to 1924, not only was the Bank's 
development as a central bank very slow, but the authorities_ were 
not always abl_e to perceive the direction in 1~hich such change 
should occur. During the first world war, and thereafter, 
the Bank became the Commonwea 1th Government's banker and, subseq-
uently, the banker of four states. Its growing strength t-ested 
with its special relationship with state and Common\'lealth govern-
ments and in its part in financing tl1e war. At the same time, 
the Bank's progress owed much to Denison Miller, Governor of the 
Bank, who favoured the Bank's acquisition of central banking 
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powers; support for this course, moreover, grew within the govern-
ing parties after 1920. Post-war banking and monetary problems 
- stemming, for example, from. the abandonment of the gold standard 
the heavy issue of paper, both during and immediately after the 
v1ar, adverse situations in the balance of payments, and wide price 
variations between Australia and Britain - reinforced the belief 
that a central banking ·authority was necessary. In short, prior 
to 1924, three factors contributed towards the growth of a central 
bank. First, the Bank retained its important role as government 
banker, though the importance of this function declined somev1hat 
at the end of the war. Second, it failed to become a significan 
commercial bank which meant there was more scope for developing 
central banking powers. Third, in 1920, the Note Issue Departme 
of the Treasury was transferred to the Bank, which ·conferred upon 
it control of the issue of Australian bank notes. Apart from the 
duties, however, the Bank lacked any other central bank functions 
until 1924, when the ~ruce-Page Government passed a new Commonwealt 
Bank Act with the expressed aim to convert the Bank into ~central 
bank. It envisaged the Commonweal th Bank as a bankers' bank 
to aid, rather than control, the private trading banks. 
product of this development was to be the solution of the 
A by-
financial 
difficulties of the period, which, it was averred, could be 
eliminated only by a central bank. The Act of 1924 in the event, 
however, fulfilled neither of these two intentions. In particular 
the Bank's acquisition of the specific power to re-discount bills 
of exchange and to publish a discount rate from time to time 
failed to increase its central banking authority; trade bills 
i,>~b~~·-,: .. 
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played a relatively insignificant role in Australian business and 
banking operations, and the Bank could not rely on discount policy 
in the absence of a bill market_. While the private trading 
banks were not obliged to maintain deposits with the Commonwealth 
Bank, the latter did become in the 1920s the clearing bank for all 
domestic exchange transactions. But the private banks were 
re 1 uctant, however, to use the Bank as a reserve bank, and he 1 d 
only a fraction of their cash res~rves with it. This was due 
in part to the fact that they feared the Bank would compete actively 
for their business, using their deposits for this purpose. In 
fact, in 1928, the Commonwealth government sought to end what was 
considered by the private banks to be unfair competition by 
constituting the Commonwealth Savings Bank as a separate institution, 
although it was to l"emain under the authority of the Bank Board. 
While the authority and prestige of the Commonwealth 
Bank as a central bank increased both during the Depression and 
recovery, these years also more clearly exposed 'its· inadequacy as 
a central banking authority. In 1929, the Bank gained cQ.f\trol 
over Australia's gold reserves; it effectively acted as lender of 
last resort; and shared responsibility with the Loan Council for 
regulating the provision of deficit finance. Although an anti-
Labor Senate majority prevented the Scullin Government from passing 
a Bill in 1930 designed to hasten completion of the central banking 
development process, the Commonwealth Bank inaugurated a Mobilization 
Agreement for London funds in September 1930 to preserve international 
solvency. This agreement - entered into by the trading banks, the 
'€: 
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Commonwealth Bank, and the government - went part of the way 
towards giving the Bank control over the system's London reserv 
which was necessary for the proper regulation of bank 
exchange rate stability, and safeguarding the balance of 
payments. iiihat it amounted to was that the Commonwealth 
and the private trading_banks were to supply 
London exchange to co~~r government interest charges overseas a~ 
expenditure on government services abroad. 
ution was to be made by the banks in proportion to their monthly 
receipts of London exchange. Still, this agreement - restrict 
by the fact that it was only a voluntary arrangement - did not 
constitute a complete mobilization of London funds, and it 
gave priority to fixed government requirements. The private 
banks continued to hold the bulk of London reserves, and complet 
information concerning these holdings was denied to the Commonwe 
Bank. Hence, even after the Bank officially accepted responsib 
for managing the excbange rate with sterling in 1931, its effect· 
control of the exchange rate was far from assured. 
private banks continued to play the dominant role in 
ion of the exchange rate, and the authorities continued to 
depend on their support to mobilize London funds. For example, 
·_&~ .. ;~-~··£::'.,~ 
although most of the private trading banks agreed late in 1936 :-:t,.~it'f<lMJ'f'·' 
to mobilize their London funds for the benefit of the Commonwealt_ 
Bank, the apathy of the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney and 
the hostility of the Bank of N.S.W. rendered the scheme inoperabl 
Above all, however, the Commonwealth Bank did not possess the 
means to implement ,the monetary policies it deemed necessary to 
- --'"·'·"•c 
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mitigate depression and create economic recovery. (
5
J 
the 
Thus, by the time the Royal Commission began its inquiry, 
Commonwealth Bank had come to realize that, although some 
attempts had been made to invest it with traditional central bank-
ing levers of control,· its ability to control and regulate the J 
monetary and banking systems remained generally small. In _ 
1 particular, it desired to reduce !;hart-run fluctuations in domestic 
economic activity, but it lacked instruments with sufficient power 
to achieve control over ·internal credit policy and the exchange 
rate. It will be recalled from the previous discussion of the 
operation of the monetary system that unless the Bank was able to 
regulate the volume of credit in response to a movement in London 
funds, severe fluctuations in these "funds would ultimately cause 
either inflation or unemployment by inducing changes in the advance 
and interest rate policies of the private banks. 
The Bank argued that the success of centr9l bank action 
to regulate credit depended largely on the influence that c9uld be 
brought to bear on the cash reserves of the private banks and, 
subsequently, on the banks' response to the alteration in their 
reserves. One of the main ways by which the Bank might seek 
to induce changes in these cash reserves was through open market 
It could, for example, seek to contract or augment 
operations. 
credit by buying or selling short-term government securities in 
the form of treasury bills. Yet the :market for treasury bills 
\~as narrow, so much so that any successful endeavour to fund or 
~iscount treasury bills was likely to have adverse repercussions 
I 
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on interest rates. In any case, the success of funding operations 
in particular would depend on whether the cooperation of the Loan 
,Council could be secured. And the Bank's only attempt to issu~ 
treasury bi 11 s as an instrument of s hart-term monetary. po 1 icy was ) 
foiled in 1936 by the deliberate action of the Bank of New South Wale 
to thwart the operation by.raising interest rates on deposits. ) 
Furthermore, the Commonwea 1th Bank was unable to rely on the purchas 
and sale of long-dated government bonds for the purpose of influenc-
lng the cash reserves of the banks - again, largely because of the 
narrov1 width of the market for government paper in Australia at 
the time. And, moreover, the meagre extent of the ·commonwealth 
Bank's trading business precluded it from trying to alter the cash 
reserves of the private banks by attracting deposits and advances 
from the banks. Similarly, its minor share of banking business(, 
and the lack of legislative authority, provided little scope for l 
the Bank to control interest rates, which, in any event, was thoJght 
to be a rather weak ins~rument, inasmuch as i,ts impa.ct upon loc(a~ 
credit conditions was concerned. A 11 in a 11 , therefore, the 
Bank's powers to influence the cash ratios of the private banks 
were considered to be especially weak. \ 
This, however, 1·1as only part of its prcbkm so fa1- as 
the control of credit went. If the Bank were actually successful 
in altering the banks' reserves, the extent of the contraction or 
expansion in the volume of their advances depended on ho1-1 much 
the banks were willing to cooperate with the Bank. More specifically 
-· -·- - - .. 
the banks could respond to the change in their re~erves 
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by allowing their cash reserve ratios to fluctuate - a response which 
was not uncommon - and hence their advance policies would be un-
constrained by central bank action, thereby reducing the impact on 
,.....·-"'·-"-... 
the credit base. The Bank knew, from past experience, that co-
operation by the private banks - especially the Bank of N.S.W. - was not 
to be assumed and that it could not depend on the banks' support for 
effective policy implementation. In these circumstances, it was not 
long before the Commission set about to examine the possibility of 
using another instrument which was quite popular in other countries, 
namely, the imposition of a legal obligation upon the private banks 
to maintain a variable proportion of their cash deposits with the 
Indeed, the Commission came strongly to favour this 
\
central bank. 
arrangement, which it believed would ·allow the Bank to regulate the 
credit structure. 
Although the Bank believed that insufficient control over 
domestic credit inhibited it from smoothing out fluctuations in the 
level of internal activity, it also felt that' its inability to 
maintain domestic economic stability was due in part to its tack of 
authority over the London funds of the. private banks. By possessinq 
: J1he ability to regulate these funds - to run them up when export . 
;..J". 
. .;;:.· ·'•·<· ~~receipts and loan funds v1ere buoyant, and run them down lvhen importS 
cJJ ere excessive and receipts from exports and loans were at a low ebb 
the Bank believed that it would be able to exert an additional 
influence upon the internal credit situation. And, moreover, by 
controlling London funds in this manner it would be able to bring 
greater influence to bear upon the exchange rate. (7) 
Thus it was that the Royal Commission, both in its 
84 
examination of witnesses and in its own deliberations, 
of its time giving consideration both to a system 
- whereby the private banks would be compelled to lodge 
Proportion of their deposits with the Commonwealth Bank -
renewed Mobiliziation Agreement - which would allow the 
Bank greater control over the foreign reserves of the banking 
system. 
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Cf/APTER THREE 
MONETARY ANO BANKING OBJECTIVES 
Although the Royal Commission examined a wide range of 
issues during its investigation of the Australian banking and 
monetary systems, two matters that exercised much of the Commissi 
attention were the objectives of monetary and banking riol icy, 
the instruments by which these objectives might be achieved. 
chapter seeks to investigate the first issue, while the second is 
and 
Thi 
examined in the next chapter. 
The.broad objectives of the monetary and banking systems 
may be said to be two in number. 
To begin with, there is a micro-
economic objective, namely, the provision of banking services, 
including the mobilization of savings, the allocation of savings, 
the furnishing of funds for investment, 
and the provisioning of the 
Secondly, the maintenance of 
government's credit requirements. 
economic stability is the principal macroeconomic objective. 
can be divided into internal and external stabilization goals. 
Internal balance r:nnsists of fc:ll emp10.\'111er;t and st.;b1e pnces, while 
This 
external balance comprises equilibrium in the balance 
of payments. 
It is assumed that the attainment 
of these aims will contribute to 
the economic Prosperity and welfare of the people of Australia. 
Recognizing that these objectives are occasionally inconsistent, a 
choice must often be made between them. 
the views of the Commissioners regarding both internal and external 
This chapter will examine 
4~ 
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objectives, and wil I focus attention also on the opinions of the 
four main groups of witnesses who appeared before the Commission, 
namely, the economists, the central bankers, government officials, 
and private bankers. 
While the Commission directed some of its attention to the 
objective, decidedly more emphasis was placed on the second. 
The private bankers, with the possible exception of Alfred Davidson, 
General Manager of the Bank of N.S.W., seemed more concerned with 
:\ 
, !the efficient provision of banking services, but the economists, 
Commonwealth Bank officials, and government officials were all 
the preservation of stability in the economy. The ·1 
last three groups primarily expounded the need to maintain internal 
rather than external sta~though there were important exceptions. 
This difference of focus no doubt contributed to the confusion in the~ ~ 
the private bankers when they read the Royal Commission's 
It seemed to them to uphold the private banking system in 
Australia, proclaiming as it did that the banks were doing reasonably 
in providing banking services, though there was a need for mortgage 
facilities for fixed and long-term lending and additional facilities 
to supply the capital needs of small secondary industries. On the 
other hand, the Report recommended that the banking system should 
be subjected to g1·eate1· control by the cuthorities, since it had 
failed in the past to maintain economic stability. It took some 
time for the bankers to realize that these were separate issues and 
that the ;<eport was not indeed self-con :rad i ctory. ( 1 J 
..... 
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The Royal Commission and the Private Bankers on the.Issue of Benkina 
Services 
The Royal Commission included in its Report a short dissertation on 
the first objective when it discussed the ideal structure and 
functions of the private trading banks. Whereas the central bank's 
duty was to regulate the volume of credit and currency, the function 
of the private banks was to mobilize and distribute the volume of 
credit throughout the economy. In discharging these responsibil-
ities, the private banks were obliged to protect the funds deposited 
with them. The Report readily acknowledged that the banks had an 
important ro 1 e to play in the economy: "They pro vi de facilities for 
operating on bank deposits by cheque, and they also collect some 
of the savings of the community, and lend to commerce and ind~stry 
! ? ) 
for working capital, and to a less extent for fixed capital."··- It 
added that, insofar as these banks sought to act in their own 
interests in pursuit of profit, some limitation of their powers was 
necessary to protect the public from inappropriate credit policies; 
·the central bank's duty, tlierefore, was to try 'to regulate credit 
in a manner which would cause the banks' interests to coincide-1~ith 
the public interest. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Bank was 
advised to "pay some regard to the distribution by the banks o"' the 
volume of cred1.: amongst diffe1·2nt industries", ond to ensure :.hat 
an adequate amcunt of credit ;·:as avai !able. (J) 
Apart from Davidson, the private bankers in their evidenc~. 
however, were ~enerally conservative and much absorbed with the 
day-to-day management of their banking responsibilities, so much 
..... "fe. 
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:. so that the Commission found it difficult to draw out their thoughts 
on the. 1;ider aspects and objectives of monetary policy. This 
. attitude of the bankers is naturally understandable, since their 
chief concern is with the provision -0f banking services and the 
their own interests, rather than with matters of 
high economic policy. Thus Sir John ~hillips', the Commission's 
'Assistant Economist, comment to the author that the private bankers 
"were pretty good people in their own field but not with a very 
outlook on banking and its modern meaning. They were [then] 
l 
much the centre of the financial syste1TL"( 4J G.D. Healy, 
Chairman of the Associated Banks of Victoria and Superintendent of j -,J .)"-e, 
~~~_:_'.!alasi_a, exemplified the private bankers' approach 
chose to confine his attention to the main functions of the 
banks. All the major facilities provided by the banks 
were enumerated by him when he was asked to summarize the main 
responsibilities of the trading banks. In short, the banks were: 
engaged mainly in financing production, trade 
and industry. Deposits, which they receive 
from many sources, are lent to persons engaged 
in trade and industry, to financial interests·, 
to governments, to primary producers and to 
others. Financing Australia's export and import 
trade employs a large part of their funds. (5) 
Among other services, he pointed out that the banks accepted fixed 
deposits, provided cheque facilities, rade arrangements for the 
transfer of funds, helped float public loans, and met government 
commitments in London. 
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There were, however, two areas in which banking admin-
istration was lacking. First, Healy and other private bankers 
conceded that existing facilities for small secondary industries 
were inadequate, although it is true that these witnesses were 
rather hesitant to admit at length the difficulties faced by such 
industries in securing necessary finance, for fear of being criticized 
for this deficiency} 6l Second, it became clear to some that there was· 
need for the establishment of facilities for long-term lending, 
especially for the primary industries. The banks admitted that 
even when they engaged in long-term lending, such a practice was not 
encouraged. The banks' attitude was well portrayed by Ernest 
O'Sullivan, Joint General Manager of the English, Scottish and 
Australian Bank, who informed the Commission that "we do not commit 
ourselves to long-term loans to industry. Such accommodation 
should be obtained by the issue of shares or debentures. I do 
not think any further facilities are necessary. All worthy objects 
can be catered for by existing institutions." (?) 
The Royal Commission on the Issue of Economic Stability 
and monetary systems de31t Of the two major objectives of the banking 
with during the inquiry. the second 
- concerning as it did the genclral 
aim of maintaining economic stability - was indubitably the most 
important. Indeed, to some extent, the first issue was examined 
more in the light of how it would best promote the achievement of 
the other objective, rather than as a distinct aim in itself. 
,.;.'..:;~....:,·,.,., 
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The Report was, however, fairly vague in enunciating the stability 
While it admitted that an ideal system should be 
objeC:tive. 
flexible enough to help facilitate an efficient and full employment 
of resources, and promote a reduction of fluctuations in economic 
activity, further details and interpretation were to be left to the 
government's discretion. 
Thus, it asserted in a notable passage 
that: 
The general objective of an economic system for 
Australia should be to achieve the best use of 
our productive resources, both present and 
future. This means the fullest possible 
employment of people and resources under 
conditions that will provide the highest standard 
of living. It means, too, the reduction of 
fluctuations in general economic activity. 
Since the monetary and banking system is an 
integral part of the economic system, its 
objective wil I be to assist with all the means 
at its disposal in achieving these ends. {8) 
'---· best achieve this goal, al I Commissioners, apart from Chifley, 
favoured "a system in which there is a government-owned central 
bank, regulating the volume of credit and currency, and, 'as an 
integral part of the system', privately-owned ·banks, which 
. distribute that volume". (9) 
L 
In commenting upon the objective of economic stability in 
'--. 
some1·1hat greater detail, the Report tended to place rather more· J 
emphasis on stabilizing -t~e Jevel of domestic activity than on 1 \ I 
internal price stability and exchange stability - although the 
achievement of the latter, in particular, was recognized as being 
important for the success of the forme~-. The Commonv1ea l th Bank 
, . L 
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was advised not to pursue a policy of altering the volume of credit 
according to variations in a particular price index. Several 
reasons were advanced for this view, of which the most important 
was the practical difficulty of there being no unambiguous indicator 
of how much change in the volume of credit would be required for a 
given increase or decrease in the price level. Instead, the Bank 
was to use movements in prices simply as a guide in formulating and 
i mpl ementi ng its po 1 icy. The maintenance of stability of exchange 
with sterling was likewise considered to be worthy of achievement 
and well-advised, but it was regarded to be of secondary importance. 
Although the advantcges of a stable exchange rate for exporters and 
importers were recognized, the difficulty of carrying out such a 
\policy was also made explicit. In fact, the Commissioners c•-iticiz 
the Bank's adherence to a policy of exchange stability; the ""i xed 
1931 was 
condemned. Apart from these subordinate policies, the 
ultimate objective of the Commonwealth Bank should be the preservation 
of stability in the internql level of economic activity. (lO) The 
British Macmillan Committee Report had previo'usly stated that Nie 
chief object of a central bank was "to maintain the stability of 
international prices both over long periods and over short per~od 
The Australian "oyal Commission, however, was adamant in dec12~ing 
that the princiJal ojjective of economic policy should be the 
"reduction of fluctuations in general economic activity 
For this purpose, the Commission claimed that the money supply 
would have to be varied inversely with the level of economic 
activity. While i: was hoped that the exchange rate could be 
--
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maintained at a reasonably stable rate, the Commission took the 
view that it should be adjusted in the event of instability in 
the level of domestic activity. Thus, if the choice had to be.~~. 
between stability of output and stability of the exchange rate, 
the monetary authorities should opt made 
the Commission recommended that 
3q(Jt''l~ tho fonOOf ~ ~ 
The Vi e1; of l.Jitnesses on Internal Stability 
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Some attempt will be made here, and in the following section, to 
identify what the different groups of v1itnesses expressed before 
th• Co~i;;ioo coocecoiog the j;;oe of m'iotoioiog ecooomic ;t,bility. . .~ \\[Ji.;_,) 
Ideally, all the witnesses ~esir~_tab_ility both in the level of ., .i f'Y1..r---
domestic activity and in the exchange rate. They realized, never- 1$' u;;,;;;,th;~-i ;~~";;- ,;;~;.,Y,-;e ~~:;;, l • to ochi e" both th"e Ii) 
object i "' ; i mo'""°"' lY ood i o the "eo t of ' coo fl i ct ' choi ce (}<'~~, 
wool d o lt im"' lY hm to be m,de bet<'" th"". The co '"' , i o f<ct, ~6" "-
considerable disagreement 
among the various witnesses as to the 
priori.ti which should be placed upon 
internal stability on the one 
Thus, some 
hand, and exchange stability on the other hand. 
minimizing fluctuations in the 
witnesses placed their emphasis on 
rate of exchange, 
while others believed the smoothing of aberrations 
Many of those who 
in the domestic economy was more import.ant. 
selected the broad objective of intern21 stabil1ty '"E:1"1t one step 
further and declared their dedication either to price stability or 
Insofar as government 
to the maintenance of full employment. 
officials did not comment upon the objectives of policy - as they 
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were not specifically asked to do so - the discussion 
on the views of the economists, the Commonwealth Bank officials, an: 
the private trading bankers. Although the issue of economic stabilit 
as such, was not of great concern to the private bankers - with the 
exception of Davidson - they were asked at length about the 
desirability of exchange stability; this issue will be dealt with 
after an investigation into what the various witnesses in the remain-
ing two groups the economists and the Commonwealth bankers 
said about internal stability. 
'"'.""'\ 
Commonwealth bankers, excluding the Chairman of the Bank Board, 
The economists, with perhaps one exception, and the i 
shared the opinions of the Commission concerning the maintenance ff 
internal stability as the primary objective of the monetary auth/~ities 
most of these witnesses believed that a reduction of fluctuation~ 
in business activity was highly desirable. I Yet beyond these ··· 
generalizations there were divergent points of view, especially 
between the CoITTTJission and the economists, on t~e one hand, and the 
Commonwealth Bank Board on the other. Whil~ the Royal Cornmi~sion 
was concerned that monetary policy should seek to maintain sta~ility 
in the level of domestic economic activity even if that meant 
some degree of price instability, though it hoped that the autnorities 
could secure boc::~ price stability and stability in the level o:'" 
activity the Bank Board appears to have placed greater weig~t 
on price stability. 
--.._ 
The opinions of the economists, on the other 
hand, more closely resembled those that were ultimately expressed by 
the Commission; tne Commissioners and the economists stressed 
the importance c~ recucing fluctuations in the level of domestic J 
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activity and maintaining full employment rather than price 
stabi.lity or, in other words, the fullest use of Australia's 
productive resources. Indeed, for the most part, the economists 
. tended to emphasize full employment even more than the Commissioners. 
,. Apart from these broad intra-group differences, however, opinions 
·.within the ranks of the two groups also varied. For example, J 
L.G. Melville, tconomist to the Commonwealth Bank, and Sir Claude 
Reading, Chairman of the Bank Board, emphasized exchange stability, 
and their views will be more appropriately discussed under that 
heading in the following section of this chapter. 
While the Commonwealth Bank Board generally favoured the 
preservation of stability in the internal level of economic activity, 
the maint~nance of relatively stable prices and especially the 
prevention of an inf I ationary boom - was uppermost in the minds 
of the Board members. Sir Ernest Riddle, Governor of the 
Commonwealth Bank, appeared before the Commission on behalf of the 
Board as a whole. The majority of Bocrd members held that a key ·"1 ~";\, 
.Y'' -
~ 
i 
-,.1: 
~../- ' 
f" 
objective of the centra I bank was the preservation of the internal . · · I 
' - ' ~ ·.,,~"'\; 
- •'-"'0 
value of the currency, and, as a means to that end, the Bank should\(" . ,, 
seek to regulate internal credit. They were in agreement with the\ 
\ 
general principle announced in a resolution at the World Economic 
Conference in 1933, namely, that the central bank should regulate 
the aggregate volume of credit in order to mitigate undue 
fluctuations in business activity and in the internal value of 
the Australian currency. (lj) Thus, although Riddle indicated 
that the Commonwealth bankers sought to avoid instability in the 
level of activity as well. as price inst3bility, he explained that 
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the primary consideration of the Bank was to maintain the internal 
value of the currency, and hence to avoid fluctuations in the 
price level. He admitted, however, 
own opinion, since the Bank had only 
policy and had yet to clarify it. 
that he was expressing his 
recently decided upon its 
As he saw it, the Board aimed 
for price stability, "not in ·the sense of a condition that excludes 
all change but in the sense of a condition that excludes wide or 
rapid fluctuations to which ·the community cannot readily adjust 
itself."· (l 4 ) Indeed, it was revealed that some internal stabi l~t 
and employment might have to be sacrificed in order to prevent 
an unhealthy expansion of credit from developing into a boom and 
then depression: If the Bank detected the development of an '<'. .. 
inflationary trend in the economy, it would induce a reduction in \ 
the level of economic activity. Riddle justified such action by 
stating that a gradual credit contraction and a slowing down ir. 
the rate at which the unemployed were absorbed would be preferable \ 
to a sudden and larger crash at the end. Cop\~ ~ .-
The economists, 
the central bank's primary 
of productive resources 
on the other hand, generally believec_that 
duty was to ensure the ful I employment 
and thus to maintain ·internal stabi\ity 
Since their views more clcsely 
expressed in the Commission's Report, 
through the regulatlon of credit. 
coincided with t~ose finally 
it is fair to sc:y that they exerted the most significant influence 
upon the Commission. In private interviews with the author 
-----Melville, Coombs, anc Phillips all agreed that the economists' 
evidence carried perhaps the greatest weight both durin.g-arnJ--a fter 
~~--~~~~~~~~~~~·~ 
. ..\·-
:%::S~~4~~S"'t.j;hifil~~~t~~a.....,~m- ;;;;gs::: 
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inquiry. (lS) 
_---:-----
Unlike the Bank Board, the economists did not 
el i eve internal price stability was of utmost importance; 
for 
'hem, the greatest emphasis should be p1aced overall on the fullest 
JS€ of resources 
that is, on the minimization of fluctuations 
domestic economic activity, and especially on the achievement 
the full employment of labour. 
And indeed, four of the economists 
':ho appeared before the Commission believed that credit and currency 
the main means by which full employment and long-term 
economic stability could be attained. 
While the Commission 
that the ultimate objective of the Commonwealth Bank should 
of domestic instability and the maintenance of 
as-full-as-practicable employment during unavoidable credit ~ 
contractions - the economists generaily tended, as a group, 
to''"''' f"11 <mploym<Pt •bo•< •11 ,7,,. Th<c< "'"'' of ''""'~ 
'"'''' of opioioo '''" •mPP9 ,,oooml't'. Foe '''mp1,, '"' ~~~~ ·~ 
- J.B. Brigden - placed greater emphasis on maintaining 
I a steady level of internal business activity without mentioning 
full employment.(l 5l Others varied their opinion by referring to the / I 
significance of a high level of real nctional income and inco~ 
P'" "''d. lodeed, Giblio'• ,,id'"'' 1oc.1•d'd '" iot•c,,tiog ··~ 
discourse on income distribution. (ll) And some economists listed 
price stability and currency stability as highly important, though of 
secondary signiflcance as objectives o7 the monetary and banking systems. 
J.B. Brigden, for example 
then the Director of the 
Queensland Bureau of Industry and the ~armer Director of the Bureau's 
predecessor, the Bureau of Economics and Statistics 
maintained that 
the centra1 bank shou1d provide contro: of credit and currency 
--
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in order to achieve steady business conditions_(lB) Professor 
Professor of Economics at the University of 
Tor] ei v Hytten 
Tasmania, ~nd Economic Adviser to the Bank of N.S.W. 
that the central bank should 
agreec' 
be the guardian of credit 
which meant control both of the note issue as well as the entire 
creation of credit. 
Yet he also said that the Bank should strive 
to achieve as its basic objective the maximum employment consistent 
with long-term stability. He added that fluctuations 
activity should be minimized, although 
in ecoriomic 
a compromise between 
stability on 
desirable. 
the one hand and progress on 
This latter point was later 
the other was likewise 
Commission's Re::iort. 
incorporated in the 
As Hytten explained: 
To the extent that economic activity falls below 
this [full employment] level, the resources of a 
country are wasted. l·lhen this state of affairs 
has been brought about, the central banks should 
concentrate on confining fluctuations in economic 
activity vli thin reasonable limits. Insofar as 
it succeeds in this, the value of the currency 
is also likely to remain comparatively stable. 
These fluctuations in economic activity are 
never entirely ciue to monetary causes: but their 
intensity may be considerably lessened by 
en 1 i ghtened monetary action. The· part the 
banking system should play is to equate the money 
savings of the community with the investment 
in caoital equipment, so that neither does such 
investment exceed savings, nor savings exceed investment. (19) 
Simil2r vi:ows were expressed by Dr. E.R. walker, LecL:"er 
in Economics at the '.!niversity of Sydney, who reviewed 
objectives of the monetary and banking systems as they 
the different 
had evo 1 "'ed 
in Australia, and ex:lained 
aims above all others. 
why he stressed the achievement of ~wo 
Just as Hytten placed greater emphasis 
'•""'ii•'··i·''"·'· 
~~~~--=== ___ , 
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on full employment, Walker favoured, on the other hand, the 
·avoidance, or mitigation, of depressions and unemployment. But, 
on the other hand, stabilization of the purchasing power of money 
'was also deemed necessary. In the event of an inconsistency 
b_etween these goals, the prevention of depression was to him the 
.more important. He explained, moreover, that the widespread. 
·acceptance of the prevention of unequally distributed changes in 
the ownership of wealth and the avoidance of depressions as objects 
·of monetary policy had become features of economic pol icy in the 
. (20) 
·twentieth century. v ~ "-.., s~~~ ~ / Price stability was nevertheless supported by him on the 
----
grounds that "violent changes in price levels involve sudden 
- 1 h . h d. t . b t. . l th " ( 21 ) - · f unsoc1a c anges 1n t e is ri u ion o< wea • 1he ch1e sources 
of Walker's beliefs were said to have been J.M. Keynes and 
Professor Irving Fisher, who both had recommended price stability; 
they had asserted that this objective should have precedence over 
the maintenance of the gold standard and a stable exchange rate. 
Another economist, J.L.R. Gifford, Lecturer in Economics 
/ 
at the University of Queensland, revealed that his ideas were also 
basically Ke~nesian, but Keynes of .The "]eneral 0 Theo~y rather tha~l 
of the ::·~·eat-:.se on Money. For l11m, crie Bank s ObJect1ve shoul:J 
be to strive towards maintaining as-full-as-practicable employment 
and to prevent general trade depressions. He differed from 
other economists, however, in stating t~at the central bank should 
aim at sustaining booms without encour~~ing or permitting excessive 
credit expansion. (22 ) 
...., 
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Similarly, both A.G.B. Fisher - Professor of Economics at 
the University of lvestern Australia and temporary Economist to the 
Bank of New South Wales in 1934 and W.B. Reddaway, Research , 
Fellow in Economics at the University of Melbourne, emphasized thJ~ 
importance of the full employment of resources. The Commission, 
was also impressed, in some measure, by Fisher's assertion that the 
central bank's primary objective should be to ensure an efficient 
distribution and use of the volume of one resource in particular, 
that is, savings. It may be recalled that Brigden and Hytten 
had directed some of their attention at currency control; similarly, 
Fisher named currency stability as the second function of the Bank. 
Taking these objectives together, he declared that the central bank 
should coordinate the banking system as a whole in order to ensure 
that the errors of an uncoordinated system were avoided as much as 
possible. Stability of the currency and the prevention of 
depression would be incidental to the establishment of a proper 
equilibrium between savings and capital expenditure~ZJ) Reddaway, 
too, stressed that the fundamental goal of the central bank ought 
to be to assist the economic system in the athievement of the~ 
optimum use of productive resources, both present and future, so· 
far as was possible by monetary means. More specifically, he 
argued that the Bank should seek to enable the economic system to 
secure the maximum real national income now and in the future by 
promoting the full employment of resources. He added that, foi-
this purpose, the central bank should deliberately regulate the 
internal level of credit~ 24 l 
~-,.~:;.·,.~v~·'*·~""-.,,...~~"'"" ... ,._..., ..... ...,..,~.,,...,., .... _._ 
~ 
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Professor L.F. Giblin a ~ember of the Commonwealth 
Bank Board and Ritchie Professor of Economics at the University of 
affirmed that his views largely coincided with those 
of Reddaway. But he stated firmly, in addition, that the aims I 
i -,of the Bank should be identical to those of the government: It 
-•-i-.·~-"-~'··· ,_, -
\ 
·ought to represent a compromise between the views of opposing 
alternative governments in order to secure the welfare of all 
\ 
I that is, the greatest real income per head of the 
population. He advised the Bank to keep two points in mind, I 
.first, that an excessively unequal income distribution was undesirabld; 
and, second, the population of Australia should increase at a moderatk 
Apart from this vague, but somewhat unique reference to 
income distribution, the attainment of a situation of full employ-
ment was declared by Gib1in to be the ~undamental, overriding aim 
- (25) 
of monetary policy. 
I 
I 
I 
___ ,' 
Presented on the Topic of Exchange Stability 
the objective of internal stability v1as strongly endorse_d by 
many witnesses, some others especially Melville, Reading and 
the private bankers - preferred to direct somewhat greater attention 
to the question of exchange stability. Most of those who were 
asked to comment about this objective (Ecognized the importance of 
exchange stability, but there were differences of opinion as to the 
degree of stability that should be sou9ht, and the means of securing 
this end_ There was no consensus on the issue of whether or not 
Australia should return to the gold standard. Li ke1-1i se, the 
reasons 1·1hy some degree of flexibility in the exchange rate should 
l 02 
be permitted also varied both between, and within, the differert 
groups of witnesses. For the most part, the private bankers were 
favourably disposed to exchange rate stability, though more than 
half of them - and especially Davidson - were not prepared to 
"t h ld . b . 11 . (Z 5) argue that l s ou remain sta le in a circumstances. 
while the Commonwealth bankers felt for the most part that a stable 
exchange rate w<:s generally desirable, they were prepared to 
this objective for internal price stability. Reading, however, 
differed to some extent from the other Board members by placins 
relatively greater stress on exchange stabilization. Yet he, too, 
admitted that this objective should not be pursued at all costs~Z?) 
On the other hand, while none of the economists saw the necessity 
---. 
to maintain an c.bsolutely stable exchange rate they did see some 
benefits in preserving a measure of short-term stability. 
·-----
St il I, 
they were convinced, for the most part, that internal stab.ility, 
and full employment in particular, were ultimately to be preferred 
to exchange stability in the event of incompatibility between tnes 
1goal S. In fact, the views of the economists most especiall 
hose of Melville, f-!ytten, and i·!clker - made their greatest i'.'ipact 
upon the Commission on this issue. 
\ 
It is 7air to say that, overal I, the economists were 
relatively more ~repfr~d than the bankers to allow greater exch~nge 
ate flexibility in order to maintain full employment: Some eco~.omis-::s, 
to be sure, were somewhat more inclined than others to place stress 
on exchange stab'.lization, but even they acknowledged that movecents 
in the exchange rate ~ould be required in certain circumstances. 
.~.~..:.,>• .. :-····' 
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lville stood apart, both from the maj:irity of economists and 
Commonwealth Bank Board members, in advocating 
as the central aim of monetary policy. 
a fixed exchange 
He did not, however, 
~
rigidity, recognizing as he did that there might be 
yccasions when adjustment to the rate of exchange was necessary. 
·':?ecause of Melville's position as Economist to the Commonwealth 
• ~ank, his influence on the Commission, and his later prominence as 
an adviser to Austra1ian governments, it is instructive to_provide "-~1-1. 
somewhat greater detail concerning his viev:s. He explained that -~ l) l 
stabi 1 ity in the exchange rate could be achieved if an adequate \ \- V:JU Gt·\! \) ut IA 
accumulated and subsequently maintained ~· balance of London funds was 
through regulation of the domestic credit leve1. 
And the pol icy f'<Z- Cc--vv\... 
lt~ 
!k., {;;" ,? b h~J·/ f.) of a fixed exchange rate, he maintained, might more adequately 
enable the monetary authorities to secure the ultimate objectives 
of the monetary and banking systems namely, stability in 
/I- D ).,(;l, 
business activity, maximum production cf goods 
as full employment as was practicable.(28) 
Gv(~,v1 
In an interview with --/~ 
and services, and 
the author, he explained that while he was the dank's Economist he 
recognized the importance of these objectives., but he also rea"i-ized 
it was very 1 i kely that a choice might nave to be made between t3o ----~l 
of them. Thus, he specified one target and guideline - exchange \ 
in an attempt to prevent the monetary c:uthoriti _J 
rate fixation 
from making a wrong decision and formul=.ting an inconsistent monetary 
It is his opinion, however, that the Commission merely 
inc 1 ud i ng morE than one object iye ;in its 
In addition, whereas "~st of t~e<Jfo~.~i~~~~J~A~:..·< 
policy. 
comp~d the issue, by 
Report _(29) 
·'·':;,'., 
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commented on the subject of the gold standard were adamant about 
its inappropricteness as an international monetary system, 
especially for Australia, Melville's view on the matter was 
equivocal. lvhile he considered the gold standard to be the 
suitable basis for monetary policy for the world as a whole, 
stability with sterling was preferred for Australia. He 
contended, moreover, that the exchange rate should not be fixed 
week by week, or month by month; 
instead, he envisaged the ideal 
of a stable exchange rate as a sort of working hypothesis in 
Which a constant relationship between the Australian pound and 
the British pound would facilitate the achievement of stability 
in the exchange rate. 
As he put it, "I think we should think 
in terms of a stable exchange for all ordinary occasions ... (30J In 
this way, retaliation by other nations could be dismissed as 
presenting a real threat. 
Ultimately, however, even he conceded 
I that the most important objective was the provision of a maxim~~ I ~~~\.!output of goods and services, and he was prepared to admit tha~ ~~ 
exchange rate stability might have to be foregone in order to 
attain this end. 
In essence, the rate of exchange should not 
be maintained through "thick and thin", but he also believed the 
rate should be adjusted only when rare, exceptional circumstances 
. . (31) . 
warranted an al:erat1on. He explained that the rate shc~ld 
not generally be allo•1ed to vary in response to normal movements 
in the volume of London funds, though such variations should, f0r 
the most part, be per!'.litted to affect the state of the domestic 
economy. The internal economy should not, however, always be 
~-1(;:"1i.;$:~,..,.;.~~~~~T....C,"::O·~~~""'""·...-.-~. ~.--~-- · 
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for every rise or fall in Lor.don funds. If it ~1ere a 
'mall, or temporary movement, "no action need be taken to adapt 
he in terna 1 economy to the altered conditions"; if the trend 
~s expected to continue indefinitely, however, "there would need 
1:~ 
o be a contraction, or expansion, of credit - gentle at first, 
applied with increasing severity until the internal economy 
suitably modified."( 3Zl 
Moreover, London funds might become so large, due to some 
xtraordinary cause, that the exchange rate might have to be 
In addition, he discussed several 
exchange rate might be adjusted. 
other situations in 
If, for example, it 
to vary the nominal wage rate in response to a sudden 
hange in prices, then the exchange rate ought to be moved instead. 
elater explained to the author that although he believed some 
~I ~gree of inflation might be tolerat~d, there were times when the 
intenance of a stable price level should assume priority. If, 
erefore, the economy was in a state of basic disequilibrium and 
flation was either infeasible or undesirable, rather than adapt 
e economy to a fixed exchange rate, the adjustment should be 
In ' I de through an appropriate change in the exchange rate. 
although the rate of exchange should generally be kept / 
i 
_stable, 1n the case of a conflict between the achievement of a { 
of goods and services anc full employment on the one J 
hand, and exchange stability on the other, it might well be :J 
appropriate to adjust the rat.e in the 'interest of the former aim. 
'\ ~"\-\~(\{\\) . ~. 
l 06 
He adqed that, in retrospect, the objective of a stable exchange 
accomplished if people had been more dedicated rate might have been 
. (33) to this end. . 
For the rest, however, the economists who appeared before 
the Commission generally stressed the importance of greater exchange 
·rate flexibility for the achievement of full employment, though 
saw merit in 
attempting to keep the exchange rate as stable as 
For example, while Giblin did not share Melville's 
conviction that exchange stabilization should be the principal 
target of monetary policy, he recognized the positive value of a 
possible. 
relatively stable rate of exchange. In fact, their views on 
some aspects of the subject were quite similar. Both, for 
example, tended to oppose Australia's return to the gold standard, 
but Giblin acknowledged that it might be appropriate in certair: 
circumstances; as a general rule he implied that it was not necessary 
for the maintenance of exchange stability. He preferred, instead, 
to think of this regime as.a symptom, rather thilll the cause, of 
stability, saying that it "is not a question of being on a golE 
standard. The question is how certain you are to remain on 1t. 
It is stability you l·1ant 
not any particular technique of measuring 
Indeed, Giblin was surprised by the extent to l"lhich 
it. ,,(34) 
economists agreed on the question of exchange 
rate policy, GiffJrd -
him being an ex.:eption. The 
re2sons for changing the exchangE ra ti= 
and the differer.ces regarding the proper amount of movement which 
were advanced by variaus economists, reflected, Giblin said, s;;::oll 
disparities of oainion of no great importance.C35 J 
<.,?,,f>;.,;s...,,;i<.-:F·~.: 
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Discrepancies were bound to arise in part from inadequate 
- which prevented identification of the stage of 
that had been reached - and in part from different points 
Some groups of witnesses - the trading banks, for example -
uld stress the short-run effect of policy on business, while the 
entral bank, Treasury, and perhaps many economists, would emphasize 
long-run effects. These differences of opinion were no cause 
..... ~·.··-·-····--·--.......,._, 
' -. 
concern as 1 ong as they w~re. not-··pnshect···to ··extremes. --.8,p..,s i ca 11 y, 
favoured a stab1e·e~~·hange rate for two reasons. For a s~'a\·J, r I l 
.,it would encc~ur~-~~· new flows of private investment from overseas,.,\. ~'v\ 
, ' 
sustain recovery and facilitate the drive towards.\~ \ .,... 
Exchange stability would serve to revive inter- \ \.., ! 
natio_nal trade and would lead to a greater export income, which, in ](./ 
. 0\~ 
tur9', would stimulate overseas investment and encourage population / () 
Yet, although he believed the central bank should peg / ,...-, 
\ to ensure there would be only small movements v1ithin n.~.r'(ow (-d.,,l 
. \ / 
· 1imi"-ts about a particular rate, internal considerations and •. tne 
...... ..·· 
' / dorriina1:-~.IJ9 objective of full employment remained UP_f?.?Pmbst in his 
""-.... . ..--- -
stil i';-st1f-f.i.0nt justification _fpr;...vat'S:-f~g the exchange- rate 
-~., .. ,, __ , ___ ,.., ....... ~·"·-~-"··· 
would be required. Also, external events might create the need 
to alter the relation with sterling in order to avoid, for example, 
the threct of ?. temporary boom or protr·acted deflation and unempl oy-
ment. ~nd, in the event of a large disaster, a decline in the 
exchange rate might be the appropriate remedy: 
l 08 
It cannot prevent or cure the first loss, but 
it can distribute it more evenly through the 
community. Without this depreciation, some 
part of the community might bear the whole of 
the first loss (e.g. export producers if the 
cause was a fa 11 in export prices) ... But it 
would be unwise, purely from internal 
considerations, to carry the exchange movement 
so far as to preserve intact the real ·income 
of the class first hit ... An all-round tightening 
of the belt is necessary, with variations up and 
down according to the ability and willingness of 
the various sections to stand it without damage 
to the structure of industry. (36) "0'\dlAi-~j\~ 
Alternatively, a tremendous rise in world prices would constitute 
another of the occasions when the exchange rate should be adjusted. 
If prices rose very high, Australia should move to parity with 
sterling and, perhaps, on to gold if necessary. ~\\ ~ \"; ,\\ --
Simiiarly, although Reddaway recognized the advantages '/ 
of exchange stability, he also believed the exchange rate shoG1d 
be altered when there was sufficient cause for adjustment for 
example, if internal stability and a high level of employment 1·1ere · 
seriously threatened. 
I 
In fact, he thought, ideally, that a poli~y 
of maximizing real national income would be best achieved 
by allowing the exchange rate to find its own level. But the-
existence of various unmanageable forces, however, meant that this 
would be very difficult. It was for this reason that he advocated 
an alternativE, le>.s ambitious oolicy that is, "the maintenan1 
of stable exch~nge coupled with only modest variations in internaJ 
Certainly he did not subscribe to the view that 
Australia ough: to have returned to parity with sterling afte,-
policy." ( 3 7) 
sterling left gold, but he aven-ed that the central feature o-: poiicy 
·~\$fi;:;;t;y.12~.;-·:-' 
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puld be a stable rate of exchange between fl.ustrai ian currency 
~ sterling, and this "is, in fact, simply a continuation of the 
ntral] bank's present policy"_( 3B) f!.part from the convenience this 
offered to traders, it was desirable for several other reasons. 
r example, it represented a reasonably well defined policy - which 
ght attract overseas capital 
and it could be carried out 
.thout difficulty, except in abnormal times, with three qualifications. 
rst, if a shortage of London funds were to render the Commonwealth 
· nk incapable of preventing the depreciation of the rate; here, although 
~ recognized that a relatively minor setback could make it difficult 
o.r the Bank to combine exchange stability with the most desirable 
,fnternal policy, a fixed exchange rate was nevertheless desirable. 
he advanced the view that it was very difficult to know 
a change in the volume of London funds was temporary or 
and hence whether the rate should be maintained or 
And third, if a movement in the rate was deemed necessary, 
be extremely difficult to decide the amount by which it 
: should be adjusted. It was desirable, therefore, for the Bank 
to maintain a reasonably stable rate of exchange, but this did-not 
authorities should not attempt to regulate internal 
While these 
credit in order to secure a high level of employment. 
tl'IO policies could normally be execute<:' more or less independently, 
it was acknowledged that if a conflict :irose between internal 
stability and exchange stability, and t'.lere was a very clear case 
for an alteration in the exchange rate, thpn the latter objective 
would have to be sacrificed for the fof.iler. 
Reddaway, in fact, 
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did not think there would be much difference in practice between 
his views and those of Hytten; he agreed with Melville, however, 
that the rate should not be adjusted until there was conclusive 
proof of the need for variation. Overvaluation and undervaluation, 
for example, were not criteria for movements in the exchange rate. 
On the other hand, a wild boom would perhaps justify a raising of 
the rate: "Where the Commonwealth Bank sees no prospect of restor-
ing equilibrium in the balance of payments without a considerable 
reduction of money incomes, then raising the exchange rate is the 
best solution ."l 39 l He also stated that the rate should be 
adjusted during a severe depression, explaining that in the last 
resort, a high level of employment and national income was more 
important to trade than exchange stabilization. He then adced 
that when a variation in the rate was warranted, a single, decisive 
move was to be preferred to small movements each week. 
Similarly, Fisher's case for exchange rate stability 
except when unusual ci rcuinstances produced the need for. a 
variation 
economists. 
1-;as much the same as that expressed by other 
Advocating as great a degree of stability as possible, 
he said that reliance on variable exchange rate policies was aot 
to encourage the authorities to ignore the necessity for other, 
more drastic adjustments. While he believed that Australia 
would probably choose to return to the gold standard in the fu:ure 
- albeit a rela:ively more elastic regime than the traditional 
gold standard hE himself sa1·1 no theoretical need for it. 
He preferred instead a somewhat freer market for exchange and s~1-1 
·,j,:,f.:--!:· .,,,,__~ 
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no objection to sma11 and frequent alterations, especially if 
they were within the limits formerly regarded as the gold points. 
Moreover, he believed that extreme conditions such as a further 
sharp decline in the prices of the main exports, or a violent 
deflation in Britain would necessitate further depreciation 
in the exchange rate. The question of a hypothetical conflic~ 
between internal and external stability was 
and he did not raise the issue himself. l
4
0) 
not put to Fisher, 
Although Brigden, Walker, and Gifford, despite Giblin's 
assertion about the latter, shared some similar views on the 
exchange issue and on the ultimate importance of preserving 
a high ievel of employment if both exchange stability and full 
employment could not be 
of the gold standard. 
achieved they differed on the question 
The latter two expressed their whole-
the gold standard, whereas Brigden was 
While he disliked the gold standard, 
Brigden stressed its positive attributes and cpuld not think of 
hearted disapproval of 
not quite as definite. 
anything better than gold: It was positiv~, definite, conv~nient, 
and "every one understands gold . .,(4l) Still, the Bank should avoid 
pegging the rate indefinitely, and shculd take positive action 
when a variation was deemed appropriac:e. Like the other 
economists, he realized the benefits cf a situation in which a 
stable exchange rate with sterling wo~ld be the governing force 
regulating internal credit policy, bu: stcbility should not be 
retained at all costs. As he explained, "As a criterion I do 
not put the stable rate of exchange as high as he [Melville] did!~l 4 Z) 
./·? 
"{'·Jj\\ 
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If a stable rate was harmful to internal business and employmEnt, 
then it should be appropriately adjusted. 
placed more emphasis on maintaining as high a level of employment 
as possible than on maintaining a fixed exchange rate. 
this objective would generally be consistent with a policy of 
preserving short-term stability of the exchange rate with sterling, 
it would involve changes in the exchange rate - even large 
movements - when they were necessary in order to sustain employ-
ment. There was no need for unlimited depreciation of the foreign 
exchange value of the Australian pound, and a large permanent 
change would be required only if Australia's exports were affected 
by a significant alteration in the structure of world production, 
or if world prices continued to rise or fall _( 43 ) Likewise, ~ 
. I Walker was aware or the advantages of a stable exchange rate, Jut j 
l he, too, was prepared to make. concessions in order to maintair. J 
a high level of domestic economic activity. He favoured short-
term stability of the sterling .exchange, as shown by his opposition 
both to any mechanical method of varying the ex~hange rate and 
to frequent variations. He was adamant, however, that the r3i:e 
would .have to be altered in the long-term if internal stabili(i 
. (44) and fu7l employment were being undermined. 
Like :llVSt othe;· econosists, Hytten was firmly of the 
opinion that the exchange rate should be sacrificed if it mear: 
preservation oo' fol' employment. Of course, he desired bot~ 
exchange stabi' ity :ond ful J employment, but in the event of a 
conflict, he hoped the authorities would opt for the latter. ~n 
~-
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113 
ardent opponent of the gold 
freer exchange rate regime. 
standard, Hytten preferred a much 
Although there was no simple guide 
to exchange policy, internal "stabilityis far more important 
. [than exchange stability], and 
in the rate from time to time, 
if that should happen to mean changes 
these must be undertaken."( 45 )Any 
alteration, whether rendered necessary by internal or external 
conditions, were best accomplished by a series of small steps. 
Sti 11 , while Hytten believed there was a striking difference in 
\
opinion between Melville and himself on the question of the 
'. exchange rate, Giblin considered in contrast that the two 
not very wide apart. It was his view that: 
Differences in pri nci pl e amount to 1 ittl e more 
than one taking for granteci some unexpressed 
proviso, which the other would like to see in 
,black and white. One takes as understood 
were 
the possibility of a move in the exchange rate 
for sufficient cause, or the dominating 
objective of full employment [s::-:::J while the other 
thinks it wise to remind us of them at every 
turn. On the other hand, one takes for 
granted the need to prevent violent booms, 
while the other thinks it is useful to keep 
these dangers constantly before us .. (46) 
~- .. - Be that as it may •. although the econorni s ts for the 
• most part acknowledged the importance of exchange stability, 
\ they \'/ere generally willing to allow a significant deoree of I -
J flexibility in the exchange rate in o.-der to achieve full 
~pl~yment. The.private bankers, on the.other hand, were more 
1ncl1ned to emphasize exchange rate stab1l1ty, though many of 
them acknowledged that there would be times when the rate should 
be moved. Yet, while the bankers as a whole tended to stress 
exchange stabilization which was ~onsidered especially 
;_} I (),,__,,JV 
\. 
()rJL- 'O tl) 
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desirable for exporters and importers no consensus was 
reached among them as to when an alteration in the exchange rate 
would be appropriate. For the most part, they were not asked to 
comment on the situation in v1hich a conflict might arise betwe=m 
internal and external ends. Perhaps the Commissioners felt that 
the bankers were not experts in this area and therefore could not 
speak with authority. And, apart from Davidson, the bankers 
themselves did not raise the question on their own initiative//_...._,, 
Davidson, however, was less dedicated to exchange stability {h3n 
other bankers, and he showed considerable initiative in his\ ~ 
' ""' advocacy of long-term exchange rate flexibility in order to presl!r·· 
internal stability. Indeed, Sir John Philli'ps and Dr. H.C. 
Coombs both later Governors of the Reserve Bank informed 
the author that Davidson's awareness of contemporary economic 
thought was most unusual for a general bank manager. In Phillips' 
opinion, "you could fairly say he was the only one of the manegers 
who really had the feeling for the theory and background of banking 
and he was a very dominant character.and aver.)( imaginative one_,,(O) 
It cannot be denied that Davidson was very knowle<:Jgeable concernins 
both monetary affairs and policy; however, his stance on the ·i 
desirability of exchange rate flexibility was not a product of 
his intellect and experience alone. For his economic advise··c -
Hytten, and his fonner teache1·, E.O.G. Shann - may have been :ne 
dominating inf;uences. Whatever the influence, Davidson stcJd 
alone among the corn;:iercial bankers in his outright rejection c: 
the gold stano=.1·d, and he appeared to differ from many other 
witness es especially Melville, for instance in his abiding 
·.·f "'"·--
·,..· .. ,,-;.,:··._:,._~_.·:...'--':::.'<~.:.":'.3:-::::1!."!"'=11!":~"T··" .... -·--~-- --
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advocated stability as a general ru vidson preferred a 
flexible rate of exchange with small, frequent changes, while 
respecting the usefulness of a fixed rate over very short periods. 
Both of them, and ultimately the Royal Corrrnission itself, agree], 
however, that in the final analysis, exchange stability should 
rate second to internal stability. .!\ccordi ng to Davidson, 
be maintained if exchange 
and, most exchange rate stabilization could 
balances were held both internally and externally; 
importantly, if governments did not exceed their financial means. 
In this way, exporters, importers, and every other section of the 
community would benefit in the absence of violent fluctuations. 
The primary guide to exchange policy, however, should be internal 
economic conditions and their relation to conditions abroad. If 
internal or external circumstances changed drastically, then a 
corresponding sharp alteration in the rate would be necessary; 
otherwise, trade and expectations would all be damaged. An 
undervalued or overvalued rate, or a large disturbance in the 
would justify adjustment. for examp 1 e, 
however, a completely safe 
Australian price structur.e, 
The state of London funds was not, 
Emphasizing the importance of central bank 
governments and treeing banks, he stated that 
guide to pol icy. 
cooperation with 
study both governme1t policy and capital 
the central bank must Norl'.!al ly, "the central 
movements in determining exchange po; icy. 
bank should watch carefully for minor maladjustments in the 
internal price structure or in prices abroad, and guard against 
them before they can have an effect on the i nterna 1 economy." ( 
49
) 
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Opposing a system of weekly, monthly or quarterly fixation of 
he favoured change only when it was desirable. 
For the rest, the bankers generally agreed that stability 
in the rate of exchange for as long as was possible was highly 
advantageous, though some exhibited a tendency towards absolute 
rigidity, while others preferred more scope for movement. For 
example, L.J. McConnan, Chief Manager of the National Bank of 
Australasia, and P.F.G. Gordon General Manager of the 
Bank of Australia and Chairman of the Associated Banks of Vic~oria 
from 1936 to 1937 
to ta 1 ri gi di ty. 
both desired long-term stability rather than 
According to McConnan, a stable rate was useful 
in that it allowed a bank to deal freely when both buying and 
selling 1-Jithoc;t risk of loss. Exporters and importers, as 
well as governments, were able to estimate their exchange cost 
or benefit; but still, he believed the rate should be moved wher 
(50) 
necessary. Similarly, Gordon advocated stabi"1ity, but ro'.lt 
at all costs, explaining that the exchange rat~ should be adj~ste~ 
if, say, the level of imports 1>1as deemed to _be too high_( 5l) _ In 
addition, C. Darvall, General Manager of the Commercial Banking 
Company of Sydney, desired stability in the exchange rate, saying 
that it was fundamental to the interests of Australia; howeve,·, 
he admitted ti";at the exchange rate was determined in the fina! 
analysis by the la1·1s of supply and demand, and hence the excr.c.nae 
rate should no: be totally inflexible. He agreed, in short, 
that stability in Exchange was desirable, partly as a means o= 
achieving the 0ore important objective of stability in the intern2· 
·~·.;t· '::,".-~:·.,:. 
··;::_:;-_:·;.:;~;.~-..,_~~·,.,..---~,-~-·" 
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(52) 
level, and partly as a convenience to importers and exporters. 
In contrast, many other bankers favoured rigidity over 
G.D. Healy, who appeared before the Commission as 
the Associated Banks of Victoria between 1935-1936 and 
of the Bank of Australasia, wanted a fixed 
several reasons. To begin with, it would 
trading conditions for exporters and importers; 
secondly, it would reduce exchange speculation; and thirdly, it 
would maintain steadier domestic price levels. (S 3) W.A. Leitch, 
the Union Bank of Australia, moreover, desired 
and, more specifically, exchange parity with 
E. O'Sullivan, Joint General Manager of the 
Scottish and Australian Bank, also had the interests of 
traders in mind when he expressed his preference for.a 
exchange rate. (SS) 
On the other hand, the Commonwealth Bank Board as a 
favoured short-term flexibility and long:term stability in 
·the rate of exchange in order to maintain internal price stabl-~ity. 
however, some difference o:' opinion between Reading, 
one hand, and the Commonwealth Bank Board, Sir Ernest 
Riddle Governor of the Comrnom1eal t;1 B2~k and A.F. Bell, 
Acting Chairman of the Board and Dfre:tor of the Bank, on the 
.other. -~·for example, stressed the importance of 
ex cha ng~~ i ty to a greater c2gree than his Boa rd 
colleagues, though even he was not preoared to argue that this 
objective should be maintained at all times. His vie1-1s, 
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incidental1y, were probab1y influenced by the fact that he was 
active1y involved with the tobacco industry, having 
of the British-Australian Tobacco Company from 1912 to 1934. 
Although he advocated rather strict adherence to exchange stability 
he avoided the question of whether the Commonwealth Bank was 
attempting to achieve parity with sterling: On this and several 
other occasions, he preferred to say that it was a delicate 
and one that the Commission should take up with the Board. For 
himself, the Bank's general aim, however, was to maintain a stable 
exchange rate, and this would only be achieved through control of 
the internal credit situation. Moreover, a policy of firmly 
controlling the rate was desirable for Australia, as it was for 
any country. When the Commission suggested that this goal 
might be less important than other considerations~ !· )'"-:·\ 
revealed that he was even more convinced of the n~exfh~) 
stability than Melville. "It is not so much that somethin¥,-!._j 
dreadful may happen if it has to be changed, but I think it is 
in the best interests of' the country as a whol~, and in the best 
interests of the primary producers to mainta.in stability." (So_)_ 
Ultimately, however, he conceded that stability should not be 
preserved at all costs. While acknowledging that if the internal 
situati.on was involved, all economic considerations - including 
the number of unemployed Australians - should be taken into 
account, he did not go as far as to advocate that exchange stability 
should be consciously sacrificed for internal balance. 
In contrast, although Bell, Riddl.g_,_and the Board in 
-----
general recognized the merits of a stable exchange rate, they 
'~·!!'1·,~~c;.,,._, 
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not espouse this objective to the same extent as Reading 
rather, they emphasized the importance of maintaining 
internal price stability. In fact, they revealed the extent 
'to which the Bank Board's opinions differed from those of Reading, 
its Chairman. The Board favoured the restoration of a satisfact-
ory international monetary standard, but it took the view that 
parity with sterling was not altogether desirable.(57) 
"seemed to do; 
~ 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE INSTRUMENTS OF MONETARY POLICY 
While it is acknowledged nowadays that the pursuit 
of economic stability can be undertaken either by monetary or 
fiscal policy, or by both, the Royal Commission tended to ignore 
fiscal policy - that is, the use of the government budget as a 
stabilization tool - and emphasized monetary policy instead. 
Two factors seem to have been responsible for this. First, the 
terms of reference naturally had a considerable bearing on 
the importance attached to monetary policy, for the Commission was 
instructed to investigate the monetary and banking systems 
prevailing in Australia. Secondly, the fu,11 significance of 
the somewhat newer fiscal arm of economic policy had yet 
widely understood, due in part to the comparatively slow 
of Keynesian economics in Australia. 
Monetary Instruments 
to be 
di f-fus i ~n-1 
_) 
In its discussion of the instruments of monetary policy, the 
Commission tended to focus on two in particular. On the one hand, 
it recommended the imposition of a system of variable minimum 
deposits, and, on the other, it suggested the control of London 
ii: 
~i 
'I 
'I 
·1, 
I' 
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funds by extending the current Exchange Mobilization Agreement! 1 ) 
Although these issues occupied much of the Commission's time, 
some attention was also directed at variou·s other aspects of 
monetary control. To begin with, the Commission drew attention 
to the need for the control of monetary policy to be ultimately 
vested in the hands of the government. It believed that closer 
relations between the Commonwealth Bank, the Loan Council, and 
the State and Commonwealth governments, would contribute towards 
the maintenance of internal stability. It argued that while 
the day-to-day responsibility for monetary policy should be 
entrusted to the Commonwealth Bank by Federal Parliament, the 
latter should ultimately be answerable for monetary policy. In 
the case of a conflict between the government - the executive of 
Parliament and the Bank regarding the most suitable monetary 
policy to be pursued, it was agreed that thorough consultation 
between the Bank and government authorities should be resorted to 
in order to reconcile' disagreements; if it became clear that 
differences could not be settled, the government should then-take 
command. The Commission concluded that while the government had 
no authority to interfere in the day-to-day administration of the 
Bank, "tl1e Government should give the Bank an assurance that it 
accepts full responsibility for the proposed policy, and is in 
a position to take, and will take, any action necessary to 
implement it. It is then the duty of the Bank to accept this 
. ,,(2) assurance and to carry out the policy of the Government-
Even so, complete unanimity on the issue was lacking. For 
example, Napier, the thairman, accepted this statement subject to 
122 
reservation, while Pitt flatly dissented.(J) The latter contended 
that the Bank should be allowed to exercise its independence, and 
not subordinate its decisions to those of the government. 
After presenting its views on government-Bank relations, 
the Commission discussed another matter which was associated with 
. . 
the control of monetary pol'icy, namely, the issue of bank national-
ization. While the majority of·the Commission rejected the idea 
of a nationalized banking system - which was in any case 
considered to be a small matter of concern - Chifley took the 
opportunity to present a minority report, in which he not only 
advocated a more powerful government-owned central bank, but also 
suggested outright nationalization of the entire banking system 
in Australia. Indeed, he disputed the Commission's contention 
that the objectives of the monetary and banking systems could best 
be attained through the.preservation of a system comprising both 
a government-owned central bank - which would regulate the 
volume of credit - and privately-owned banks, which would assume 
responsibility for distributing credit. ·The private 
trading banks, he argued - being primarily motivated by profit-
making had neither collectively chosen, nor had individually 
been able, to act in the best interests of the community in the 
past, above all during the years of the Depression. Thus, in 
condemning a system which included private banks, he asserted 
that "the best service to the community can be given only by a 
banking system from which the profit motive is absent, and, thus, 
in practice, only by a system entirely under national control. ,,(4) 
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This is not to say, however, that Chifley worked against the 
Commissioners. In fact, in an interview with the author 
Phillips, who was the Commission's Assistant Economist, went so 
far as to suggest that the minority report was more representative. 
of the Labor Party's views than those of Chifley himself, who was 
obliged to submit to it. According to Phillips, Chifley's ~, 
original ideas were substantially modified by the evidence whicf 
was presented by the economists; hence, during informal, UnQffi 
discussions with Mills, Abbott, Harris the Commission's secreta 
and Phillips, it seems that Chifley tended more towards greater 
central bank control over 
nationalization! 5 l 
the private banks as opposed to complete· 
On the other hand, while the Commission firmly repudiated-
nationalization of the banking sector, it believed that the 
Commonwealth Bank should have sufficient powers in order to 
its main function, na~ely, the regulation of,the credit volume. 
The Commission soon realized, however, that the Bank's ability to 
control credit was dependent upon the effect of its action on the 
cash reserves of the private banks, and the latter's reaction to 
In the the resulting alteration in the level of their reserves. 
i-esult, it appears that the Commission became very concerned 
the Bank's existing instruments of control were inadequate to 
that 
induce the changes in the cash reserves 
and ultimately the interest, policies 
and thus in the advance, 
of the private banks, 
which were needed to produce the desired alterations in the credit 
structure. Above all, it was this realization which prompted 
:::4~:.;:- __ ,, __ 
, ,:.a-,~ 
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the Commissioners to devote a great deal of their time to the 
issues of minimum deposits and control of London funds, and to 
-. emphasize the necessity for these radical additional measures. 
While the Commission stated that the powers then available 
·to the Commonwealth Bank should be used more fully and courageously, 
it also recognized that the limitations of these means of control 
prevented the Bank from operating as an effective central bank. 
Thus all Commissioners agreed that the current method of limiting 
the note issue was undesirable. Under the existing arrangements, 
the Bank was required by law to maintain a reserve of twenty five 
per cent of the notes issued in the form of gold or sterling. 
Without this restriction, however, the Bank would be able to use 
- these reserves freely; Mills particularly objected to this 
1 . - . l d h . ( 
6 ) Th C . . . 1 f im1tat1on p ace upon t e note issue. e omm1ss1on 1tse 
argued that gold backing for the notes issued was not necessary, 
except as a means of restricting the volume of notes; it added, 
however, that the reserve requirement was virtually ineffective 
as a means of preventing a rise in the volume of the notes iss~~d in 
Australia, for "if the Bank wishes to increase the volume of the 
note issue, it can, by raising the exchange rate, increase the 
value in Australian currency of the note issue reserve, whilst 
keeping within the legal limits.-(?) In addition, the 
Commissioners objected to the reser.ve limitation on the grounds 
that it could place the Bank in an awkward position if it wanted 
to reduce the exchange rate. The consensus was that a 
limit on the issue should be fixed at a stated maximum, with some 
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provision for elasticity when necessary. With the exception of 
Pitt, they all recommended, at Mills' instigation, that a variable 
gold or sterling backing for the notes on issue should no longer 
be required, and that the note issue should be legally restricted 
to a fixed maximum, say, of sixty million pounds; however, the B"ank 
be able to extend the limit by a stated sum, for example by ten 
pounds, if the Treasurer approved such action. While Napier 
merely consented to these suggestions subject to reservation, Mills 
Chifley, and Abbott agreed in no uncertain terms that the Bank 
should be free to deal with its gold and sterling funds as it saw 
fit. (8) 
After directing its attention to note issue control, the 
Commission then turned to the main means at the Bank's disposal for 
regulating the cash reserves of the private banks; these, it 
believed, were insufficient. In respect of open market operations 
the deliberate buying and selling of government securities for 
the purpose of credit control the Commission exhibited 
considerable hesitancy. Here, Mills seems to have been the 
dominant influence; it was his view that, although the creation 
of a successful open market system was desirable, there were 
manifold problems to be overcome before its establishment could be 
(9) 
seriously entertained. In particular, the central bank was 
inadequately equipped with a sufficiently comprehensive portfolio 
of securities to create an open market on its own account; nor, 
more importantly, was the current market for government securities 
sufficiently wide to sustain heavy sales and purchases without 
-1'p 
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great fluctuations in security prices. This had been clearly 
demonstrated in 1936, when the Bank's sole attempt to establish 
a market for treasury bills proved unsuccessful as a result of 
themanoeuverings of the Bank of New South Wales. \olhil e Chi fl ey 
believed that a market for treasury bills should be given a proper 
trial, he admitted that it would probably be a- narrow market; and 
thus, it would not constitute a real weapon of control. Napier, 
too, expressed doubts about the effectiveness of such a market_(lO) 
These views were then placed in a wider context when the Commissioners 
made a general statement on the purchase and sale of both long-
term and short-term government securities. It was asserted that 
if open market operations: 
could be effectively used, this would be a useful 
way of increasing or decreasing the cash reserves 
of the trading banks, but there are limits to the 
extent of the operations which are possible at 
any one time. The width of the market for 
government securities is difficult to estimate. 
Some opinions have been expressed to us that the 
market is wider than the Bank's views would 
suggest, but other opinions support the Bank. 
In our view the market is narrow, but its extent 
depends upon so many circumstances that no 
estimate can safely be made of the amount of 
securities which could be sold at any time without 
seriously affecting their price. [Reservation 
by Mi 11 s and Abbott]. \ 11) 
t.nother instrument available to the Bank at the time, and 
which was investigated by the Commission, was the trading bank 
powers of the central bank. The consensus of opinion on the 
Commission was that the Commonwealth Bank should continue these 
activities in order to attempt to alter the cash reserves of the 
private banks. It could, for example, reduce the banks' cash 
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ratios by drawing deposits away from them. 
believed that the Bank should be at liberty 
11hil e the Cammi ss i oner 
to take on any ordinary 
business which it felt was not being adequately provided 
private banks, they did.not, however, encourage the Bank to compete 
aggressively with the private banks except where such competition 
would further central bank policy. Chifley was somewhat of an 
exception, as he naturally believed the Bank should accept all 
business being offered, provided it was sound and the Bank had 
sufficient funds. Yet he agreed with the other Commissioners 
that a recommendation on this issue was inappropriate. Apparently, 
they all realized that the Bank's relatively small-scale and 
undeveloped trading bank activities did not and, more importantly, 
could not, give it effective control over the cash reserves of the 
private banks. Thus, it was decided that no action on this 
issue should be taken, and that the operations of the Bank should 
continue merely as an adjunct of other central banking policies. (lZ) 
The control of interest rates was yet another issue about 
which the Commission refrained from making any suggestions so far 
as central banking was concerned. Here again, Chifley's influence 
is evident, stating as he did that there were certain ways in which ~­
~k ~ tnterest rates could be regulated, but they could not be controlled 
by the Bank with its existing powers. (lJ) And when the 
Commission sought to ascertain whether the Bank would be able to 
regulate credit by manipulating the level of interest rates, its 
conclusion was not very promising: Even if the Bank proved 
successful in changing the level of interest rates, such action 
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would not necessarily bring about the desired movement in the 
level of available credit. In fact, the Report ·declared that: 
Apart from the direct effect on the cash 
reserves of the trading banks, the Commonwealth 
Bank, through its trading bank and savings bank 
activities, can bring about alterations in 
interest rates which may supplement other 
actions to regulate credit. But in Australia 
the variation of interest rates is probably 
not so important in producing either expansion 
or contraction of credit as is the direct 
variation of the volume of credits. (14) 
This conclusion was based partly on the Bank's lack of firm control over 
interest rates, which had been amply demonstrated in March 1936 
when the trading banks raised interest rates against the advice 
of the Commonwealth Bank; and partly on the Commission's 
assertion that more direct measures were needed to control the 
level of credit in the Australian economy. 
In short, the Commissioners concluded that, while the 
Bank might be able to exert some limited influence upon the cash 
reserves of the private banks through the ·exercise of variou.s 
existing powers, the Bank seemed to lack sufficient sovereignty 
over the credit structure. For the banks could offset moves 
by the Common we a 1th Bank to i nci"ease or reduci: their cash reserves 
and, thus, their advances, by maintaining flexible cash reserve 
ratios. One way of preventing such action, and ensuring that 
the central bank would, in fact, be able to control credit, was 
for the Bank to secure the cooperation of the private banks. 
The idea was that both the Bank and the private banks mi9ht 
consult on the aims of central bank policy, and the means by 
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which they could be implemented. Although no formal recommendati 
concerning Bank cooperation with the private banks was advanced, 
the implication was that, ideally, cooperation should work both 
ways; the central bank should formulate its policy in consultatio 
with the private banks, and the duty of the banks would be to assis 
in policy implementation. Yet· the Commission was not convinced 
that complete cooperation by the private banks would always be 
obtained, and, indeed, past experience seemed to justify such 
doubts; therefore, it concluded that compulsory powers over the 
banks were essential in order to invest the Bank with the means it 
required to regulate credit. (IS) 
Before discussing these additional controls, however, 
further instrument which came to the Commission's attention 
namely, the allocation of advances to different activities is 
worthy of notice. Mills, in particular, believed that as the 
Commonwealth Bank accumulated an adequate store of information, 
it should use this knowiedge to guide the trad1ng banks by 
identifying desirable avenues for an expansion of advances, or the 
directions in which caution should be exercised. Once again, the 
similarity between his viewpoint and the discourse in the Report 
suggests that Mills carried considerable weight within the 
Commission. It wil I be recalled that, while nationalization was 
rejected, the•Commissioners nevertheless felt there was some 
scope for enhancing the Bank's authority over the issue of credit. 
In a similar vein, the Bank was also directed to "pay some regard 
to the distribution by the banks of the volume of credit amongst 
···"*""'·"'° 
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different industries", that is, the Bank should specify the industries 
that should be expanded and those that should not be encouraged to 
(16) . 
develop. In sum, the Commission recommended that, although 
the distribution of credit should continue to be the banks' 
responsibility and: 
We do not suggest that the Commonwealth Bank 
should interfere in any way with the granting 
of particular advances by trading banks ... In 
order to promote a wise distribution of credit, the 
Commonwealth Bank should equip itself with all 
possible facilities for ascertaining economic 
trends in Australia and abroad, so that it can 
advise trading banks as to the directions in 
which it is desirable in the national interest 
that advances should be made. (17) 
Although Chifley did not dissent from this majority 
recommendation, he tended to disagree with the other Commissioners, 
declaring as he did in his minority report that the central bank 
should establish a trading bank department which would assume 
authority for the allocation of credit. He stated that policy 
objectives could only be attained if the Commonwealth Bank had a 
tradinq bank department which could distribute credit directly to 
industry. In fact, the Bank's trading activities "should be 
extended, with the ultimate aim of providing the whole 
services now rendered by private trading banks .• (lB) 
of the 
An 
extension of its existing trading bank functions and a more liberal 
advance policy would, moreover, increase its power to prevent the 
private banks from initiating a rise in rates on advances as they 
had in 1936. In response to an argument against the enlargement 
of the Commonwealth Bank's trading bank section namely, that 
-- -- - ~-· .. -~ -
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private bank deposits with the central bank could be used to 
compete with these banks he replied that such funds should, 
and could, be separated from the resources of the Bank's tradi n·g 
department. 
Two other aspects associated with the distribution of 
advances to different activities were also analyzed. First, 
the Commission revealed that existing provision for fixed and 
long-term borrowing was inadequate. Abbott, reflecting the 
interests of the rural sector, strongly favoured the establishment 
of mortgage banks. Mapier summed up the opinion of the 
Commissioners when he asserted that 
these ban ks were formed_( 19 J Hi thou t 
it would be advantageous if 
specifying the type of bank th 
was desirable, the Commission's recommendation merely stated that 
a 'mortgate bank or mortgage banks should be established to provide 
facilities for fixed and long-term lending _,,(ZO) Chifley, on 
the other hand, revealed his preference for the creation of a 
mortgage bank department within the Commonwealth BanY., and he 
disagreed with those who advocated the raising of advance rates as 
an effective means of preventing a boom, on the grounds that this 
action would also cause rates on fixed and long-term loans to 
increase. Furthermore, increase.d rates of interest would, in 
turn, impose an unequally distributed strain on governments and 
individuals alike during a downturn in economic activity'. 21 ) Second, 
whereas Chifley stated in his minority report that an industrial 
bank department of the Commonwealth Bank should be formed to help 
provide capital for the development of manufacturing industry, 
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'the recommendation of the Commission, which he helped to draft, was 
less radical, stating as it did that the "Governments, 
assistance of the Commonwealth Bank, should investigate 
"the problem of setting up institutions to supply the needs of 
small concerns in second[ary] industries. ,,(Z2) 
The System of Minimum Deposits 
While the Commission acknowledged the various instruments that were 
.presently available to the Bank, it was convinced that they were 
i nsuffi ci ent. Hence, it sought to compensate for the inadequacy 
of these powers over the banking and monetary systems by recommend-
ing important and radical changes. In short, the maintenance of 
minimum deposits with the central bank and the provision for greater 
central bank control of London funds were advocated in the hope of 
vesting the Commonwealth Bank with the machinery of a fully-fledged 
central bank .. 
The minimum deposits recommendation was the first Qf the 
most critical issues to be discussed in the Keport, but, interest-
ingly enough, Phil lips' notes on the recommendations indicate that 
the subject of London funds was examined by the Commissioners 
first. 123 lA1though the Keport suggested that, ideally, control 
over the credit volume would best be accomplished through the use 
of existing channels and by seeking cooperation between the 
Commonwealth Bank and the trading banks, it went on to say that 
cooperation might not always be forthcoming; therefore, it 
advocated the creation of a system of minimum deoosits which 
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coui d be used by the Bank as an emergency power and only with th 
Treasurer's approval. 
It did not recommend that the private 
banks should be permanently obliged to maintain fixed minimum 
deposits with the Commonwealth Bank but, rather, it proposed that 
the power to require minimum deposits should be exercised with 
discretion and responsibility. Hence, no fixed percentage for 
these minimum deposits was ·specified; instead, it was suggested 
that the appropriate figure should be just enough to ensure that 
every bank complied with central bank policy. 
recommendation began by stating that: 
The formal 
The Commonwealth Parliament should legislate 
to provide that the Commonwealth Bank Board, 
with the ·consent of the Treasurer, may require 
every trading bank to keep with the Commonwealth 
Bank a deposit of an amount not less than a 
percentage, specified in the requisition, of the 
liability of that bank to its depositors in Australia. {24) 
Napier and Pitt, however, expressed dissent. 
Napier believed 
power to requisition ~unds should be confined· to some modest 
percentage; Pitt was of the opinion that any legislation whlJ:h 
incorporated the Commission's recomrnendation should set down a 
maximum deposit to be lodged with the Bank. 
Both hoped, more-
over, that the Bank would be required to give the private banks 
reasonable notice in the event of a decision to requisition funds 
from them\
25
) The Report indicated that not only should the 
deposits be variable over time, but they should be subject to 
a time iimit: 
'"'-f..,,,,,~. -., 
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Each trading bank should be required to 
keep on deposit the same percentage. The 
Board should have power at its discretion 
to vary the percentage from time to time 
within the limit fixed by the consent of the 
Treasurer. 
The authority to requisition should not remain 
in force for more than six months after the 
consent of the Treasurer has been given, but 
the Treasurer should have power to consent to 
its extension for a further period not exceeding 
twelve months. In any period of two years, 
the power should not be exercised for a longer 
period or periods than eighteen months. (26) 
The basis of these statements originated with Mills, 
and, ultimately, the majority supported him; however, important 
differences of opinion were expressed within the Commission, even 
among the majority, during its deliberations on the issue of 
private bank deposits to be kept with the Bank. Chifley, for 
example, believed that the Bank should specify a minimum percentage 
of deposits to be maintained with it; indeed, it was his view that 
the minimum deposits should not only be variable in total, but 
should also be vadable as between banks\2.7l Napier agreed that 
the Bank should be able to resort to a minimum reserve requirement 
if the private banks sought to counteract the Bank's attempts to 
control credit; however, he insisted that the minimum reserve 
should remain frozen at all times that is, he felt that the 
Bank should prevent the banks from regaining access to the funds 
they deposited with the central bank. Moreover, it was his 
belief that part of the funds that were requisitioned by the Bank 
under the minimum deposits provision should be set aside as ·part 
of the private banks' contribution to the Mobilization Agreement. 
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Of most importance, however, was his criticism of Mills' 
suggestion that the minimum deposits scheme should be exercised 
for a certain time and then lapse unless the Treasurer's consent 
was obtained again; instead, the power to require minimum 
deposits should remain effective for a period of six or twelve 
months at a time. In addition, it should not continue for more 
than two periods without the approval of Parliament, rather than 
of the Treasurer.(2B) Phillips, too, preferred the requisition 
of fixed minimum deposits~29 ) "Nixon, on the other hand, could not 
see any offsetting advantages in fixed reserves, although he was 
prepared to say that there might be occasions when they would be 
necessary as an emergency power, to be used against those banks 
which would not respond to central bank policy~ 30) Abbott and Pitt 
differed from Mills in the emphasis they placed on obtaining the 
Governor-General's approval. Exclaiming that the power to compel 
variable reserves should be punitive, Abbott held that the central 
bank, with the consent of the Governor-G@neral', ought to possess 
the authority to demand certain minimum depbsits. While he--
did not believe that the central bank should have unlimited 
authority to requisition funds that is to say, he felt that 
Governor-General should have the authority to ratify such action 
he was convinced that a system of variable deposits betlveen banks 
should be recommended by the Commission. For his part, Pitt did 
not object to a low minimum deposit provision, but he was willing 
to grant the Bank power to require higher deposits with the 
endorsement of the Governor-General in Council, on the condition 
... ..:;$~~.:::~--
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that all the ·private banks would be subject to the same require-
. \31) 
ments. Despite the fact that M_ills stressed the authority of 
the Treasurer more than the others, ultimately, they all agreed 
with his proposals. As far as Mills was concerned, there was 
not much to be gained from the maintenance of certain fixed 
·:reserves which would cause unnecessary hardship for the smaller 
private banks. He asserted, moreover, that it would be very 
difficult to find the correct minimum percentage. Perhaps 
Mills, and the others who favoured his suggestions, believed that 
·a very high percentage might be required in an unusual situation 
and, thus, they were reluctant to specify a limit which would 
meet such an emergency. In any case, such an arrangement was 
uncalled for, since considerable power could be wielded by the 
very imposition of variable reserves, without varying them from 
bank to bank. He was adamant, therefore, that an emergency 
power should be given to the Commonwealth Bank to impose variable 
reserves, subject to the consent of the Treasµrer.( 3ZJ 
London Funds 
Apart from their concern with minimum deposits, the Commissioners 
believed that the Mobi I ization Agreement concerning London funds, 
which had beer. in force since 1931, should be re-examined, formalized, 
and extended to help finance government overseas debt, and to assist 
the Bank to operate effectively as a central bank. Even though 
the arrangement had worked satisfactorily heretofore: 
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... it is terminable by any of the parties 
at any time, and it makes no provision for 
contributions in excess of the amount required 
for the oversea[s] debt service. It seems 
to us that it should be possible for the 
Parties to come to some agreement, binding for 
a term of years, and Providing for t.hP. [overseas] 
debt service., and also for additional 
cont•ributions to assist the Com111onweal th Bank 
[in building ~P its London funds and, hence] 
in the performance of its central bank functions. (33) 
Though they admitted the difficulty of determining a specific 
amount that would enable the Bank to retain an adequate reserve 
of London funds, the Commissioners stated that all the banks 
should contribute a minimum of £500,000 sterling per month; in 
return, the Bank was advised to compensate the banks at the 
at which the latter would sell to their ·favoured customers. 
Even so, Abbott and Mills expressed dissatisfaction with the 
suggestion, stating as they did that a binding agreement 
the debt service and other matters should not be forced upon the 
banks but, rather, should be left to their discretion. The 
agreement had ori gina·l ly been arranged, they argued' to 
an emergency situation, and had worked well on a voluntary basis. 
Abbott, in particular, stressed that the existing situation was 
satisfactory and, thus, did not justify any alteration. The 
crisis had passed, he added, and so the matter was no longer as 
vital as it had been! 34 l Pitt tended to agree with Abbott and 
Mills on this point; 
even in the absence of such an arrangement, 
they believed that sufficient funds would be available to the 
government for the purpose of servicing its overseas debt. 
Napier, and Nixon, however, lacked faith in a scheme which 
""'h'~" -,..c.~.:Mif&~ 
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in the event, it was their view compulsory, and was unreliable; 
which was endors·ed by the Cammi ss ion. 
The Views of Witnesses on Minimum Deposits 
The call for minimum deposits, together with that for the control 
of London funds, originated with a concern shared by many 
·witnesses that the central bank lacked the means to achieve its 
objectives and to fulfil its duties adequately. The represent-
atives of the Commonwealth Bank who appeared before the Royal 
Commission conveyed the Board's conviction that additional central 
banking powers were necessary to ensure the Bank's operation as 
an effective central bank. Sheehan, who was Secretary to the 
Treasury and, incidentally, the only government official to comment 
upon the adequacy of existing instruments of control, was similarly) 
convinced of the need for stronger controls over the private banks( 
The trading bankers, on the 
to the extension of central 
other hand, expressed strong opposition 
bank authority over credit policy. 
As for the economists, no clear consensus prevailed; 
appear to have been evenly divided on this issue. 
in facr, they 
The representatives of the Commonwealth Bank Board who 
appeared before the Commission asked for nevi rm1e;·s, and based 
their arguments - whic~·were neither detailed nor strong - on 
the fact that the Bank was at that time unable to control the credit 
volume and the exchange rate. Reading, Chairman of the Bank 
Board, for example, sought to expose the limited control the Bank was 
ablP to exercise over the trading banks. Explaining that the authority 
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of the central bank could only be indirectly exerted through 
Bank's attempts to manipulate the cash reserves of the private 
banks, he concluded that the existing means by which these cash. 
reserves could be altered left much to be desired; he added 
also that the prevailing financial structure prevented the Bank 
controlling credit. Si~ce the private banks were not required 
maintain rigid cash ratios, and "provided the trading banks are 
prepared to see their cash ratios vary, action by the 
Bank to increase or decrease their supplies of cash need not be 
followed by any change in credit policy. ,,(:lS) He said, 
that he strongly favoured the establishment of a minimum deposits 
provision. Riddle and Bell Governor of the Commonwealth Ban 
and Acting Chairman of the Bank Board, respectively 
agreed that the Bank was ill-equipped to control credit, and they 
touched upon several arguments though not at great length. 
his part, Bell revealed that the Commonwealth Bank had come to 
favour the acquisition of wider powers in the light of its past 
experience, and especially in vie11 of its inability to stimulate 
economic recovery during the Depression. Thus, the Bank Board 
wanted the banks to lodge minimum deposits with the Bank: Its 
formal request was for the "obligation on the trading banks to 
maintain with the central bank not less than a [certain] fixed 
percentage of their l i abi I iti es to the public." ( 36) Be 11 added 
that the Bank should be given the power to requisition funds becaus 
it was an impartial authority which would act in the best interests 
of the community as a whole; the minimum deposits instrument 
was, moreover, an impo~tant means of securing, first, trading bank 
. ,-~ ·~ --------
stability, 
system. 
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and, secondly, the stability of the entire banking 
Furthermore, he asserted that, although the Board 
··desired cooperation between the Bank and the trading banks, the 
possibility of a conflict of interest had to be reckoned with. 
Hence a compulsory system of minimum deposits was necessary in 
order to ensure that the banks conformed to the credit policy of 
the Bank. In the final analysis, the Board believed that its 
request was justified by the fact that proposals to maintain 
minimum reserves with the central bank had been accepted in other 
parts of the world, and minimum deposit schemes were, moreover, 
universally acknowledged as a general principle of central bank 
policy and legislation. 
Yet the three bank witnesses were not very informative, 
or precise, so far as the details of their request were concerned, 
and this served to diminish the force of their appeal. It appears 
that the Board lacked total confidence in its capacity to demand 
the high minimum deposits which were deemed necessary for 
effective control. It may be that it shied away from asking for 
a high percentage in order to avoid outright conflict with the 
banks, with the loss of public confidence as a result; perhaps 
the Board was somewhat apprehensive about assuming the greater 
responsibilities which would accompany the receipt of stronger 
powers. The Board in general, and Reading in particular, seem 
to have desired a reserve power which would serve as a blatant 
encouragement to cooperation, and possibly as a backstop if such 
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cooperation was not secured. Bell later explained that the 
Board sought, above all, an assurance that it could rely on 
cooperation from the banks. While his words reflected forceful 
undertones, Reading played down the role of direct control and 
stressed instead the desirability of a voluntary agreement. (37) 
Although the Board realized.that variable minimum deposits as 
opposed to fixed deposits - would give the Bank greater control 
over the private banks, it did not ask for this form of deposits, 
perhaps because it feared that the banks would be so enraged that 
they would fight even more bitterly against the general idea of 
minimum deposits. It also wished to avoid the practical 
difficulties involved in implementing a variable system; 
and,j 
consequently, both Reading and Bell declared the Bank Board's 
preference for a fixed minimum reserve. Yet Bell also reveal d 
that the Board had not even discussed the percentage of minimum 
deposits which should be kept with the Bank; indeed, it was 
"more concerned ... [with] the acceptance by the commission and the 
incorporation in its report of the idea that there should be a_ 
minimum reserve ... (33 ) 
Apart from these rather general statements, the Board 
had very little else to say on the subject. Overall, it seems 
that its case for minimum deposits 11as somewhat weak. Indeed, 
the Commission asked the Board in February 1937 to clarify its 
reasoning for the desirability of minimum deposits. Thus a 
Commonwealth Bank memorandum was drawn up in an attempt to bring 
together the various arguments Which had been advanced both during 
·f'ii'f::.'-\-,_;~.'. 
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and after the presentation of the Bank's evidence. The 
memorandum was probably .drafted by Melville, who may have been 
assisted by A.H. Lewis, the Secretary to the Commonwealth Bank; 
following the Board's approval, the memorandum was submitted to 
the Commission, which then incorporated the Board's arguments 
in favour of minimum deposits in its Report.( 39 ) For a start, 
the Soard believed that the reserve provision would enable the 
Bank to control the volume of credit in Australia and allow it to 
influence the exchange rate. More specifically, the "maintenance 
of these deposits would ensure that the Commonwealth Bank would 
have adequate resources, with which to buy the funds in London, 
and the securities in Australia, required for its control of the 
exchange rate and internal credi~"( 40) Secondly, legal 
minimum deposits were necessary to ensure that the private banks 
actually maintained their liquid reserves on deposit with the Bank, 
rather than in the form of treasury bills or London funds. It 
was felt that, without this safeguard, the Bank might not be able 
to exercise the desirable degree of control over the rate of 
interest on treasury bills if an open market were established. 
In addition, if minimum deposits were not required by law, the 
trading banks would be free to hold funds, which ought to be 
maintained with the Bank, on deposit in London. Thirdly, it 
was argued that, insofar as the private banks were compelled to 
comply with the minimum deposits arrangement, they would need to 
request loans from the Bank from time to time; consequently, the 
Bank would increase its authority over the credit policy of the 
private banks. 
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Sheehan agreed with the Bank Board that a minimum 
deposits requirement was desirable, though he differed to some 
extent from the Board in asserting 
variahle minimum deposits system. 
that there was a need for a 
He was adamant that the Bank 
should be "empowered to ~equire an increase in such percentages 
whenever the Commonwealth Bank's London funds fell below a given 
amount."(41) 
But he believed that the Governor-General, acting 
on the advice of the government, and not the Treasurer, should be 
the authority responsible for aporoving a rise in the percentage 
of deposits to be requisitioned by the central bank. 
opposed to 
The private bankers, on the other hand, 
the extension of central banking powers 
were vehemently 
for at 
least five reason/42 ) First, they argued that existing powers 
already very wide and, hence, entirely adequate. Secondly, the 
central banking system in Australia could not be expected to 
produce precise result.s, due mainly to large ~easonal fluctuations. 
Thi rd, they believed that any expansion of .statutory centra l_banki ng 
powers would be deleterious to the encouragement of central banking 
by cooperation and consultation 
the trading banks. 
which was much preferred by 
Fourth, although it was admitted that elastici 
in the banking system was an obstacle to control by the central 
bank, this flexibility was nonetheless 
considered to be 
Last, further powers were not desirable, nor would they 
necessary. 
improve 
the situation; in fact, their misuse would disrupt the ooerations 
of the monetary system. The banks also feared that if their resource 
were drastically requisitioned by the Bank, they would not be 
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returned when the banks believed they were needed. Present 
powers of control, although wide, were not strong in practice, but 
this was due to circumstances peculiar to Australia and to the 
Bank's reluctance to use them. 
The private bankers as a group were especially united in 
their distaste for a minimum deposits provision. According to 
Phillips, minimum deposits became a symbol of central bank control 
of the private banks, which meant that the subject received an 
altogether unfavourable receptionJ43) The banks signalled beyond any 
doubt that they would not willingly allow the Commonwealth Bank 
to determine their credit policy; they would submit to such 
control only if forced by legislation. The bankers gave various 
explanations for their attitude towards the proposal f 44) To begin 
with, it was argued that if fixed minimum deposits were required by 
law, the banks would have to protect their position by maintaining 
additional deposits in excess of the minimum. As a result, they 
would have to hold more cash, advance rates would increase, and 
borrowers would ultimately bear the cost. All in all, the Bank's 
power would not be strengthened. According to McConnan Chief 
Manager of the National Bank of Australasia "the introduction 
of a provision whereby the t1-adi ng banks may be re qui red to 
maintain minimum cash ratios with the Commonwealth Bank would be 
unlikely to succeed as a measure of credit control .• (45 ) 
Secondly, seasonal changes in cash ratios would mean that the fixed 
minimum would perhaps be too low to be effective at a particular 
time of the year, and yet it might be an excessive burden to the 
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banks at other times. Third, it was asserted that since 
reserve ratios were not maintained at uniform levels among the 
various banks, the deposits requirement was likely to affect 
some banks more harshly than others. Fourth, McConnan believed 
that differences in the economic structure of different states 
would make minimum deposits unequally onerous in certain states. 
Fifth, the minimum deposits proposal lacked adequate provision 
for elasticity, an essential prerequisite for the successful 
operation of the monetary system. Sixth, Darvall - General 
Manager of the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney 
that m1n1mum deposits would accelerate the process of credit 
restriction in times of stringency. (45 lSeventh, the banks contend 
that substantial deposits were already, and would continue to be, 
kept with the Bank on a voluntary basis. In fact, it was this 
particular argument which prompted Gordon General Manager 
the Commercial Bank of Australia to admit that the formal 
implementation of a minimum deposits scheme, such as that which 
prevailed in New Zealand, would not harm the banks to any great 
extent in view of the deposits currently maintained by these 
banks~ 471 Apart from this confession, however, the banks generally 
opposed any proposal for minimum deposits. Finally, the banks 
were convinced that if the minimum \·!as to be va,·iable at the 
discretion of the Commonwealth Bank, it would have to alter from 
time to time, from place to place, and from bank to bank; in 
actual practice, however, this would prove to be almost impossible 
to administer. McConnan added that the banks would tend to 
maintain higher reserves ttian necessary, if variable minimum 
->;·:Jif:l~"i~~~.-.":"-
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, de.posits were made compulsory in orderto allow for any variations 
, in the reserve requirement. (4S) In short, the bankers, taken 
together, condemned the idea of statutory provisions, preferring 
:instead to leave the matter of deposits to the discretion of the 
·banks. O'Sullivan Joint General Manager of the English, 
:Scottish and Australian Bank only acknowledged the desirability 
of some system of deposits after he was informed of the Macmillan 
·committee's recommendations. He even went so far as to say that 
legislation would be inevitable in the absence of a voluntary 
agreement; still, he doubted the effectiveness and wisdom of 
, forcing the banks to keep minimum balances with the central bank, 
and expressed his opposition to compulsion very clearly: "The 
lessons of the recent Australian crisis", he noted, ''seem to 
justify the conclusion that the size of these reserves to be p1.aced 
on deposit with the central bank can properly be left to the 
prudence and discretion of the trading banks.•l
49 l 
The economists, on the other hand, exhibited a mixed 
picture on the issue of the adequacy of central bank control -over 
the private banks. Those economists who called for change, 
especially Melville, played a key role in influencing the Commissioners, 
particularly those who lacked a preconceived opinion on the matter. 1, 
The economists were notably important in that they modified \ 
Chifley's views to some extent. For his part, Melville strongly 
favoured the immediate acquisition of additional powers by the 
Commonwealth Bank. He explained that the present means of 
credit control were inadequate and, accordingly, advocated both 
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a system of fixed minimum reserve balances and the establishment 
of an open market for treasury bills. Indeed, the Commissione 
agreed with Melville that the central bank was not as influential 
as it ought to be; however, there was some differences of 
opinion as to what sort of new control was appropriate. While 
the Commissioners suggested the requisition of variable dep~s 
-"" 
only in an emergency situation, Melville asserted that a fixed jl 
deposits provision was necessary as a permanent instrument of 
control. l•Jhile he did not altogether reject the relatively<1'!10" e 
drastic version of variable deposits which was recommended by the 
Commission, he preferred a system of fixed balances on the 
(50) 
grounds that it was more practicable in a political sense. 
. economists also tended to recognize the need for change. 
f examole, A.G.B. Fisher, Professor of Economics at the University 
For 
I , 
I of Western Australia, cal Jed for more direct central bank powers to compensate for the ineffectiveness of traditional Bank 
instruments. He stated that it would be advantageous to prescri 
"by law the reserves which trading banks are required to deposit 
in the central bank, and at the same time to allow the central 
bank (after consultation with, or perhaps with the approval of, 
the Treasury, or other appropriate government autho1"ity) to vary 
the legal ratios prescribed. ,,( 5l J Brigden, Director of the 
Queensland Bureau of Industry, was constrained to admit that 
minimum deposits might be desirable one day and that the Bank 
would, consequently, need to obtain legislative authority so they 
could be drawn upon when that day arrived; but this was all he 
~~~-~~-'"'-
148 
as prepared to concede. It was his opinion that the Bank should 
lace equal reliance on graduaLLy evolving its powers and persuasiveness, 
nd on obtaining specific powers, since the credit policy of the 
anks could not be sufficiently regulated in a formal way. None-
··heless, in view of the limitations of the Bank's present levers 
f control, it was advisable to grant the government the authority 
·O confer further temporary powers upon the Bank. He qualified 
.his suggestion, however, by indicating that the Bank should first 
ave to apply for special powers before they could be awarded. (5Z) 
But some economists had more extreme reservations about 
strengthening the authority of the central bank through the 
··imposition of a minimum deposits provision. For example, Walker -
Lecturer in Economics at the University of Sydney - was prepared 
that the Bank's powers were limited, but he also believed 
Bank should be able to exert more control over the monetary 
a greater use of open market operations; he stated, 
that the Bank•s ability to influence the policy of the 
banks would be enhanced if the Bank was' able to command 
respect and cooperation from the private banks. He 1>1a-s 
convinced that the ideal method of controlling credit was by a 
combination of central bank and government action, and he 
did not favour the proposal to require the banks to hold minimum 
reserves with the central bank. Indeed, he revealed that he 
saw no advantage in prescribing such a minimum reserve. As he 
put it: " ... I do not think it is necessary for the control of the 
Commonwealth Bank over the policy of the trading banks ... (53 l 
Similarly, Gifford, Hytten, and Reddaway opposed compulsory 
minimum deposits; unlike Walker, however, each of them generally 
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felt that the Bank was already well equipped with sufficient 
means to carry out its tasks in an efficient manner, and were a 
to concur with the trading bankers that the development of the 
central bank would proceed best along the same lines as had 
occurred in the past. In fact, Gifford assured the Commissio 
that the Bank could operate quite well in most circumstances wit 
the powers it already possessed. It was his opinion that the 
required more power to prevent contractions in 
during a depression, rather than acquiring the means to demand mi 
reserves which he thought would only serve to strengthen the 
Bank's ability to contract credit; the difficulty was that the 
8ank had declined to use its present instruments of control. 
was also unfavourably disposed to minimum deposits, preferring 
as he did greater cooperation rather than legislation. In· 
contrast, Reddaway compromised by asserting that a minimum reserv 
provision was necessary only if the trading banks would not 
cooperate with the central bank; this statement was, however, 
subject to two qualifications: The percentage should 
to a low figure, and the provision should be reasonably elastic. 
For his part, Giblin merely said that his views tended to coincide 
with those of Reddaway, especially with regard to the extent to 
which the Bank already possessed control of the credit volume, 
and as to the most effec.tive means of control. (54 J 
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Witnesses on Control of London Funds 
Much of what the various witnesses said in regard to minimum 
deposits, and greater central bank control in general, was repeated 
in discussions on the extention of the Exchange Mobilization Agreement, 
.~the other major additional power sought by the Commonwealth Bank for 
its successful operation as a central bank. More formally, the Bank 
Board asked for the right to call upon the overseas funds of the 
trading ban ks. It seems that the Board in general, and Reading 
··in particular, did not place much emphasis on the domestic credit 
implications of this request that is, with the exception of Riddle, 
'they tended to play down the fact that control of London funds would 
strengthen the Bank's ability to regulate credit. At all events, an 
official reason given to the Commission for the Bank's proposal v1as 
that "the distribution of ... [London] funds between the trading banks 
and the Commonwealth Bank hampers their effective use. ,.(SS) In 
effect, the Board was concerned with the problem that two or three 
private banks normally had a surplus of London funds even 
after they had made their contributions under the existing 
Mobilization Agreement. A situation could arise, and in fact 
did occur in March 1g36, when the Bank's overseas reserves were 
very low, while a small number of private banks held more than 
they required and, in fact, had control of most of the London 
funds that were available. It was the Board's, and especially 
the Chairman's, view and indeed the latter may have concerned 
himself with this issue perhaps to a greater degree than its 
significance warranted that the Bank might not be able to 
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maintain the exchange rate and would, in consequence, find itsel 
in a difficult and most embarrassing position. The likelihood 
this occurrence was increased by virtue of the fact that it was 
the Bank of New South Wales which held the trump card 
the largest, regular annual surplus of London funds 
between Reading and Davidson, the General Manaaer of the 
New South Wales, had been strained for several years. Indeed, 
Davidson on one occasion had independently initiated a 
exchange rate, and it seems that the Bank's request was directed 
almost solely at the Bank of New South Wales in 
it from taking similar action in the future. Reading admitted 
that, even though exchan9e rate arrangements on the whole 
satisfactory in recent years, if one trading bank were to 
.away", the entire exchange rate situation would become 
He continued, sayin9 as he did, that the greatest deficiency of 
Bank was that it lacked "direct means of acquiring sufficient '~ondon funds to complete its machinery for operating effectively 
as a central bank."(S6) Riddle, however, proceeded one-_step 
beyond Reading when he implied that access to London funds would 
the Bank's control over domestic credit policy.(S?) In any event, 
it was made very clear that the existing ~1obil ization Ag1·eement 
was voluntary, and hence inadequate so far as the Bank's require-
ments 0ere concerned. The Board, therefore, asked for access 
to London funds; it did not request unlimited rights to all 
the overseas reserves of the banks, but rather it sought to use 
only that portion which would meet its requirements. 
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Having notified the Commission of its desire for 
control of London funds, the Bank was virtually at a 1 oss, 
discussion turned to the legal means by wh-ich 
send might be achieved. For example, it was uncertain as to 
to secure access to the ex-Australian assets of banks with head 
Indeed, Bell was unable to offer the 
ission much detailed information; he contended that the 
of the proposed legislation concerning exchange mobilization 
uld be determined by the Crown law advisers of the government. (SS) 
mentioned that the funding of treasury bills would 
'ob ably serve to in crease the Bank's London funds, he fa i 1 ed to 
ntion the 1 icensing of Banks as a way of obtaining access to 
Reading merely suggested that a certain minimum, 
datum, level should be determined, and whenever the Bank's 
don funds fell below that level they should be restored. He 
intained that it was the trading banks' duty to keep the Bank 
pplied with adequate funds, but he did not 
which these funds might be secured.( 59 l 
explain the means 
Similarly, Sheehan highlighted the shortcomings of the 
isting exchange mobilization scheme; although it had worked 
.satisfactorily for six years, it lacked the "permanency which its 
.importance makes necessary ... l 50J Asked by the Chairman if the new 
ewer would bring pressure to bear~on the banks to dispose of their 
ondon funds, Sheehan replied that if the Bank gained access to 
the private banks' London funds, the banks would have to be prepared 
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·to supply the Bank with the reserves it required. This 
mean that they would have to maintain a higher balance of 
in Australia, and "that would, in some circumstances, at least 
involve their selling London fund~" (61J 
The private b·ankers, on the other hand, initially tende 
to reject the idea of central bank access to London funds 
they believed, would jeopardize their potential ability to 
the exchange rate. With the exception of Davidson, however, the' 
softened their stance somewhat as the inquiry progressed. It 
that many of these bankers came to realize the need for change 
and, hence, some agreement concerning this issue was reached betw, 
themselves and the Bank. It is even more likely that their 
half-hearted opposition to the Bank's request stemmed from their 
knowledge that the implementation of the new.arrangement would 
pose no threat to their interests. Since many of the private 
banks normally had a ,deficit of London funds, ,they may have been 
largely indifferent as to whether the Bank gained 
London funds. Although they largely agreed, at 
the Bank should have the authority to maintain the exchange rate, 
yet they were aware that its ability to control the rate was 
rather 1 imited. O'Sul Ii van, for example, argued that the Bank 
could hold the present exchange rate only as long as it was able 
to buy and sell London funds, conceding as he did that some 
additional Provision for exchange mobilization was necessary. 
D.S. Forbes Chief Inspector of the Queensland National Bank 
was also of the opinion.that the Bank should be given greater 
. , '-""f""""~''':-
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(62) 
of London funds in an emergency. The one banker who 
,strongly argued that central bank access to London funds was not 
only undesirable, but also unnecessary, 1~as Davidson of the Bank 
South Hal es. It is not difficult to locate the source 
his anxiety when it is recalled that, of the two or three banks 
jn possession of a surplus of London funds, the Bank of New South 
Wales was by far the most important - having regard both to the 
size of its balances and the stubborness with which they were 
held. It was Davidson's view that the Commonwealth Bank was in 
'command of the rate of exchange, and could hold it at whatever level 
it desired, since it could always command adequate funds either 
Australia or in London. It is interesting to note, however, 
, that the Commission did not seem to think that this latter condition 
, ·would always be satisfied. Davidson denied, however, that there 
was any need for special access to London funds on the grounds 
of inadequate central bank control over the cash reserves of the 
private banks, saying as he did that the Bank.possessed sufficient 
. means to regulate credit. Still, it cannot be over-empha~!zed 
that there was one strong current underlying all of his objections 
to greater central bank control of London funds, and even to a 
minimum deposit provision . This was his fear that the Bank 
might well misuse its nev1ly acquired powers to carry out a drastic 
requisitioning of his bank's resources. Furthermore, he claimed 
that the •centralization of foreign exchange reserves is undesirable 
because it opens the door to centralized control of foreign 
exchange transactions ... [which] would be highly dangerous."l 63 l 
I 
[ 
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Finally, he asserted that the Bank's request for access to Londo 
funds would severely hamper the desire for cooperation between t 
Commonwealth Bank and the private trading banks. 
Just as the bankers presented different viewpoints on 
the issue of whether the Bank's means of control of the exchange 
rate were adequate, so the economists similarly lacked a consensu 
almost half of them did not believe that the central bank's 
in this respect were sufficient. Melville, Brigden, and 
asserted, for example, that the Bank could only determine the rat 
within definite limits as long as the banks were able and willing 
to buy and sell exchange in unlimited quantities at that rate; 
however, since cooperation by the banks could not be assured, Melv 
said it might be advisable to enlarge the Mobilization Agreement a 
make it compulsory. Acting on the advice of the Attorney-General 
Melville explained ~hat the Bank deserved the riqht to purchase 
London funds from the banks until its reserves were restored to 
an appropriate level .. In this way, the exchange rate could be 
regulated. 
He added that, without access·to London funds, -:the 
Bank would remain on the brink of external default with no means of 
using the supply of overseas reserves which was scattered amongst 
the various banksf64) Jn contrast, Hytten, Halker, Gifford, and 
Reddaway all opposed a compulsory mobilization arrangement. With 
the exception of Reddaway, they did not believe that the central 
bank required greater control of London funds. 
On the other hand, 
while Reddaway acknowledged that the private banks could thwart 
the Bank's actions if they failed to cooperate 
and even admitted 
.,;,f.,;,_· ... , 
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·.the Bank's inability to stabilize the exchange rate at all times 
.'··- he neverthe l es·s. expressed his disapproval of the Bank's 
/solution; tl:Jat is, its request for access to London funds. He 
suggested alternative means by which the Bank might obtain the 
·exchange it desired, stating as he did that the form of control 
sought by the Bank would prove to be a source of weakness: Such 
control over London funds "would either be unfair to the trading 
banks or impossible to keep within desirable limits .1 55 1 Again,f: 
Giblin made no specific comment on this issue, but it may be 
:remembered that he generally agreed with Reddaway's answers on 
'matters of central bank control. 
The Witnesses on Other Instruments of Control 
The Commission's recommendations regarding minimum deposits and 
. greater control over London funds derived from its conclusion 
·i f. 
1' 
that existing instruments of control were insufficient to maintain 
monetary and exchange rate stability. In other words, it decided 
that the Bank was correct in asserting that.its present powers- were 
inadequate. The fact that the trading banks did not adhere to 
strict cash/deposit ratios, the problems associated with open 
market operations and discount policy, the inadequacy of interest 
rate changes as a method of credit control, and the lack of co-
operation between the Bank and the private banks in the past had 
all encouraged the belief that a variable minimum reserve system 
was necessary; moreover, insufficient control of London funds 
meant that the Commonwealth Bank did not have full control over the 
exchange rate. 
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However, although the private bankers formally denied 
that additional central banking powers over the trading banks were 
necessary or desirable, they tended to contradict themselves und~r 
cross-examination by admitting that there were deficiencies with 
central banking powers in practice. On the one hand, they thoug 
in principle, that existing instruments were adequate, and there w. 
therefore no need to seek new ones, arguing that the Bank would 
able to achieve its objectives if it used the powers it already 
Possessed in an effective manner. On the other hand, they 
demonstrated that, in operation, the means by which the Bank could 
regulate credit were not very strong and that without the cooperati 
of the private banks, the central bank could not, and had in the 
past been unable, to implement its policy. 
Davidson, for example 
initially argued that open market operations were more effective 
than the Bank had indicated ~s a means of increasing, or decreasing 
the cash of the banks. 
It had, moreover, other weapons in the 
exchange rate, its trading activities, the ability to alter the 
volume of treasury bills, its control of savings bank investment, 
and its capacity to reduce its advances and raise its deposits -
when a contraction of credit was desirable. 
Yet Davidson admitted · 
at several points in his presentation of evidence that the Bank's 
use of its powers 1vas not as effective as it might have been. 
fact, he Exposed the central bank's lack of control over the 
monetary and banking systems by stating as he did that a successful 
central banking system depended essentially upon cooperation 
between the trading banks and the central bank, and despite 
In 
his past tendency to act against the wishes of the Bank Board 
·-"·'4'"-"""·< 
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he ironically went to great pains to assure the Commissioners that 
the banks would, without coercion, take careful notice of central 
bank policy and "immediately take steps to conform to it. ,,( 55 ) 
He also stressed the importance of fiscal policy and, consequently, 
highlighted the inherent shortcomings of monetary policy and the 
inadequacies of central bank power, especially over the non-banking 
financial intermediaries and the government. Action taken by 
the government, he said, could "easily work in a different direction 
to central bank action. The central bank has adequate powers of 
control over the trading banks, but unless it can gain the co-
operation of all the other bodies influencing monetary policy, it 
may be frustrated in the attempt to reach its goal _.( 5?) 
Similarly, although the other bankers flatly rejected any 
direct proposals to increase the relative importance of the central 
bank, some of the answers that they furnished under cross-examination 
highlighted the weaknesses of the Commonwealth Bank as a central 
bank when it came to actual practice. For example, .McConnan, 
Gordon, Leitch, Healy, O'Sullivan, and Darvall all admitted-:that 
the effectiveness of open market operations was limited by the 
sensitive nature of the market for securities in Australia. l 5BJ 
So far as the quotation of rates for advances and deposits by the 
Bank was concerned, McConnan and Leitch stated that this power was 
not very effective in controlling the supply of credit.( 69 ) Like-
wise, the abi Jity to vary the exchange rate was said to be a 
relatively weak lever of control. Even the rate of rediscount 
on treasury bills and the willingness of the Bank to rediscount 
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was considered to be a control of little importance. 
in fact, aptly summarized the situation when he said the Bank's 
powers to exercise control over credit policy and the exchanger 
were not completely effective in themselves. (?O) Indeed, the 
central bank lacked direct power over the activities of any 
trading bank, because tt ~id not use the instruments at its 
The Commission, however, agreed with the Bank that, although the· 
latter had in fact attempted to regulate credit through the use 
these powers, its efforts were frustrated due to the unwillingne 
of the private banks to cooperate with it. 
Whi 1 e Sheehan of the Treasury failed to comment upon 
the Bank's existing instruments of credit control, it may 
on the other hand, that not all the economists were convinced tha 
the Bank required additional powers. While some of them believ 
that the central bank was capable of carrying 
the controls it already possessed, others, including Melville, 
Fisher, and Brigden refuted the view that existing instruments 
wielded by the Bank gave it sufficient control over the monei:.ary 
sys tern. Indeed, Melville explained that the central bank had ve 
little influence over the size of the primary credit base, in 
of the shortcomings of the available means of altering it. He 
concluded, therefore, that the existing instruments, which include 
open market operations. the ability to advise and finance governme 
the extension of loans to the banks, and voluntary cooperation were 
insufficient. (ll) On the other hand, some economists, such 
l4alker, Gifford, and Reddaway, agreed for the most part that the 
"-'•·h···'""" 
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exercise control over the credit base if it chose to 
use all of the weapons which were available to it though some 
admitted that there might be occasions when the Bank's powers would 
,be insufficient. For example, Hytten believed that open market 
__ operations, variations in interest rates, the Bank's trading 
activities, its persuasive influence, its ability to vary the 
exchange rate, and its power over the note issue, assured the Bank 
of adequate credit control. Even he acknowledged, however, that 
the power to vary interest rates was not very strong, due to the 
fact that cooperation between the Bank and the private banks was 
not firmly established. Yet he was not the only one who entertained 
such doubts. Indeed, Reddaway who represented his, as well 
views was of the opinion that existing central 
would be inadequate to, say, bring about a contraction 
of credit if 
·1· Commonwea 1th 
advisable to 
the private banks chose to act against the wishes of the 
Bank; in this situation, he declared that it might be 
have a legal minimum reserve. (?Z) He then pointed out, 
as did various other economists, that fiscal policy was perhaps more 
powerful than monetary policy, and he felt that it was useless to try 
to regulate the quantity of bank credit without first securing 
government cooperation; above all, he considered that monetary 
policy alone would not prevent a general depression. Similarly, 
~~Giblin, Melville, and to some extent Hytten, believed there was a limit to the efficacy of monetary policy, and that the role of the government and other institutions was often more decisive. 
rrFor his part, Melville cautioned the Commissioners not to expect too 
~!much of monetary policy in Australia.1 73 1 He later informed the 
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author that he expressed the view at the time that monetary po] 
was not always effective in view of the fact that government 
action could overrule action taken by the Bank: In short,· 
fiscal pol icy was not "more powerful", but rather it was "al 1 
persuasive". (?4) Above all, Gib1 in appropriately summed up 
the situation when he .said that: 
If export prices fell heavily in relation ) 
to import prices and interest, if a large 
flow of overseas investment suddenly ceases, · 
if the productivity of our land or mines is 
seriously lowered, we must suffer a loss of 
real income which no monetary measures can 
affect. We can only make it up by increas i/r,ig 
productivity in other ways. All that 
1 monetary policy can do is to ease the shocJ (J~ 
and prevent the secondary effects of the (f.-\~;·' ( 
first loss of real income - which may, 
unchecked, cause a loss considerably greater v 
than the first loss. (75) · ' ~V 
Ir v / v \ . 
These, then, were the views of the Commission and t 
various witnesses who appeared before it. When thfi' recommend-
ations of the Royal Commission were made public, thh evoked a 
mixed reaction; j it is to this response, esp'ecial/iy 
i 
and leading academic commentators, that the sub-,hesis 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE PUBLIC REACTION 
Jhe Royal Commission's Report was presented to the 
eighteen months after the Commission had 
Soon after the government received 
government in July 1937, 
begun its deliberations. 
the Report, it released on 19 July a summary of the Commission's 
July the ful 1 report , both of whi main recommendations, and on 20 
were received by the public through the press with considerable 
interest and some eagerness; the printed version of the Report 
was not published until the following month. 
the Commission completed the taking of after 
government was frequently asked by the Labor 
when it expected to receive the Report. (l) 
Both before and 
evidence, the 
Party in Parliament 
An interim report 
was conveyed to the government on 22 June 1937. With the final 
report in hand the following month, Sir Earle· Page, as acting 
Prime Minister, announced on 19 July that the Commissioners ti_ad 
been largely unanimous in their support of the present banking 
system. The government, he revealed, had decided to establish 
credit facilities for long-term mortgages and finance for small 
secondary industries; ond the other recommendations were to 
receive careful consideration in due course. (Z) Yet on 20 July, 
he added that the government had not committed i tse 1 f ti:: the 
Report in its entirety. (3J And on the same day, a Commonwealth 
assured the community that the Report contained publicity officer 
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no major recommendations for revolutionary change in the Australian 
banking structure. (4J In a speech in September 1937, Lyons 
acknowledged that while improvement was possible, he wished to 
retain the basis of the existing system. (SJ At this stage, it 
would appear that the government was generally committed to take 
action on ma!Jy of .t.he Report's recommendations, but various 
pressures were already working for inaction and eventually they 
were to dominate the scene. 
One force calling for immediate action, however, was the 
Labor Party. It will be recalled that Labor traditionally 
favoured strong government control of the banking system. When 
the government first announced its intention to establish the 
Mortgage Bank Department of the Commonwealth Bank, Curtin criticized 
the government on 21 July 1937 for not commenting on the Commission's 
proposals for additional central bank powers. The government, he 
contended, was unable to come to a definite decision. (5) H.C. Barnard 
(Labor) later announced that the implementation of all the recommend-
ations would be the first step taken by a future Labor gove;nment. (?J 
According to labor, the government's inhibitions were due to its 
domination by the private banks. Curtin asserted that a vital 
part of labor's monetary and banking policy was the active use 
and expansion of the Commonwealth Bank's powers as competitor with 
the trading banks. (B) G.W. Martens (Labor) later claimed, 
in September 1939, that if the Lyons' Government had 
introduced legislation to give effect to the recommendations of 
the Commission, Labor had promised that it would allow the bill to 
pass with only one speech frnm tho n ......... __ .: ..I..~ 
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he said, had not really favoured the Report and, therefore, nothin 
had been done.(g) The Labor Party emphasized the public campaig 
of the private banks as being the major reason for the government" 
procrastination. The Sunday Sun was quoted as saying in June 
1938 that the government would lose substantial party funds if 
. . (10) 
banking reform was proceeded with. The pressure brought to 
bear upon the government by° the private banks to reject the 
Commission's Report will be examined in the next chapter. The 
object of this chapter is to note the public's reactibn to the 
Report. 
Press Comment 
At first, the local press conveyed the impression that the public' 
response to the Report was favourable, both in Sydney and Melbour 
On 1 July 1937, even before a summary of the recommendations had 
been officially released, an article appeared on the front page 
of The Daily Telegraph regarding the Report. Whi1 e its story 
was based on speculation and was in some respects inaccurate;- many 
of the points it made were interesting nevertheless. For exampl 
it stated that the Commission's leading recommendation was that 
the central banking and trading sections of the Commonwealth Bank 
should be separated. "A notable suggest ion", it added, "was 
that each trading bank, including the Commonwealth Trading Bank, 
should lodge as an annual deposit with the Central Reserve Bank 
a percentage of its profits.'(ll) It revealed the generally 
favourable response the Report had received from those who 
-----~--···· 
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privy to it: 
It is described as a report very much on the lines 
of the famous Macmillan Report on Finance and 
Industry, and economists who have read the 
document {my italics) consider that as a financial 
investigation it ranks only second to the Macmillan 
Report, with this advantage, however, that it 
relates to post-depression conditions as well as 
depression conditions. Practical banking as 
well as cicademic'analysis are set out and the 
Government feels that the research, although 
few specific recornrnendatfons are made, has ·been 
well worth the £20,000 it has cost.· 
As early as 20 July 1937, The Sydney Morning Herald warned, 
however, that private bank opposition to the proposal for minimum 
deposits would be forthcoming. The Commission, it stated, had 
made proposals for restricting the private banks' freedom to 
carry out their business. The Herald predicted that the trading 
banks would face difficulties with the introduction of minimum 
deposits, and that strong criticism would be levelled at this 
recommendation by the banks.< 12 ) On 20 July, The Melbourne 
Herald expressed its approval of the Report i·n an article entitled 
"Bank Report is Cl ear and Reassuring". 
· It stressed the fg_ct 
that nationalization had been rejected and agreed that the govern-
ment should be the final authority on monetary policy. It 
added that the Report had spelt out definite powers of direction 
to be followed by the monetary authorities; however, the 
minimum deposits provision was not specifically commented upon. 
' Yet it did conclude by saying that "there are neither· sensational 
disclosures nor recommendations of a disturbing nature..... The 
Report is an emin,ently useful document of educational value. ,.(l 3) 
Further approval of the Commission's recomendations was expressed 
167 
in The Age on 22 July, which stated that efficient operation of th 
central banking system required some limitations on trading bank 
powers in the public's interest.(14) The Argus, on the other 
... 
hand, preferred to stress the Report's vindication of the private 
banks which, according to The Argus, had performed a highly 
satisfactory role during the Depression, and had stood up adequate 
.. . .... . 
to various criticisms. ··It felt that "the general public can 
congratulate itself on having been furnished with a document 
will set at rest all the genuine fears and all the unfounded 
suspicions that have been entertained against banking as now 
conducted in Australia." (lS)The Argus did not foresee the need 
for radical change in the system, but it was concerned about the 
possibility of political interference. As for the recommendatio. 
it noted that "change will be made if made at all on evolutionary 
lines ... The possibility of change that would strengthen the 
political element against banking authorities is a matter, 
which would demand the closest investigation." It added that 
cooperation between the bankers and the government was best for 
the public. 
The Age and The Sydney Morning Herald also published 
favourable editorials concerning the Report. On 21 July, Tl;e 
Age commented that "even in summarised form the recommendations 
of the Royal Commission on Monetary and Banking Systems are 
instructive and stimulating. It is clear at a glance that the 
full report is of prime importance, and that the Commission 
has thoroughly justified its appointment ... already it is 
.:'"'' r·".%2". 
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sufficiently clear that it is a report the making of which has 
'been well worth while _,,(l 5l The Age looked kindly upon increased 
central bank powers. The financial system, it stated, was to be 
made more flexible and serviceable: The maintenance of minimum 
deposits was not a permanent power and would be exercised in a 
reasonable-manner. In a separate article, The Age summarized 
the Commission's findings, emphasizing that nationalization of 
banking and Douglas Credit proposals had been firmly rejected by 
the Commission. In yet another article in the same edition, 
it relayed the impression that the Report had initially received 
a good reception in Melbourne business circles; however, the 
article ·also added that some bankers and financial leaders had 
failed to express an opinion because they feared that if they 
described the Report as "satisfactory", political capital might be 
made· of their comments. At this early stage, criticisms of the 
Report had not yet been definitely formulated, although the same 
article expressed the hesitancy of the Chairman of the Associated 
Banks of Victoria - A.W. McNichol to accept the provisio~ for 
minimum deposits. Still, the article ended on a note of optimism 
expressed by A.W. Ralph, the Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, 
who felt that "business men would approve the recommendations ... (l ?) 
After stressing the Commission's rejection of bank 
nationalization, The Sydney Morning Herald similarly reported 
favourably on the Report in its leading article on 21 July. 
It stated that: 
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The Commission can ... be congratulated upon 
the thoroughness and the moderation which 
characterise its work. There will inevitably 
be disagreement with some of its conclusions 
and recommendations,but the general lines of 
its report are likely to win the approval of 
most of those who have given any serious 
thought or study to the problems with which it 
deals. While it recommends several notable 
changes, in'broad outline the report gives 
its· blessing to ·~11 that is fundamental in our 
present banking system. (18) 
The Sydney Morning HePald also approved of increased government 
controls over the monetary system, but stated that some adverse 
opinion would probably be expressed, especially by the private 
bankers, on the subject of minimum deposits. Even if the tradi 
banks were not receptive to this recommendation, the article 
that the government should assume overall responsibility for 
monetary policy, and it considered that this requirement was· 
not "unreasonable if the Commonwealth Bank ... Lwas] to be proper] 
equipped to discharge the full functions of a central bank." 
Following this initially favourable impact, there seems 
to have followed a strengthening of the forces of opposition, whi 
accordingly, was reflected in the press. By August 1937, the 
private trading bankers had become more organized in their campai 
of criticism and their arguments appeared to have 
The local media now played up the outbursts of the private banks, 
with the financial press taking the lead. Thus The AustPalasia 
Insu:rance and Banki~g ReaoPd on 21 August extolled the virtues of 
the banking system, saying that "the policy pursued by the banks 
has successfully stood Jhe test of the last few years... The ban 
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have been of practical value to the Governments and to the public 
generally under adverse circumstances _ .. (19) The Recopd·was opposed 
to the recommendation concerning minimum deposits, which "would tend 
to hamper the banks in conducting their business, as was stated by 
various witnesses in their evidence, and this would not be to the 
advantage cif customers· ... It was also pointed out that the 
Commission's Chairman, Mr:. Justice Napier, did not agree with the 
proposal. And it opposed the proposal for additional Commonwealth 
Bank access to London funds, pointing out that various witnesses had 
strongly criticized this recommendation. In sum, it thought that 
the existing Mobilization Agreement was adequate. In an 
editorial dated 28 July, The Bulletin also expressed dissatisfaction 
with the recommendations regarding minimum deposits. The idea, 
according to this publication, was altogether too radical, represent-
ing as it did "a new branch of banking law ... and it would not 
attain desired ends or improve banking and financial conditions _.(ZO) 
Yet The Bullet:in did concede that "any government which is returned 
. . 
at the next elections will have to pay serious attention to the 
Report since any government meeting in 1938 will have to consider 
monetary reform ... 
However, just as the Report had initially evoked a 
positive response in the local press, so it was generally well 
received in overseas papers when its fundamental contents were 
first made public. On 20 July, the London Morning Post stressed 
the fact that nationalization of banking had fortunately not been 
supported by the Royal Commission. (21 ) On the same day, the 
London Daily Telegpaph similarly commended the Commission for 
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removing the question of monetary policy from the political 
adding its conviction that credit control would be kept out of 
politics if the Commission's recommendations were acted upon. 
case for a central bank, it said, had gained momentum; indeed, 
it was "stronger than has been realized until recently by public 
opinion in 'the Dominions b_u.t if a central bank is to command 
confidence it must be above even suspicion of political pressure. 
Again, on 21 July, both The Morning Post and The Daily Telegraph 
expressed satisfaction that the proposal for nationalization had 
been rejected, with The Telegraph conveying London's endorsement 
of the Report. It stated that the Commission had: 
made constructive proposals which should be 
useful. The recommendations [were] numerous 
and most technical. In brief, they aim[ed] 
at providing greater elasticity and efficiency, 
and a proper strengthening of the Central Bank 
without infringing upon private rights and 
without allowing political interference to 
become any more of a possibility than it is at 
present. British practice, it seems, is to 
be copied in several important ways ... At 
first sight, the Report commands t~e full 
respect and approval of London banking circles.(23) 
Also on 21 July, The Times commented on the outstanding reception 
of the Report among the Australian business community. 
that the Report had been similarly met with favourable 
London at least at first sight: "Only summai-ies having been 
received on this side, op1n1on was more cautiously expressed in 
London, but it appeared to be favourable."( 24 ) Even earlier, 
28 December 1936, The Financial Times in an article entitled 
"Australian Banking and London Funds", had given its support to 
the idea of minimum deposits and greater control over London 
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funds. Calling for increased central bank powers and the 
concentration of London funds with the central bank, it had 
revealed that: 
To an English observer there are strong arguments 
for making the Commonwealth Bank a fully-fledged 
central bank (and purely a bankers' bank) and 
concentrating London funds in its ownership ... 
·The Australian banking and credit system needs 
greater flexibility and less direct dependence 
upon the ebb ana flow of external trade. (25) 
The leading article of The Financial Ne.iJs on 21 July 1937, 
announced that the Report had met with the approval of many 
Australian bankers in London and it did not think the recommend-
ations were very radical: 
The recommendations of the Australian Banking 
Commission will come as no surprise to anyone 
who has followed the trend of banking thought 
and evolution in Australia in recent years •.. 
But it is quite clear that this report, like 
many others of its kind, seeks a compromise 
between the two leading schools of opinion.(26J 
It added that the Commission cou-ld have gone ·even further if it 
had really desired to ina,ke the Commonwealth Bank a central bQ.nk 
in the classical sense; however, in view of political constraints, 
the Commission had perhaps ventured as far as was practicable 
in its efforts to strengthen the Bank's authority. The paper 
applauded the Commission's attempts to equip the Bank with more 
comp re hens i ve central banking powers, "for recent experience has 
shown that it is very desirable that the technical equipment 
of the central bank should be strengthened wherever possible.· 
The proposal for minimum deposits was supported as a means of 
enabling the central b~nk to contract credit effectively. According 
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to The Financial News, some of the proposals were certain to 
invoke opposition from the private bankers who feared that the 
Commonwealth Bank would compete unfairly with them. The 
solution to this problem, however, was to be found more in 
informal cooperation between the Commonwealth Bank and the 
banks than· in legisla1::ive acts~Z7) On the other hand, it was 
the view of the London financial publication, Finance and Commerc 
that the reforms proposed by the Commission were chiefly technica 
rather than fundamental. It noted that, as expected, the Report 
had already met with a certain amount of criticism, "the most 
notable being that published in a circular issued by the Bank of 
New South Wales. ,.(ZB)It was important to bear in mind, however, 
that Australian conditions differed from those in Britain, and 
thus there was some truth in what A.C. Davidson, General Manager 
of the Bank of New South Wales, had been saying: 
That there is force in these [Davidson's] argu-
ments cannot be denied ... The Commission, 
might, however, have done better had it· suggested 
for the Co'mmonwea1th Bank the additional 
powers for which the Bank asked rather than the 
threat of variable minimum deposits by the 
trading banks and a voluntary mobilization 
agreement ... [On the subject of minimum deposits] 
the Royal Commission went even further than the 
[Commonwealth] Bank contemplated. 
Even so, the paper was prepared to concede that the Bank of New 
South Wales' suggestions were not altogether convincing. 
Davidson had contended that the central bank should not exert 
control over all the private banks' London funds. This a rgu-
ment was actually misdirected, according to the paper, for the 
Commonwealth Bank had ·not sought total control over London funds, 
·!-'!'~:Jci~Wf.-.'--· 
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but "only wants to draw upon the ultimate reserve in case of 
difficulties to ensure it controls exchange." (29) 
The Report was also received in a positive light in some 
North American, particularly Canadian, newspapers. For example, 
on 7 Sept~mber 1937, _The.St.John Citizen stated that "the whole 
leaning of the comiiiissio.n.'s findings is toward a strong central 
bank which will regulate the volume of credit and pay some attention 
to its distribution". The rejection of the nationalization of 
banking was stressed.( 30J On 9 October, The Montreal. Star also 
upheld the Commission's proposals for greater control over financial 
institutions. The Report, it said, ,contained some observations 
fhat were of interest to Canada: 
Australia is manifestly giving the closest 
attention to effective control of her financial 
institutions. That, together with the curb 
on loans exertised by the Loan Council, should 
prove ample guarantee against any such 
unfortunate occurrences as have impaired 
the credit of some of our Canadian prov.inces. (31) 
Although overseas newspapers, for the most part, responded -
agreeably to the recommendations advanced by the Royal Commission, 
the two British financial weeklies, The Economist and The Statist, 
were not as enthusiastic as the daily papers had been. On 24 
July 1937, The Economist asserted that, on the basis of the 
summaries of the recommendations which had been cabled to London, 
the Report was "not .a startling document. ~ 32 ) It criticized the 
Commission's lack of detail concerning the call for minimum 
deposits, stating as it did that "no specific ratio of these 
minimum balances to the trading banks' own deposits is nro~~~;h~~ 
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nor does the Report suggest the circumstances in which this 
power should be exercised." The Economist asserted further 
that mortgage bank facilities and the provision of capital for 
small industries were outside the Commonweal th Bank's scope of 
activity and if the Bank were to undertake these functions, it 
would be inconsistent ~ith its development as a central bank.133 
On 25 July, The Statist was constrained to admit that the 
document was satisfactory, yet it claimed that the recommendatio 
had met with only qualified approval: 
To say that its recommendations have met with 
unqualified approval in this country would be 
to overstate its welcome. But as a reasonable 
compromise _between the political and financial 
interests that had to be considered by the 
Commission the report may be regarded as a 
satisfactory document. Action on the 
lines proposed by it will undoubtedly strengthen 
the whole structure of Australian banking and, 
in particular, tighten up the control of credit 
and currency within the Commonwealth. (34) 
Still, with one important exception that the Commonwealth 
Bank should have been relieved of its competitive commercial 
activities - The Statist conc_eded that the proposals amounted 
to a more effective credit control and were generally sound. 
After describing the Commission's recommendations concerning 
minimum deposits, which 1·1e1·e to be variable within limits 
fixed by the Treasurer, the journal seemed to criticize the 
proposal for a new, more enduring and specific Mobilization 
Agreement: 
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The intention is evidently to leave the trading 
banks less freedom than they have at present 
of accumulating London funds. These funds are 
for these banks a second line of defence -
equivalent to the money at call of British banks-
and their ability to transfer them to Australia 
makes for an independence from centra1 bank 
control which the Commission are evidently 
desirous of curbing. 
The.Statist believed that.this proposal would probably be strongly 
resisted by the trading.banks because of the competition which 
the banks would experience in exchange business by the Commonwealth 
Bank. In fact, the minimum deposit and exchange mobilization 
proposals drove home the journal's statement that central banking 
should be of a non-commercial character: 
Here,[in the proposal for a new foreign exchange 
agreement] and in the matter of altering the 
percentage of reserve balances to be kept by 
the trading banks,are obvious illustrations 
of the objection to mixing central and 
commercial banking. (35) 
By August 1937, both The Economist and The Statist were 
expressing their views more explicitly, On 14 August, The 
Economist repeated the private bankers' objection to the mi-nimum 
deposit proposal: "From the business point of view the proposal 
is open to the objection that it would be of a hampering nature 
and might be used for political purposes."( 36 ) On the same 
day, The Statist revealed that many people thought the 
Commission had only supported the private banking system with 
faint praise. The banks, it said, would not favour further 
restrictions upon their freedom of action, though the banks 
themselves had not presented a strong case for the retention of 
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the existing system: "Their case would have been stronger had 
they supported with more unanimity the present system of control 
On 16 October 1937, The Economist compared the Australian bankin 
inquiry with three earlier banking investigations, namely, the 
British Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry of 1929-31, 
the Canad1an. Royal .. Commi~~ion on Banking and Currency of 1933, 
and the New Zealand Mon.etary Committee of 1934. According to 
The Economist, the Australian Commission "atoned for its tardine 
by sitting longest and producing, this summer, the most lengthy 
report of all."( 3B)The four reports, it stated, could advantageo 
be read together. The British report had the most "fire and 
wit" - no doubt owing much to the presence of J.M. Keynes 
had commendable literary qualities. ~ although each of the reports • . Yet the Australian Report was \\.!L ~lt.)\r' ~/ considerable praise: singled out by The Economist for 
~)tf/ ~ The latest of the series is more sophisticated, and more academic in the arrangement of its full 
It argues its points fully and fairly, even, in Q-~ ~ and precise survey of the Australian economy. 
· ·· fact, a little pedantically ... it gives ... ~~ ~ sixteen pages to the best and soberest refutation -~ \ ~ of his [Major Douglas' - the Social Credit 
· theorist] ideas so far published. 
According to this journal, all the reports were very similar in 
I ' [\ .\ ~ 
11/ - \191~ 
~ 
their recommendations. In short, it predicted that the era 
of central banking and monetary policy, and its application to 
the economy, had arrived, especially in Australia. Jn the 
words of the article: 
178 
One and all they inculcate the principle 
of monetary management and of the responsibility 
of Central Banking. They consecrate the support 
of these principles by public opinion throughout 
the Empire, and they give them their classical 
statement by lay authorities. 
And the Australian Commission, it continued, had been more 
unariimous in· its r'e'commenCfations than the other commissions, 
inasmuch as the Australian Report-contained fewer addenda, 
reservations, and minutes of dissent than any of the other reports; 
in 1 ength they equa 11 ed "no more than 6 per cent [of the Report], 
and even then they are reservations of small moment. For all 
\ 
intents and purposes it [the Report] is unanimous." This 
unanimity was all the more commendable and "impressive because 
of the profundity of the Commission's researches. Their report 
is admirably documented." One other aspect, concerning the 
objectives of monetary policy, was referred to by The Economist 
in passing: 
The British Macmillan Report stated the object 
of Central Banks to be "to maintain the stability~­
of international prices both over long periods and 
over short periods". This report tells the 
Commonwealth Bank to "make its chief cons iderat-
ion the reduction of fluctuations in economic 
activity". In both cases the ultimate aim 
is, of course, identical, but the alteration in 
emphasis indicates a change in opi :ii 011 about 
methods, interesting as a 1 esson taught by the 
past six years as well as a reflection on the 
special position of raw material-producing 
countries. The rest of the report shows 
clearly why the change has come about, and gives 
it an interest of its own. In fact, in every 
way this is a volume worthy of its predecessors 
and to be read by anyone interested in contem-
porary economic life. (39) 
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Finally, on 18 December 1937, The Economist took 
on ~he issue of minimum deposits, prepared as it now was to 
. . h C . . ' d . ( 40 ) Th B k some merit in t e ommission s recommen at1ons. e an 
New South Wales_, according to the journal, was in error when it 
stated that, insofar as ppen market operations were an effectiv 
and adequate. instr.ument of credit control, minimum deposits wer 
neither necessary nor advisable. The Economist held that open 
market operations did not afford the central bank an effective 
means of controlling the volume of credit and, therefore, the 
Commission's advice was sound. The proposal for exchange 
mobilization also seemed to possess some value as a device for 
augmenting the central bank's authority. The recommendations 
of the Commission, it maintained, carried added weight at that 
time for a political reason; specifically, if the government fell 
short of implementing the Report, then a Labor government might 
validly claim the right to go beyond the Commission's recommenda 
ions. 
It is of interest to note, ?lso, the stance taken 5:y 
The Round Tahle in an article on the Report which was published 
in October 1937. For it, the most controversial aspect was 
the question of whether supreme authority for monetary policy 
should rest with the Commonwealth Bank or the government. And 
yet it was pointed out that the recommendations concerning the 
powers of the government and the Commonwealth Bank had not 
received much comment, except from the private banks which had 
generally advised caution and careful consideration. (4l) Jn 
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October 1937, The Bankers' Magazine noted that, although the 
Report had initially been well received in Britain, the Australian 
banking community's opinion had definitely soured. And it 
felt that the criticism emanating from this quarter seemed to be 
valid: 
Wher the -~indinR~ and recommendations of the 
Commission were first cabled to this country, 
there was general satisfaction that the Commission 
had apparently declared quite emphatically against 
any nationalisation of the banks, but now that the 
full Report has arrived together with innumerable 
comments from banking authorities in Australia, 
there would seem to be a very general fee1ing in 
the Australian banking community that if the 
actual word "nationalisation" has been avoided, 
many of Ure recommendations of the Report, if 
they were carried into effect, would mean such 
a measure of Government control as to give to 
the Government of the day complete power over 
currency and banking in Australia. (42) 
Academic Response to the'Report 
As for academic comment upon the Report, it was generally 
supportive. On 21 July 1937, Dr E. Rona 1 d Wa 1 ker, who had 
presented evidence before the Royal Commission, publicly pr~ised 
the Report, saying as he did that it had "offered a valuable 
analysis of the banking and monetary system of Australia." (43 ) He 
also approved of the Commission's recommendation concerning 
relations between the Bank and the government: 
)' 
I 
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The application of the Commission's recommendat-
ion that the Government should take full 
responsibility for monetary policy in the event 
of confl.ict between the Commonwealth Bank and 
the Government of the day may, on some occasions, 
raise difficulties, but I hope that the recommend-
ation, which seems the most striking one in the 
report, will be adopted. 
He had now come to ss~ merit in the proposal for minimum 
It was most important, he felt, for the Commonwealth Bank to 
have the power to vary the percentage of the private banks' 
liabilities to deposits which should be maintained with the 
Bank: "The variation of the percentage would give 
Bank Board power to prevent undue credit expansion in boom 
peri ads." And the government's announcement that it would 
establish a mortgage bank "was most encouraging.• (44) 
W.B. Reddaway, an economist visiting Melbourne Universit 
.from Cambridge, and who had also appt;ared before the Commission, 
, did not go so far as to admit that he approved of the Commission' 
\ recommendations in.their entirety; 
\ 
he did comme.nt, however, 
upon the minimum deposits provision, which, he considered, 
prove a very strong instrument of monetary control: 
The Banking Commission's recommendation that 
every trading bank could be required for 18 
months in 24 to keep a specified deposit with 
the central bank which could be varied at will 
by the central bank was a very powerful form of 
control. A similar provision in the federal 
reserve system of the United States had been 
effectively used to prevent the great influxes 
of gold being used as a basis for over 
expansion of credit. ( 45) 
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According to S.J. Butlin, A.G.B. Fisher, and O.B. Copland, 
the recommendations of the Royal Commission, and the Report 
itself, were useful and important. Butlin, in particular, praised 
the results of the inquiry, concluding that "as Royal Commissions 
go, that on the Bank~ng System was worth the money." 
his ·opinion that: 
The Banking Commission .• :has given us a Report 
which can be set beside the model Report of 1929 
on the Constitution. It is readable in style, 
it does present a very good synthesis of the 
It was 
evidence; it does (with two very important 
exceptions) really argue a case for its recommend-
ations; and the evidence is to be printed - although 
rumour says the price will be prohibitive. The 
net was cast wide. (46) 
Copland was also highly impressed by the Commission's work: 
The Commission has naturally drawn very fully 
upon ... [the] evidence, and has consequently 
given students of banking the best and most 
intimate picture of the Australian banking system 
so far available. The report, moreover, will 
occupy an honoured place among the many reports of 
commissions and committees of inquiry u·pon· the 
banking systems of individual countries in recent 
years. (47) 
The comments of these three academics upon the work of the Royal 
Commission will now be analyzed in detail. 
Fisher's article, "Twentieth Century Banking in Australia", 
appeared in The Economic Record in December 1937. He noted 
that some critics believed that the government had established 
the Commission in order to cast its "pseudo-independent" blessing 
upon the Australian banking system; however, instead of 
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vindicating the banking establishment, the Commission had 
to cer_tain significant defects in the Australian banking and 
monetary systems and had made notable recommendations which, if 
implemented, would lead to fundamental changes in these systems: 
Those who were sent for to bless the bankers 
· d·id not exactly turn and curse them, but with 
disarming·mildne93, they have drawn attention 
to certain important defects in the Australian 
capital market. The co.nsideration of these 
leads to important recommendations, which, if 
adopted by the Government, endorsed by Parliament 
and effectively administered by the Commonwealth 
Bank, would ·mean important changes in our general 
banking and financial structure. The Commission's 
criticisms are not always set out in elaborate 
detail, being in fact often left implicit in 
recommendations for change in future practice, 
but they are none the less important, and since 
the publication of the Report there ·has been a 
steadily widening recognition of this fact. At 
first there were those who claimed that the reP.ort 
was a complete justification of existing banking 
practices, while it was complained by others 
that the Commission had merely whitewashed the 
existing financial system. On second thoughts 
both friend and foe began to suspect that their 
first reactions had been a little hasty. In 
this case second thoughts were certainly best, 
for though the Report is moderate in. tone, ·its 
recommendations contain a good deal more 
potential dynamite than either side had at first 
supposed. \48) 
Fisher rightly recognized that the most important recomme 
ions were those which sought to provide the Commonwealth Bank 
1~ith the powers it required to function effectively as a central 
bank. He noted that many people were eager to strengthen 
the central bank, but had failed to take account of the fact 
the Bank might base its decision-making on specious principles. 
Fisher added, however, that the Commissioners were aware of the 
problem: 
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The Commission itself was apparently a little 
troubled by this dilemma ... while the Commission 
felt its-elf compel led to recommend wider powers 
for the Commonwealth Bank, it felt a little 
dubious as to the way in which these powers would 
be used, and therefore indulged in a rather lengthy 
lecture on the errors committed in the past. In 
effect, they seem to say, you cannot be blamed 
for these mistakes, but don't do it again. The 
point at issue here is indeed one of immediate and 
pressing ·practic.al importance. (49) 
He implied that, although the Commission desired a strong central 
bank in theory, central bank control in practice was another 
matter: 
"It is wholly unwise," the Commission tells us ... · 
"to wait until a boom· or depression occurs before 
taking action." But does this mean that restrictive 
action should be taken in October or December, 1937 ... 
that we may approve of central bank control in 
principle, but may steadily refuse to admit that 
the present is ever a suitable time for applying 
the brakes which in theory we admit to be 
essential. (50) 
He then discussed the Bank's instruments of control as they had 
been analyzed by the Royal Commission. The Commission, he 
said, approved of the Bank continuing its trading activities; 
however., a more radical recommendation concerned the power to 
compel the holding of trading bank reserves with the Commonwealth 
Bank. Even though Fisher used the word "radical" in his 
------ ------~~~~-
article, his following comments shed doubt on ·the possibility 
that he actually considered the recommendation on minimum deposits 
to be "radical": 
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This is now a common practice in banking systems 
which cannot easily adopt Bank of England methods. 
The idea of making the legal reserve elastic at 
the discretion of the central bank and the Treasury 
is a still more recent development, applied already 
in the United States and in New Zealand. The 
Australian trading banks do in fact already keep 
deposits for clearing purposes with the Commonwealth 
Bank, but it is not obligatory to do so, and the 
Commission recommends that the Commonwealth Bank 
should have power to insist upon certain deposits.(51) 
He noted that the Commissioners had not specified the amount Gf 
deposits to be maintained with the Bank and, furthermore, they 
had failed to reveal the reasoning behind the time constraint 
placed upon the Bank when exercising this power: 
No specific figure is mentioned, nor is the 
Commonwealth Bank to be permitted to exercise 
such power continuously, the period of exercise 
being limited, for some obscure reason, to 
eighteen out of any twenty-four months. (52) 
He added that while the recommendations would increase the powers 
of the Commonwealth Bank and the Treasury, it was futile to say 
who would really control, or should control, th.e banking system. 
I The answer would depend on personalities to some extent. He _did agree with the Commission that in the last resort, the government, backed by Parliament, must prevail. In addition, he doubted 
whether the proposal to establish a mortgage bank was as important 
as its proponents had suggested: 
~rr~ (}.~~ u 1'i 
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There is something to be said for co-ordinating 
existing institutions, but farmers would be 
deceived if they supposed that such a Mortgage 
Bank would make available for their use a larger 
aggregate volume of credit. Lending with 
more discrimination, rather than more lending, 
is what is most needed in this connection. (53) 
He also seem.ed wary of -~he recommendation for an investigation of 
the problem of setting up instituti.ons to supply the financial 
needs of small units in manufacturing industry. In essence, he 
was not at all confident that these two provisions would achieve 
an efficient allocation of the community's savings. He was 
also disappointed by the Commissioners' failure to deal directly 
with the case for nation al i zation, although he noted th at some 
of the most important issues raised by calls for nationalization 
had been indicated in the Report. All the same, he did not 
think that the case presented by the proponents of bank national-
ization was very convincing: By depicting the banking system 
as the cause of credit shortages, the reformers were, he said, 
underplaying the more important criticisms that the banking-
system often granted too much· credit, and was sometimes reluctant 
to stop such lending. He applauded the Commission for taking 
these sorts of questions into account in recommending greater 
powers for the Commonweal th Bank; st i 11, he was ·not con vi need 
by the Commissioner's rejection of nationalization: 
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Their formal approbation of a system of 
privately owned trading banks controlled 
by a st.rang central tiank would have been more 
convincing if they had addressed themselves 
more directly to the question whether even 
the strongest central bank can possibly limit 
unwise boom expansion of credit by vigorously 
competing trading banks. (54) 
In conclusion, he ·conceded that· complete implementation of the 
proposals would not bring "the mi 1.1 enni um"; however, the 
provided the authorities with an opportunity to mitigate 
economic and monetary problems. Yet he also warned against 
placing too much emphasis on the extent to which banking reforms 
could improve the economic situation, agreeing as he did with t 
Commission thattoo much "should not be expected, even from the 
most enlightened policy of an all-powerful central bank ... l55 l 
Indeed, he was not over-sanguine that the recommendations would 
acted upon: "One would feel more optimistic about the future if 
there had been a clearer indication of willingness to adopt and 
apply the more far-reaching recommendations which have been made. 
Professor Copland, writing on "Some Problems of 
Australian Banking" in The Economic Journai in December 1937, 
stressed the fact that the Commission was not entirely 
<ci-:'<1,)1,\'*'"' 
with the functions of the existing Aust1·alian moneta1·y and banki11·• 
systems. He stated that the Commissioners' recommendations 
concerning the improvement of credit facilities for long-term 
mortgages and finance for small manufacturing business were minor 
matters compared with its investigation of the extent to which 
the system carried ou~ desirable monetary objectives. Copland 
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seemed to agree with the Commission that Parliament should be 
ultimately responsible for monetary policy. The Commission, 
he said, assumed that the government and the Bank would normally 
work out a satisfactory compromise. He believed that: 
This is fundamental to its major recommend-
·ations o.n the note issue, the powers of the 
Bank and· the plate to be assumed by the 
Treasurer in determining banking po1icy. 
Those who regard as dangerous the Commission's· 
declaration on the relations of the Government 
and the Bank will object to the recommendations 
of the Commission for increasing the Bank's 
control over banking policy and for regulating 
the note issue. For the Commission's 
proposals will substantially extend the right 
of the Treasurer to make important decisions 
upon banking policy in the normal discharge 
of his functions as liaison officer between 
the Government and the Bank. (57) 
Turning to minimum deposits with the central bank, Copland 
argued that, unless the private banks held a portion of their 
liquid assets on deposit with the Commonwealth Bank, central 
control of the banking system would be limited for two major 
reasons: 
a) The central bank may not have sufficient 
resources to purchase funds in London or 
securities in Australia requ~red for its 
control of the exchange rate and internal 
credit policy. 
b) Jn a period of favourable trade balances, 
the trading banks may hold their liquid 
assets in a form (treasury bills or 
London funds) over which the central 
bank has insufficient control, and the 
banks may therefore pursue a lending 
policy inconsistent with the desired 
objective of the central bank. (58) 
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He sought to expose the weaknesses in the argument of the Bank 
of New South Wale-s to the effect that the central bank al ready 
possessed sufficient powers to implement its policies. The 
Bank of New South Wales had argued that the central bank could 
force the -trading banks to transfer London funds to the former, 
principally by the execution of open market operations. But 
Copland explained that the bank's-reasoning was ill-founded: 
The argument assumes that what is true of a 
highly specialised money market is true also 
of conditions in a simple money market, as 
in Australia, where a) open-market operations 
are limited, b) fluctuations in interest rates 
do not cause international movements of funds, 
c) small movements in the exchange rate do not 
promote substantial short-term changes in the 
balance of payments, and d) changes in the 
money-market conditions have important 
repercussions on Government finance, and 
therefore give rise to political difficulties. (59) 
He believed that the same reasoning could be used to refute the 
Bank of New South Wales' assertion that the Corrnnonwealth Bank 
already possessed the means to control the cash reserves of the 
\ 
banking system. Copland was convinced that minimum deposits 
were necessary to ensure that the Commonwealth Bank was 
with the means to manage the monetary system: 
If we could consider the operations of the 
central bank in vacuo, we might concede its 
ability to control the cash reserves of the 
trading banks. But there are other influences, 
political and financial, that prevent the Bank 
from pursuing its policy to the bitter end. The 
importance of giving the central bank sufficient 
resources to implement its policy was recognised 
by the Macmillan Committee, which justified 
the obligation of the private banks to keep 
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reserves with the central bank on the ground 
that it was necessary to pro vi de "the Centra 1 
Institution with adequate resources .... -[ with 
which] to manage the monetary system." If 
this is true for a highly developed money 
market, it is still more true for the Australian 
money market. (60) 
Indeed, Co.pl and did not believe that the Commission's recommendat-
ion concerning minimum d~posits had gone far enough. The private 
banks, he held, were able to restrict the powers of the Commonwealt 
Bank by virtue of the fact that they could maintain a substantial 
portion of their liquid assets in the form of London funds and 
treasury bills. Hence, Copland explained that: 
To require the banks to hold a certain proportion 
of their liabilities on deposit with the 
Commonwealth Bank would not be sufficient. The 
banks could increase their London funds and 
discount treasury bills, or sell ordinary Government 
securities to maintain their deposits at the Bank. 
This would leave the Bank in a sound enouqh 
position to buy London funds, but its capacity 
to sell funds would be limited. It would not 
control the international currency reserve of 
the country. (61) 
The Commission, he said, had failed to discuss these problems; 
although they had been impressed by the arguments put forward by 
the Commonwealth Bank, the Commissioners had not recommended the 
exact powers sought by the Bank. 
Noting that the Commission had stressed the desirability 
of bank cooperation, Copland also believed voluntary cooperation 
between the central bank and the trading banks to be a most 
satisfactory arrangement. Yet he was fully aware that the 
attainment of voluntar7 cooperation was likely to be a very slow 
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and frustrating process. He suggested that the Commission had 
realized this point and consequently sought to hasten such co-\ 
operation by recommending latent powers of compulsion. CoplanA 
approved of this recommendation for several reasons: Fi rs t, 
the reserve power would probably bring about a good working 
arrangeme~t between. the. Bi!rik and the trading banks with respeot 
to deposits maintained with the former; second, 
trading bank deposits with the central bank could 
the banks as regards interest on liquid funds when compared with 
the pre-depression situation; third, minimum deposits would 
furnish the central bank with greater funds, thereby strengtheni 
its position in the banking system; and fourth, the increase w~ 
in line with developments in other countries with less specializ 
money markets. This power, however, would not give the Bank 
control of the international currency reserves. Thus the 
Commission had recommended that the Bank's holding of London 
should be increased ,and a new Exchange Mobilization.Agreement wa 
proposed accordingly. Copland admitted .that there were t\'!o 
dissentients to the recommendation concerning the need to 
a new agreement; however, he did not feel that they were 
dissenting from the proposal that the Bank should increase its 
London funds at the expense of the trading banks.( 5z) 
Finally, it was his belief that the Commission h~ 
taken a "realistic" view of the function of a central bank, for 
it had recognized that cooperation was a precondition for the 
effective exercise of central bank powers. The Commission 
f)o-"J-
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revealed that central banki.ng required sagacity on the part of the 
monetary authorities, and Copland had confidence in the Bank's 
capability to undertake its duties, for the most part, without 
~ having to resort to compulsion: 
Th~ Co!1111]1ssion .\ook a realistic view of the 
function of a central bank, recognizing that 
the Bank must.have adequate powers, but should 
only exercise these powers when other methods 
failed. Normally the Bank would act after 
consultation with the trading banks and with 
their full concurrence. Without the co-
operation of the trading banks, and of other 
financial institutions, the central bank would 
have very limited powers to discharge ·its main 
function of attempting to promote economic 
stability. The obligation to secure this co-
operation is not less on the trading banks than 
on the central bank, and the Commission leaves 
one in no doubt that it re.gards the trading 
banks as essentially public utilities. On 
the other hand, it is emphatic that the 
technique of central banking is a highly 
specialized and responsible function, necessitating 
on the part of the directors and the senior 
officers judgment and understanding of a high 
order. The Commonwealth Bank is still 
learning the technique of central banking, and, 
it is perhaps fortunate in the past ten years in 
the prestige it has acquired for pursuing 
an enlightened policy not always of its own 
making. (63) 
On the Commission's decision to stress, as the chief objective 
of the monetary system, the need to maintain stabiiity in the 
level of economic activity, Copland congratulated it: 
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This is a very simple statement of what all 
students of monetary reform will know to be 
a highly complex problem. But the Commission 
is to be congratulated on deliberately 
avoiding the appearance of being too learned 
on the problem, while drawing the attention 
of the banking system to its public responsibility 
for using its undoubted influence to mitigate 
industrial fluctuations. The policy is not 
precise. It <lemands different action at 
·di fferef!~ times .•• and it requires a common attack 
on all fronts - the Commonwealth Bank, the 
trading banki.in their attitude to advances, 
the Governments in their loan policy, and the 
general enterprise of other financial institutions. (6 
Copland chose to cover much the same ground in his article in 
The Economic Record in April 1939; again, his principal focus 
was on the issue of greater central banking control~ 55 l 
In September 1937, The Aus.tralian Quarterly pub 1 i shed 
S.J. Butlin's review on "The Banking Commission's Report". 
He stressed, like Fisher, that the Commission had been no white-
washing exercise: 
In fact, one of the important implications is a 
qualified approval of the Seu 11 i.n Government's 
policy. Criticism has been freely distributed -
where it was due, with great even-handedness ... 
Similarly, two trading banks are accused of showing 
"no disposition to co-operate with the Commonwealth 
Bank" in keeping down deposit rates in February 
and March,1936, after the open-market offer of 
Treasury Bills. Then the Commission turns 
on the Commonwealth Bank, and accuses it of 
indecision and lack of purpose in this matter, 
and criticizes the open-market offer itself ... 
The Commission's purpose is, obviously, not mud-
slinging, but indicating defects in [the] present 
structure and past policy, with a view to securing 
something better. It realises the difficulties 
which have faced the Commonwealth Bank. But, 
nevertheless, the general impression created by 
the Report of the past activities of the 
Commonwealth Bank is unfavourable. It suggests 
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the bank [was] digging in its toes, like a calf 
that won't be led, behaving as if it didn't 
want to be a central bank, and yielding only 
when it had to. (66) 
Butlin added that not only did the Commission criticize past 
actions of the Bank, but it also indicated that the Bank had 
failed to.ma.ke adequate 4~e of its existing powers. Yet its 
major criticism was levelled at the lack of control the monetary 
authorities currently possessed over the Australian monetary and 
banking systems: 
The Commission evidently has no faith in unregulated 
private banks, and the completeness of its lack 
of faith is shown by the degree of direction it 
wants the Commonwealth Bank to give. The trading 
banks, if the Commission's recommendations were 
adopted, would have no discretion as to the total 
amount of credit, interest rates, or exchange, 
and only a limited discretion as to the distribution 
of credit between industries. And the Commission 
is serious about it. If the Commonwealth Bank used 
its existing powers as the Commission would have 
them do, and had the new powers proposed, it would 
be king. It could simply eliminate any bank 
which did not conform to the policy prescribed. 
The implications of such proposals hardly justify 
the headl i.ne under which one Sydney newspaper 
wrote up the Report: "Austral fa has a good 
banking system." (67) 
After reviewing several of the Commission's recommendations, such 
as that concerning mortgage banking, which was, he said, "quite 
a minor suggestion", Butlin then directed the greater part of his 
commentary to a discussion of what he considered to be the three 
truly significant conclusions of the Commission: "Political 
control" of the central bank, almost dictatorial powers to the 
<> k . 1. . ;, (6B) 
uan , and no nat1ona 1zat10~ 
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Butlin favoured the Commission's recommendation conce 
ing relations between the government and the central bank. 
he asserted that this proposal was nothing new, for the same 
situation already prevailed elsewhere: "This is, of course, 
situation in England. It is also [a] good democratic principl 
since central banki)lg· is ?!1e of the most important aspects of 
politics; and it is implicit in the i.deas of all 
inveighed against the New Despotism of bureaucracy and 'indepen 
authorities. ,.( 6Jr;:ided firmly with the Commission in 
of political cohtrol as the most desirable alternative: 
\ 
The Report shows clearly that the Commonwealth Bank 
has chosen to carry out its own views on policy, 
in opposition to the Government of the day, and, 
one can safely say in the particular case quoted, 
in opposition to public opinion. The Report, 
too, takes the view that the particular policy 
(reduction of treasury bills) was contrary to 
the general interest. Moreover, "independent" 
control can produce the sort of situation we 
have already had, of the Government deciding 
on a public works policy, the bank carrying out 
a ctedit policy, and the Arbitration Court a 
wages policy, all three being mutually inconsistent 
and conflicting with one another. In other words, 
in the past, the independent system has worked 
worse than political control would have done. 
This writer, at least, is with the Commission 
in preferring political control to administrative 
dictatorship by the Commonwealth Bank. It is 
only to be regretted that the Report does not 
argue the case more fully. (70) 
Butlin went on to say that the issue was especially important 
in the light of the Commission's desire for complete central 
bank control of the private banks. Not only did the Commission 
want the Bank to exercise its existing powers, including its 
trading bank functions, more fully, but it had proposed the 
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significant new power of minimum deposits. He praised the 
Commission for th_is recommendation and especia11y for advocating 
a variable system rather than a fixed one: 
The Commission has not been seduced by the 
scheme of fixed minima which the bank board 
itself suggested. These proved inadequate 
·in the Uni fed States, and were modified in 1935. 
Nor did Tt make"'the mistake of prescribing 
a maximum 1 imi't to the reserves which the bank 
could require, which the Chainnan and Mr. Pitt 
urged. A fixed minimum, as American experience 
proves, is merely stupid. If set low enough 
to be workable in all circumstances, it is 
not high enough for control. The system of 
a maximum limit, on the other hand, is meaning-
1 ess, for the appropriate maximum to meet a 11 
possible situations would have to be set so 
high that the limit would not matter. (71) 
He explained that the minimum deposits requirement, as recommended 
by the Commission, would greatly enhance the Bank's power over 
the banking system, since it would be able to set an upper limit 
to total bank lending: 
The scheme surmounts the two diff}culties. which 
most central banks, including the Commonwealth 
Bank at present, experience in setting such a 
limit. Other means of influencing the cash 
available to the trading banks are indirect 
and do .not always work efficiently; open-
market operations, for instance, are clumsy 
and inefficient in the special conditions in 
Australia. Secondly, a trading bank can 
at present to some extent meet central bank 
action on cash resources by a change in i·atios 
The power to require and to vary minimum deposits 
provides the simple solution of demanding 
more as a weapon for securing co-operation. 
It is an ideal weapon, for it should never be 
necessary to use it; no trading bank would 
be so foolish as to refuse the mere requests 
of a central bank armed thus. Added to the 
rest of the Commonwealth. Bank's armoury, it 
means absolute authority. (72) 
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On the other hand, the Commission's treatment of the nationaliz 
issue was not well received by Butlin. The press, he argued, 
had misled the public by headlining the rejection of the 
when, in fact, the Commissioners had simply not included the 
issue among their recommendations. He was himself highly 
critical of the way the Commission had ignored nationalization 
without adequate justification. He was especially disappoint 
that Chifley's minority report was so short, since he regarded 
the issue to be one worthy of a detailed case and more analysis' 
"Nevertheless , " he added, "Mr. Chi fl ey made out, even in his thr 
pages, a better case for nationalisation than the Majority did 
. h' " (73) for private owners ip. 
Finally, there were the objectives of monetary policy, 
to which Butlin thought the Commission had given insufficient 
attention. 
fl uctuati ans 
but at least 
it, until we 
Even its statement concerning the aim of reduc~·n 
in economic activity, he felt, was "rather vague, 
there should be a large measure•of agreement on 
start to define terms like 'stability' ... (74 ) j 
Overseas, H.V. Hodson provided comment on the 
Commission's Report in the September 1937 issue of The Banker. 
But it is interesting, first, to examine a previous article he 
had published in July 1936. Then, he had identified the true 
problem to be the relationship between the monetary authorities 
and the banking system. If there were a conflict between the 
trading banks and the central bank, a dangerous situation 
might arise: 
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No effort to secure governmental authority 
will be. fully successful unless it extends 
to the trading banks or includes much more 
stringent statutory restrictions upon their 
operations. On the other hand, if the 
loyalty of the banking system to the central 
banking authority is such that the country's 
monetary and credit structure can be controlled 
·through the decisions of the Commonwealth Bank 
al one, th'e pro bl em is reduced to a very s imp 1 e 
shape, namely;· how to secure that the po 1 icy 
of the Commonwealth Bank is genuinely and 
wisely conceived in the interests of the 
whole nation. (75) 
He· maintained that, in the final analysis, stronger central bank 
powers were desirable, concluding that "there can be little 
doubt that the incompleteness of the central bank's authority in~ 
Australia does represent a certain handicap in this respect."(?~ 
Turning to the more recent article, Hodson dealt 
·briefly with the Commission's major recommendations. First, 
he noted that the government should be acknowledged as the final 
authority on monetary matters. Na ti ona l i zat 1 on,' he averred, had 
been rejected by the Commission: "But its approval of 
independence and private enterprise in the banking system was 
accompanied by a recommendation whose effect was to make the 
government the ultimate arbiter of policy for currency and credit."(?7) 
On the subject of minimum deposits, he observed that a great deal 
of controversy had been stimulated in Australian banking 
circles: 
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It has been defended as necessary to proper 
central control of the credit mechanism, 
analogi_es being drawn with the minimum percent-
age rules in the Federal·Reserve system. It 
is attacked as locking up the liquid assets 
of the trading banks and leaving them inadequate 
scope for legitimate enterprise which may require 
deviation from the average, and as a supremely 
dangerous inst~ument in the hands of a Socialist 
·Treasurer. (78) 
Next, he took up the issue of London funds. According to 
Hodson, the Commission had demonstrated that control of these fu 
would play an important role in regulating trading bank 
and, ultimately, the country's credit structure. This issue, h 
noted, had provoked "the keenest controversy". Representatives 
of the Commonwealth Bank claimed that the central bank should 
obviously have charge of what is in effect the national exchange 
reserve. The trading bankers retorted that their intimate 
commercial relations with London forbade them from putting themse 
at the mercy of a central bank ... [ii-1hich wished to] secure their 
1 
. . t' Th C . . · · d " ( 7 g) B t ster 1 ng requ1 remen s... e omm1ss10n comprom1 se ·. u 
controversy, Hodson said, not only related to the exchange -H'!te 
question and to the general problem of controlling Australian 
monetary policy. For the Commonwealth Bank had been directed 
make the stability of economic activity the chief priority of 
monetary policy, rather than price or exchange rate stability. 
In addition, the Report encouraged the Commonwealth Bank to 
expand its powers by actively using its trading bank functions. 
In sum, "the very core of. .. [the Commission's J report is the 
desire to establish in Australia a strong and all-pervading 
central bank, which shall nevertheless be submissive in the 
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last resort to Government policy." (BO) But to strengthen 
the position of the Commonwealth Bank would weaken the autonomy 
of the private trading banks, and whether they would take that 
lying down was very much to be doubted. 
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CHAPTER SI.X 
THE CJl.MPAIGN BY THE PRIVATE BANKS 
A vigorous and highly effective public and private campaign, 
waged against the principal recommendations of the Royal Commission 
by the private trading banks in late 1937 and throughout 1938, 
occupied a predominant place in the aftennath of the publication 
of the Commission's Report. The evidence presented by the banks 
to the Commission had.been an early warning of the inevitable 
clash of interests involved, and, even before the Report was 
completed, the set pieces of the battle scene were being la'id. 
When the Commission was considering its report, it was generally 
recognized that greater central banking powers would be recommended 
and appropriate legislation would probably follow. Soon after 
the publication of the Report, as early as 7 September 193&, R.G. 
Casey, the Federal Treasurer, informed S.M. Bruce in London that 
the Commission would probably recommend legislation on the subject 
of London funds, in view of the fact that one trading bank -
namely, the Bank of New South Wales - v1ould prevent the settlement 
of any voluntary agreement between the Commonwealth Bank and the 
private ban ks: 
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I feel su2'e [Casey wrote] that we could get a 
good watertight voluntary agreement between the 
Commonwealth Bank and all but one of the trading 
banks - but of course this isn't good enough, 
bearing in mind that the one Bank that is 
unlikely to agree is by far the biggest of the 
· 1 ot in genera 1 business and in London· funds. So 
that the Royal Commission may (and I think probably 
will) recommend.some form of legislation on the 
subject. (lJ 
Indeed, Casey's presumption soon proved correct, for in the abse 
of legislation, cooperation by the Bank of New South Wales was no 
forthcoming. Before the Report was completed, two conferences 
between the Commonwealth Bank and the private banks were held for 
purpose of discussing the issues of fixed minimum deposits and 
access to London funds. The result of the first conference, he 
on 6 October 1936 - from which Davidson, the General Manager o 
the Bank of New South Wales, was absent - was very favourable: 
While the private banks maintained their stance on the undesirabi 
of a minimum deposits provision, they agreed to recommend an 
extended Mobilization Agreement. This consensus was short-
lived, however, as Davidson rejected the proposa 1 ~ 2) In the fiope 
of reaching agreement among all the banks, another 
called on 3D November with Davidson in attendance. The 
of this conference was less promising than the first, as the 
bankers would not consent to a new Mobilization Agreement 
an atmosphere which had become "tense", to say the 1 east. rt 
became very clear that some of the private banks were resolved 
stand by the evidence they had presented to the Commission and 
opposed any intervention in their affairs. Davidson, in particu· 
~·*-. "-r:·-?.·· • 
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saw no need for a new excha.nge agreement which, he said, would 
'·cause inflation; the London funds of the private banks, he argued, 
.were reserves and hence were unavailable for exchange purposes. 
He added that he was not concerned about rumours of banking legislation, 
nor about the Commission's Report which was being prepared. More-
over, he revealed his readiness to stage an anti-Report, anti-
legislation campaign once the Report was completed. (3) It was 
at this point, in fact, that the private banks, led by the Bank of 
New South Wales, began to organize themselves for a bitter fight 
. against any measures which would subject their credit policy to 
effective control by the Commonwealth Bank. Yet, when the Report 
released, some bankers chose to remain silent and 
several even responded favourably to the recommendatfons. But 
by the end of August 1937, many private bankers began building up 
an opposing case, which then gathered momentum with the announcement 
in Parliament on 30 November 1937 that legislation would be 
(4) 
introduced by the government. 
A Brief Overview of the Banks' Campaign 
The general thrust of the banks' opposition soon became clear: They 
made it known that effective control of monetary policy would not 
be secured by voluntary cooperation on their behalf. In particular, 
they would refuse to accommodate thelTlselves to the specified 
needs of the Commonwealth Bank, nor vmuld they agree to the main 
recommendations of the Commission. Many statements which had been 
presented to the Commission were now repeated, and their unhappiness 
... 
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with the entire business of increased central bank control was 
pre-eminent. At times, some of the banks tended to manipulate 
the recommendations of the Commission to suit their own ends; hal 
truths were often stated; and the central bank's arguments for 
greater regulation were cleverly evaded. The banks were at one 
in agreeing that the minimization of central bank authority was 
imperative; this was to prove the stronghold of unity among 
them. A general examination of the banks' arguments reveals 
that there were two major points of criticism. To begin with, 
the bankers feared that the implementation of some of the 
ations of the Corrnuission would lead to increased competition by 
the Commonwealth Bank. The problem, which was not really resolv. 
until the creation of the Reserve Bank of Australia in 1959, was 
that the Corrnnonwealth Bank was a trading bank competitor as 
as the central bank. The government's desire to establish a 
Mortgage Bank Department in the Commonwealth Bank, together with 
the possibility of establishing special facilities in 
lending to secondary. industry, was similarly ,resented by the ban 
as an infringement upon their traditional _spheres of activi!Y· 
There was the added difficulty here that the Commission had 
proposed that the Commonwealth Bank should actively engage in 
indeed extend its trading activities. This, too, heightened 
the banks' fear of increased inroads into their business by the 
Bank. In short, consideration for profits was a predominant 
factor causing concern among the banks. The proposa 1 concerni n 
minimum deposits, moreover, added insult to injury, in that the 
trading banks believed that their deposits lodged with the centre 
. ' 
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would be used to compete against them. This point, in fact, 
had been advanced frequently before the Commission itself. (SJ 
The major source of unease, however, was the private 
bankers' belief that the implementation of mapy of the recommend-
ations would curtail their independence, and thus erode their 
prestige. According to Sir John Phillips, some of the private 
banks "remained fairly anti, I suppose none of them accepted 
that considerable control from the central bank was really a good 
idea. They were pretty keen on the maintenance of their independ-
ence .
11 (6) For this reason, the recommendations regarding 
minimum deposits and control of London funds were subjected to 
especially vigorous criticism. Some of the banks believed that 
their judgments on appropriate monetary oolicy were likely to be 
superior to those of the Commonwealth Bank. The practical 
objection to minimum deposits was that they would involve both a 
contraction of advances and higher interest rates. And this might 
occur at a time when business conditions reqMired expansion rather 
than contraction; the private bankers would be required tu_ make 
the proposed central bank control effective by raising their 
deposits with the Commonwealth Bank to the ten per cent provided 
for in the proposal. Thus, there would be less money available 
for advances, which would have to be contracted. With a larger 
proportion of their funds immobilized in this way, the banks would 
have to raise interest rates in· order to keep their "heads above 
water". This &rgurnent appeared to be very pertinent in 1938, 
in the light of an impendi.ng recession during which deflationary 
policies were undesi~~ble. It was argued, too, that this 
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proposal, by necessitating the Treasurer's approval, could lead 
political interference which the Lyons' Gov.ernment opposed. 
arguments were brought to the fore by the banks in order to di s'c 
the Commission's recommendation regarding greater central bank 
control of London funds. Not only was it contended that 
was unnecessary, but if·it were to occur, it would seriously 
impede the banks' independence to conduct their business as they 
wished. 
·Early Criticism by the Banks 
With this background in mind, it is of interest to observe in 
somewhat greater detail the unfolding of the banks' arguments an 
how they became more frequent and intense as time progressed. 
At first, the banks tended to adopt an ambivalent approach;.on 
the one hand, they believed it was necessary to avoid controvers 
by stressing the great moderation of the Report, hailing it as 
a vindication of the· existing private system.of banking; on the 
other hand, they set about to obtain a moderation of those p.ecomm 
ations which were likely to prove most detrimental to the interes 
of the private banks. This latter approach was most clearly 
expressed by the bankers' view propounded in par·ticular by 
Davidson that while the Commission's conclusions might seem 
to be wbo l ly adequate in theory, they were extremely dangerous 
in practice. 
The banks did not really begin to organize their 
arguments until late in August 1937. Indeed, on 21 July 1937, 
• _·:.-:".-·-=:-::::-·: 
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Ralph, the President of the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce, 
¢lped to establish a general atmosphere of approval when he 
"business men would approve the recommendations." (7 J 
the Chainnan of the Associated Banks of Victoria, 
satisfaction that the Report had vinditated the views 
by the bankers in their evidence before the Commission, 
1amely that privately-owned trading banks were able to provide 
he public with the best banking service at the lowest cost. He 
hen, however, expressed his concern at the minimum deposits 
··roposal, commenting that "a varying minimum percentage of its 
eposits ... might strengthen the banking system, but only experience 
ould show the ultimate effect. Unforeseen disadvantages might 
·rise." (BJ On 19 August, the Chairman of the Commercial Bank 
f Australia, J.L. Webb, ·stated that the Report was: 
a valuable and permanent record of Australian 
finance. The findings emphasize the sound 
and efficient manner in which the banking 
business has been conducted. Some recommend-
ations require careful thought. Regarding 
minimum deposits we want to cooperate With 
any idea likely to benefit the banking system, 
but the recommendation in the form submitted 
in the report is too far reaching and, under 
certain circumstances, likely to create 
difficulties greater than the emergencies it 
was obviously designed to meet. It may 
seriously interfere with trading banks' 
ability to lend and reflect adversely on the 
community generally, as the resulting 
uncertainty may cause the banks to carry an 
unnecessarily large percentage of liquid 
assets. (9) 
In an effort to weaken the Commission's recommendation, he argued 
a reasonable maximum percentage of deposits, to be lodged 
the central bank, should be specified in any legislative· act. 
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Davidson Takes Charge 
It was at this point that Sir Alfred Davidson entered the 
As the leader of the most powerful and best informed of the g· 
banks, he took it upon himself to 
awaken and -organize the ban 
into an effective campaign against the Report and its recomme. 
ions for minimum deposits and greater control over London 
Davidson became the militant leader of the private banks, 
be recalled that the Bank of New South Wales had most to lose 
from any banking legislation; indeed, the new mobilization sc. 
was aimed principally at the Bank of New South Wales. Stating 
opposition clearly and frankly, Davidson believed that if the -
Commonwealth Bank were to encounter difficulties, the Bank wou 
hav~ only itself to blame for its ineptitude and failure to 
exercise its existing, adequate powers. He declared that the 
Bank of New South Wales would conform to central bank policy on 
if a satisfactory explanation of the policy was forthcoming, an 
agreed with the policy. It was his ultimate objective 
lose 'the independence and influence which he and his bank had 
traditionally enjoyed. (lO) 
As to Davidson's fear concerning the possibility of 
minimum deposits, an important factor 
to be taken into account 
as the economic uncertainty prevailing in late 1937 and through 
1938. Export prices fell sharply towards the end of 1937 and 
continued to fall during most of the following year. Drought 
also reduced export production at a time when imports were 
ising on account of the increased level of economic activity in 
_i 
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1936/37. Hence, in 1938, the banks' liquidity was low, and 
.since it appeared that advances would not be easily reduced, the 
.banks were seeking to protect their deposits. By June 1938, 
the banking outlook had deteriorated significantly; Davidson 
':believed that drought and falling export prices might deprive th 
banks of cash to finance the pending Commonwealth loan, and he 
· expected a further reduction in London funds. By the September 
, quarter of 1938, the Bank of New South Wales' ratio of advances 
to deposits had increased to 92.4 per cent - largely as a result 
of an increase of £6.5 million in advances during the year - and 
the ratio of cash and treasury bills to deposits had fallen to 
Rine per i:ent. Davidson, therefore, not unnaturally stressed 
the danger of an economic crisis if minimum deposits were imposed 
at a time when credit was excessively tight. (ll) 
Lacking only a formal lobby, Davidson's campaign utilized 
every available outlet, with the banks acting collectively and 
individually, and through various members ot bank boards with 
contacts in government. The public campaign involved en~rgetic 
and extensive discussions with, and distribution of circulars to, 
bank staff, politicians, and businessmen about the dangers of 
political control of banking. Davidson encouraged bank 
representatives especially bank staff and. individual bank 
board members - together with sympathetic organizations, to 
communicate with Members of Parliament and Ministers. He himself 
approached politicians wi.th his arguments, exploiting as he 
did his close personal association with B. Stevens, the Prer.iier 
of New South Wales. ·, In addition, the bankers aligned themselves 
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with a section of the business community which opposed change in 
the banking system.( 12 ) 
In particular, the private banks were able to use the 
press as a crucial channel of communication. While 5ome press 
reports were critical of the bankers, especially of Davidson, the 
anti-Commission cause capitalized on the publicity it received. 
example, The Financial Post stated that the recently published 
Report of the Royal Commission was "a model document in many 
resP'=cts"; it added, however, that some of the recommendations 
had "evoked the ire of Australian bankers, and several .. [had] 
k • th • • t • • I ( l 3 ) outs po en in e1 r cri i c1 sm-. ' It then referred to the 
Report circular produced on 23 August 1938 by the Bank of New 
South Wales and approved by many other Australian bankers. This 
circular was the most critical of any public statements issued. 
to date: It helped to solidify the bankers' defence and to 
recruit support, particularly through the additional publicity it 
received in The Bankers! Magazine in October 1937. (l 4) In 
the circular, Davidson stated that the Commissioners had lacke-0 
actual banking experience and that their recommendations seemed 
to be compromises between the various views which had been 
advanced. Although the Commissioners had condemned national i za tiori 
tbey had suggested provisions which opened the banking system 
to political interference. "In practice the Commissioners 
recommend what they expressly repudiate. This most 
dangerous and paradoxical result seems to arise from a fundamental 
inconsistency between the text of the report and the recommendations, 
with which it concludes."'(lS) Here, one could imagine Davidson's 
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as to why the Commission advocated "nationalization" 
when it had been appointed to bring in a report against 
Moreover, the implementation of the ~y form of nationalization. 
~mmission's proposal concerning future relations between the Bank 
the government would remove the safeguards and independence of 
Bank; in particular, "the central bank would find that it 
no margin left in the administration of the note issue and 
eserves _JlG) further, he believed that the minimum deposits and 
xchange mobilization recommendations would open the door to 
interference in the banking system: 
In two other equally vital respects the recommend-
ations of the Commissioners again expose the 
central bank to the danger of substantial political 
pressures: the control of the Commonwealth Bank 
over the minimum deposits of the trading banks, 
and the right of the Commonwealth Bank to requisition 
part of the London funds of the banks. In both 
these important matters the Bank is to act hlith tr£ 
consent of the Treasurer ... If this is intended as 
a protection for the Board it will be a very small 
one, for if these recommendations are adopted the 
Commonwealth Bank will find itself in a weak 
position if it has in the future to advise a 
government that a certain line of act~on will 
endanger the international financial position 
of Australia ... A future Treasurer, if he were 
so minded, could press for the introduction of 
a system of more or less complete exchange 
control in order to conceal the economic 
consequences of a mistaken government policy ... 
and to this extent the safeguards for the central 
bank will be diluted. (17) 
that all, for the recommendations might also be dangerous 
economic point of view because they were "likely to be 
exercised principally in periods of financial difficulty and their 
use at such times will be calculated to produce just those 
conditions of alarm and uncertainty which it should be the task 
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of statesmanship to avoid in times of stress.• (lBJ 
Davidson, furthermore, did not feel that a minimum d 
provision was required as a means of controlling the level of c 
in Australia, or that a new Moblilization Agreement was 
to control London funds: 
... if the Commonwealth Bank wishes to increase 
the reserve deposits of the trading banks it can 
always do so by ·purchasing securities upon the 
stock exchanges. It only needs powers to 
compel the trading banks to increase their reserve 
deposits with it if it wishes to buy from them 
not government securities but something which 
for the time being they do not wish to sell. In 
the case of Australia, that something is London 
funds. Given this power of requiring minimum 
reserve deposits, the Commonwealth Bank will, 
if it chooses, be able to compel the trading 
banks to sell their London funds to it ... Yet 
there is no evidence that trading banks have 
refused to sell these in the past, and much 
that they have worked well with the Commonwealth 
Bank whenever the position required it. (19) 
This emphasis on London funds seems understandable in 
Bank of New South Wp.les' large surplus of su,ch funds. 
took it upon himself to explain at some length why the 
requisition London funds was undesirable: 
Unless the Commonwealth Bank is to become possessed 
of foresight to an almost suoerhuman degree, 
it will find itself askinc for the riaht to 
exercise its powers at ti;es when a w~akness 
in the exchanges is already developing. But 
the exercise of this right at such times will 
be likely to increase the weakness in the exchange 
market, because by warning the public that the 
central bank is short of foreign exchange it 
may frighten a 11 traders ~tho need exchange in 
the ordinary course of their business to cover 
their requirements immediately and before the 
shortage gets worse. 
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In consequence, the demand for London funds will 
increase very markedly, and the effect will be 
to intensify the shortage which is already 
embarrassing the central bank. Instead of 
allaying uneasiness in difficult times and 
fortifying confidence in the Australian pound, 
the exercise of the reserve ·power to requis.ition 
London funds in the way in which the Commissioners 
suggest is likely to produce conditions under 
which there will be a heavy sale of Australian 
currency. Thus the financial reserves of the 
nation will be wasted in meeting the crisis 
which will have been intensified by its own 
resort to compulsory powers ... [The recommendation] 
will almost inevitably cause alarm both internally 
and externally, and bring about just that flight 
from the currency which it should be the object 
of the central bank to do everything in its power 
to prevent ... It is greatly to be hoped that the 
government in Australia will hesitate long before 
it gives its central bank the right of running 
up a red flag to warn the world that the Australian 
financial position is weak at just exactly those 
moments in Which it should be the task of 
statesmanship to restore confidence both at home 
and overseas. (20) 
Although Davidson was the strongest exponent of non-
interference in the monetary and banking systems, other supporters 
of the Banks also voiced considerable dissa\isfaction with many 
of the Commission's recommendations. For example, on 25_kugust 
1937, Professor Hytten, the Bank of New South Wales' economist, 
expressed his concern at the inconsistency between the main theme 
of the Report and its specific recommenations; as reported in 
The Financic.: Tin;es: 
The implications throughout the report certainly 
are that the Commonwealth Bank has al1owed 
itself to be led rather than to 1 ead, and that 
there is no constitutional reason for this 
position. It is therefore a shock to come 
to the recommendations which seem to imply that 
the bank's inferiority complex is due to a 
lack of 1 eg,;i.1 powers. l2l) 
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He was opposed to the minimum deposits proposal, which he 
as very vague: 
Any such regulation is surely both unnecessary 
and harmful in a banking system like the 
Australian with a few large units ... But, if it 
has to be, a definite proportion is desirable. 
The CoJ1111ission, however, has recommended a 
fluctuating .amount with no maximum, and that 
at the pleasure of the ·Treasurer and not the 
Commonweal th Bank. No bank can feel safe 
under such circumstances against the whims 
of a Treasurer, whose object it might be to 
demand a hundred per cent deposit with the 
intention of nationalising the whole system.(22) 
Similarly, on 24 November 1937, Ward of the English, Scottish 
Australian Bank commented that "some of the thirty 
of the report we take strong exception to in their present 
they are inconsistent with the body of the report. ,,(Z3) 
The Banking Conferences and the Private Bankers' Offensive 
Between January and the end of April 1938, the banks were 
several opportunities to convey their views'to the commonwealt 
Bank and the Treasury on the proposals fo.r legislation conC-erni 
minimum deposits and exchange mobilization. 
conference between the Commonwealth Bank, the 
trading banks was held in March 1938. Subsequently, a sub-
committee of trading bank representatives known as the 
Bankers' Sub-Coimittee - was formed in order to present the 
banks' case to Casey during a series of April meetings. 
there are fe,; foriilal minutes of these meetings extant, the 
trading banks clearly indicated from the outset that they would 
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ight to the end for their independence. In effect, these 
onferences marked the beginning of the most intense and effective 
campaign. The trading bankers aired many 
f their criticisms regarding these two extremely contentious 
they were wary not to expose information which might 
e used against them; the authorities themselves were not entirely 
. rank with the banks, either. As a result, a complex political 
By this time, with the prospect of banking 
air, the bankers were altogether more organized 
~nd stronger in their opposition than they had been before and 
uring the Royal Commission. In fact, this stage of the campaign 
_appears to have been a precursor of the banks' battle against bank 
~ationalization in 1947. Many arguments which were advanced by 
in 1938 resembled, at a less desperate level, those 
later in the banks' anti-nationalization campaign. 
Several factors served to intensify the banks' criticisms 
this 1938 offensive. For a start, the appointment of 
. -
Harry Sheehan, Secretary to the Treasury, to the position of -
Governor of the Comrnonwea 1th Bank in March 1938, increased Davidson's 
fear of greater Treasury influence over the central bank; he was 
al so concerned that none of the Bank Board members had any back-
ground in private banking. In addition, the.banks, and especially 
doubted the Chairman's ability to use the proposed powers 
efficiently. The banks, moreover, played upon political 
feelings to a considerable extent by exploiting divisions within 
the government to their advantage. Apparently, there were 
. ,.~·~· ....... __.._....__...~~--.. ·'"'"·---· -···· r.~. 
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several members of the government who were 
that the Bank Board would be able to exercise monetary control 
wisely; and there was uncertainty within the governing parti,1 
concerning the Bank's ability to function adequately as a cent 
bank and administer the central banking system with competence 
and discretion. Thus the Bank of New South Wales, itself 
harbouring these doubts, jumped at the opportunity to 
the government's suspicions. 
The Authorities Take Note of-Private Bank Criticisms 
Although nothing had been resolved when the various conferences· 
were concluded at the end of April 1938, Commonwealth Bank and 
Treasury officials set about the difficult task of analyzing th 
barrage of criticisms from the private bankers in order to pinp 
and counter their arguments. While the content of 
arguments will be discussed in the next chapter, it is 
to examine "behind the scenes" correspondence in order 
the diversity of ~rivate bank opinions and the problems 
for the authorities. 
The acting Secretary to the Treasury, S.G. McFarlane, 
sent a memorandu;;-. to Casey on 11 March which asserted that the 
most significant criticisms were those of the English, Scottish 
and Australian Ba~k, together with those of the Associated Banks 
Victoria. (Z4J It is likely that McConnan, Chief Manager of 
National Bank of ~ustralasia, prepared and sent a statement on 
behalf of the Associated Banks to Casey, since he was the princi 
·c 
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spokesman for the Associated Banks, and he often corresponded 
But Davidson was probably the major influence upon 
McConnan. McConnan argued that there was no need for additional 
Commonwealth Bank instruments to regulate credit as this could be 
accomplished by open market operations. In reply to the 
recommendation concerning minimum deposits, the Associated Banks 
stated that every bank already maintained substantial deposits with 
the Commonwealth Bank. Even if the power to require minimum 
deposits was established as an emergency power, they averred that 
there would be undesirable consequences, such as credit contraction. 
The central bank's aims would be better achieved through 
consultations with the trading banks in order to convince them of 
the correct lines of policy, rather than by coercion. ~-1oreover, 
the Associated Banks were opposed to the exercise of trading bank 
activities by the central bank, on the grounds of unfair competition. 
More importantly, they raised objections to the exchange mobilization 
provision by emphasizing the fact that Mills, and Abbott had 
recognized no need for such a provision. (2S) 
Some perspective on the banks' arguments was provided 
in a summary by L.G. Melville, the Commonwealth Bank's economist, 
which stated that the banks wanted their activities to be totally 
free from control: 
To be sure they state that the Com.-;10nweal th Bank 
has now adequate powers to regulate the system. 
The arguments by which they support these claims 
are those which they placed before the Commission, 
and which the members of the Corrrnission, after 
careful consideration, rejected unanimously ... 
The Banking Commission thought, reasonably enough, 
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that the strength of individual banks was not 
inconsistent with some central control. 
But the trading banks will have none of it. 
They will accept neither the recommendations 
of the Banking Commission nor the more 
moderate proposals of the Commonwealth 
Bank Board and they are not prepared to 
offer any alternative suggestions by which 
this central control can be exercised. They 
want to preserve the banking system of 
Australia as ·a ki-nd of museum piece in a 
world which has moved on to new banking 
He noted that the banks had advanced four major arguments 
the renewal or extension of the Mobilization Agreement: 
That an important minority of the Commission 
dissented from the original recommendation. 
That the Central Bank requires a free exchange 
market as a guide to Central Bank policy. 
That an appropriate Central Bank policy will 
guarantee that ample supplies of foreign 
exchange wi 11 fl ow norma 11 y to the 
Cormionwealth Bank. 
That the external assets of the Commonwealth 
Bank in recent years have steadily increased.(27) 
And, as he mentioned, there were other matters they had raised 
well, including the irrelevance of a ·Mobilization Agreement in 
The requisitioning of funds abroad 
only practiced in countries suffering from exchange control; 
the absence of an emergency: 
was 
the banks were prepared to continue and the present arrangements 
if the centre:] bank 1-1as unhappy with open market operations. 
Melville, in addition, gave a brief summary of the 
banks' arguments against the imposition of variable minimum 
deposits: 
. ' 
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That all banks already keep substantial deposits 
with the Commonwealth Bank. 
That legal minimum reserves are.not a real reserve 
s i nee they cannot be drawn upon in an emergency. 
The present powers of the Commonwealth Bank are 
adequate to give it effective control over the 
credit policy of trading banks. 
That minimum deposits might be used -for political 
purposes to destroy the trading banks. 
That central bank objectives can better be 
achieved by convinc1ng the trading banks of 
the right line. (28J 
Moreover, the banks had suggested that the imposition of minimum 
requirements by the Co1m1onwealth Bank would place the 
banks in a position where they would be unable to meet.those 
requirements. It was argued that total cash in the banking system 
was determined by the central bank. An individual bank could, 
therefore, only obtain cash to place on deposit with the Commonwealth 
Bank by selling some of its assets, or by calling in advances, 
operations which would themselves withdraw cash from other banks. 
Hence, all banks could not meet the increased requirements of the 
central bank unless the centra 1 bank was i tse 1 f prepared to increase 
the total cash in the banking system. 
The bankers, themselves, continued to make their views 
known through means outside the private conferences. On 31 March 
1938, Sir John Sanderson of the Bank of Australasia praised the 
Commission for recognizing the role of the private trading banks. 
But he did not approve of the recommendations which would introduce 
excessive rigidity into the system: 
.; ~·-
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The report contained recommendations that 
were not greeted with unqualified approval, 
among them the granting of wider powers to 
the Commonwealth Bank in certain directions. 
In the event of a decision by the Commonwealth 
Government that, following the Commission's 
r·eport, certain legislation is required, one 
may express the wish that the existing elasticity 
of the Australian banking system, which has 
stood the country in good stead for so many 
years, will be preserved. So far as possible 
the legislation should not seek· to impose 
rigidity in cases which many authorities feel 
convinced can better be left to be treated by 
reason and good will rather than by compulsion.(29) 
He also informed the Commonwealth Bank that the 
with head offices in London would prefer to fix 
deposits by mutual agreement; however, in the event 
they opposed Melville's suggestion that there should 
iation between the banks; they desired equal reserve requiremen 
and a low minimum which would not vary except by further legisla 
According to Sanderson, these banks opposed variable deposits as 
felt they would not be able to make full use, of the deposits 
the opportunities arose. In addition, ti)e banks would hav.e to 
offer a lower interest rate to depositors, and the availability 
of bank services would be hindered.l 30J 
Clive Baillieu, Managing 
Ltd., director of other companies, including the English, Scottish 
and Australian Bank, and a prominent member of the Bankers' Sub-
committee, corresponded with Casey du?·ing the banking conferences. 
While he understood the central bank's point of view, he did not 
(3 
agree with its idea of the correct solution to the banking issue. 
·,. 
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BailliJtl realized that the government was committed to legislate 
generally along the lines specified in the Commission's Report and 
he agreed that, for political reasons, the legislation would have 
to include compulsory deposits and further exchange mobilization. 
This sympathetic view of the government's obligations may have 
stemmed from the fact that he was a representative of the Common-
wealth Government on the Imperial Economic Committee. Be that 
as it may, he indicated that the government was facing several 
difficulties of a high order, including a large loan conversion 
operation, an increase in defence expenditure, and a rise in 
taxation; it was thus a matter of concern to him that the Common-
wealth Bank's proposals might disturb confidence and investment 
at such a critical time. But, although Baillieu opposed the 
government's proposals, he said that he and the majority of _his 
colleagues did not adopt "a non-poss,;mus" attitude towards them. 
In fact, he suggested an alternative mobilization scheme, which 
would ensure that London funds were equally qistributed throughout 
the system and that the dangers associated. with the present_ 
proposals would be eliminated. Similarly, he did not think that 
compulsory deposits would be very useful as an instrument of 
credit control, believing,. as he did, that the Bank's proposal 
was more designed to satisfy possible political criticisms. If 
such a system had to be imposed upon the banks, he hoped that it 
would be a fixed one, rather than the variable scheme which had 
been recommended by the Royal Commission. But he maintained 
that the real political attack upon Casey would be directed at 
the Treasurer's autho·r.ity in the matter of minimum 
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deposits. Still, he added that the bankers were determined t 
reach an agreed settlement which would not be built upon fear a 
compulsion. 
On the other hand, Davidson seemed to adopt a decidedl 
more "non-posswnus" attitude to the proposals enunciated by the 
authorities. He adhered strongly to the idea of a voluntary 
banking system and private enterprise. Unlike Bail lieu, he 
expressed the view, in a letter to Casey in April, that legislati 
was entirely unnecessary. He noted that he always kept what 
seemed to him to be a reasonable percentage of cash to deposits,. 
and the central bank had neither criticized the balances he held 
with it, nor had it ever suggested a "reasonable" percentage 
for him to hold. Davidson stressed the willingness of the 
to cooperate if they were given a chance; the trading banks, he' 
added, considered the central bank's attitude to be one 
rather than cooperation. Of particular interest was the view • 
he expressed to the effect that the Bankers' Sub-Com~ittee \'illuld 
make constructive proposals if given sufficient time. 
as he put it to Casey, "the Commonwe2lth Bank itself will also 
suffer if legislation is passed which makes the whole system 
ri?id and automatic, and therefore en~irely unresponsive to 
. . . . ., (32) 
chan?rng needs in a crisis.· 
McConnan was another private banker who was heavily 
involved in putting the banks' case to the government. From 
September 1936, he had been trying to secure an agreement on 
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voluntary cooper2tion between the Commonwealth Bank and the 
private trading banks, and he claimed to have made some headway 
in this endeavour. By 1938 he was active in the negotiations 
on the issue of minimum deposits. G.M. Shain, who became Manager 
of the Commonwealth Bank in 1937, wrote to Melville in Aprii 1938 
informing him that McConnan 1•as seeking to draw upon American 
experience to strengthen his argument. According to Shain, the 
National Bank was searching for information: 
regarding the recent credit position in the 
United States and this was confirmed to him 
by Mr.Stuart of Eric Morgan and.Co., on the 
morning of April 13. The National Bank 
wanted to make a case showing that when the 
Reserve Bank increased the reserve requirements, 
the [current] U.S. recession was begun. 
This is doubtless being used by McConnan 
in bolstering up his arguments in connection 
with the proposed reserve requirements here. \33). 
In the face of the banks' mounting offensive against 
legislation, Casey began his own attempts to clarify the banks' 
arguments. In correspondence with Reading, he noted that the 
trading banks had asserted that they would still have to create 
a body of fr"'"' liouid funds outside their deposits with the 
Commonwealth Bank if minimum deposits were imposed. They had 
insisted that this would be so despite the fact that the Comnon-
wealth Bank 1·1as ":iie Bank of last resort" and would come to <:.heir 
assistance in tro~bled times. As Casey observed, these add it i or.a 1 
funds were viewed 'Jy the banks as having two functions: First, 
to ensure tre'.r s0:vency; and, secondly, to allow them to unc-!r-
take an expansionc'Y policy. 
' 
Yet he contended that these were 
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spurious needs, for the central bank would not allow the solvency 
of the banks to remain in doubt; and, if an expansionist policy 
was in accord with central bank policy, the Commonwealth Bank 
would not obstruct that path(_34 l On 11 April 1938, Casey conveyed 
to Reading the nature of the trading banks' fears surrounding the 
imposition of minimum deposits: 
I have had a long talk on the telephone with 
[W.I.] Potter [who advised McConnan] and he is 
coming to see me tomorrow. He tells me that 
there is real apprehension on the part of some 
of the Trading Banks as to the minimum deposits 
provision. Substantial selling orders for 
Commonwealth Bonds have already been placed 
by some Banks - but he tells me confidentially 
that other banks are still buyers. I gather 
that Potter is being present at the Bankers' 
Sub-Committee meetings here in Melbourne. (35) 
On 13 April, Casey relayed to Reading the arguments which 
had been expressed at the meetings of the Bankers' Sub-Committee. 
The banks were still genuinely disturbed about minimum deposits, 
and repeatedly said that they would cooperate wi,th the central 
bank. According to Casey, the bankers had jnformed him: 
individually and collectively that, if we put 
this provision into the law, they will feel 
themselves absolutely obliged to recommend 
to their Boards the creation of additional 
cash reserves over and above the stipulated 
maximum percentage that may be mentioned in 
the Biil, and that this will mean calling in 
advances beginning at once and carried out 
progressively until they have brought the 
average of their deposits with the Commonwealth 
Bank up to probably 2~ to 3% above the stipulated 
maximum percentage of 7~% o'r l 0% or whatPver 
it is. In the meantime some Banks will sell 
Bonds in an endeavour to help themselves -
although they realise that this means that the 
Bank that does .~o is only helping itself at 
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the expense of the others. I am to 1 d by 
Brokers that this process has already started. 
They point out that with a drought on us, 
which promises a slowing up of deposits owing 
to reduction of national income, coupled with a 
demand for increased advances - the effects 
are liable to be drastic over the next nine 
months. At the same time, they promise real 
cooperation with the Commonwealth Bank - and 
repeat this continuously. I said that if this 
took place, the minimum deposits power was 
unlikely ever to be used - and so the necessity 
to anticipate its use (by piling up extra cash 
resources) was quite unnecessary. However, 
they repeat that (maybe, they admit, out of 
undue -prudence and conservativeness) if the 
Commonwealth Bank has power to "demand" and 
so put some of their cash outside their control 
they will have to do as I have said. (36) 
Reading, in turn, believed that the banks had two major 
grievances concerning minimum deposits: First, that the power 
might be used arbitrarily to embarrass the trading banks; and, 
second, that the possibility of minimum deposits being required 
would cause the trading banks to contract credit in order to have 
the necessary cash available at all times~3 7) But, on several 
different occasions in Apri 1 and May, Reading acknm~l edged that 
the fears, threats, and forebodings of the banks in connection with 
minimum deposits were groundless and could be safely dismissed. 
At all events, if problems did materialize, they could be quite 
comfortably met. (JB) 
Casey also wrote to Reading in April about the London 
funds mobilization scheme. Although the banks had exhibited 
enthusiasm for this scheme, he declared that they were, as a whole, 
comparatively less hostile to it than ~o minimum deposits. 
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Nevertheless, he advised Reading to take into account the fact 
that some of the banks regarded a part of their London funds in 
light of London reserves; that is, the funds served to promote 
geographical spread of the risks faced by the banks. He believ 
this was especially true of the London-owned trading banks.1391 
After the con'clusion of the conferences with governmen 
Co1T111onwealth Bank officials, the banks continued to inveigh 
legislation to implement the Commission's recommendations. On 
May 1938, the Chairman of the Bank of Adelaide, Sir Howard 
strongly attacked the recommendations of the Commission in what 
the first official comment by a bank chairman. He praised the 
Report for vindicating the policies of the trading banks, both 
before and during the Depression, and their contributions 
recovery; however, he maintained that: 
The recommendations of the Royal Commission on 
Banking, if put into practice completely would 
place the whole banking system under political 
control, a development against which the country 
has already on three occasions emphatically 
recorded fts vote ... there would be a grave 
danger that not only the banks .but the whole 
financial system would lose strength and 
flexibility which the Commission itself says 
is essential ... [for maintaining stable] conditions 
in Australia ... We quite concede that a strong 
Central Bank is a very important part of the 
financial system but we do not admit that any 
good purpose can be gained by 1·1eakening the 
trading banks to the undue adv2ntage of the 
Central Bank, particularly as it is considered 
by experts that the Commom,•ea 1th Bank al ready 
has a 11 the powers nee es sa ry to function 
efficiently as a central bank if it cares to 
use them ... It is to be sincerely hoped that 
commonsense will prevail, and that a survey of 
the proved English system will convince the 
. ' 
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Government that it is advisable to allow 
the Australian system to develop along the 
same sound lines rather than to adopt a policy 
based upon political expediency and academics. (40) 
·credit.Contraction as a Weapon @) 
By this stage, the banks began to circulate widespread warnings 
that a system of minimum deposits would force a deflationary policy 
1upon them; in fact, instances of credit contraction by some 
public as part of the banks' case against banking 
On 18 May, 1938, McCall .of the UAP asked Casey in 
anks were made 
legislation. 
Parliament whether he had seen the statement made by Sir Howard 
Lloyd to the effect that the mobilization scheme would reduce both 
the banks' liquidity and their power to maintain or expand advances; 
he also asked Casey if he had noticed the credit contraction which 
had been carried out by some of the banks in anticipation of the 
measure. 
Casey evaded direct replies by stating that the 
first statement was purely hypothetical; and' so far as the second 
question was concerned, the government had valid reasons fot:. wan:ing· 
. d b k' l . l . (4 l) to intro uce an·1ng eg1s ation. 
Indeed, by the middle of 1938, the campaign by the 
banks llad reoached a ne1• stage of intensity. On 2 5 May , Si r 
James Elder, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Natio~al 
Bank of Australas~a. expressed his concern about the government's 
proposal to intro:uce banking legislation. The National Bank, 
he declared, desired the least legislative control of bankin; 
that was possible, an4 he refuted the belief that there was c 
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public demand for control of banking. Elder stressed 
desire to cooperate completely with the central bank. And he 
comnitted himself and the National Bank to the anti-legislation 
arguments which had been advanced so far by the private banks: 
The contention of the trading banks - and I 
believe it to .be soundly based - is that the 
present powers of the Commonwealth Bank in 
this regard are ample for all reasonable purposes, 
and any additions to them can only be effected 
by means of irksome legislative restrictions 
on the trading banks. We agree with the 
Commission's view of the merit of a strong central 
bank, and we also agree with its pronouncements 
that .. too much should not be expected, even from 
the most enlightened policy of an all-powerful 
central bank.' Be it noted, central banking 
has by no means brought all the benefits 
expected of it, and has, accordingly, somewhat 
declined in prestige during the last decade. (42) 
He maintained that the exercise of the minimum deposit 
as an instrument of credit control would be a major mistake, 
since it would fail in its objective and achieve nothing more 
a measure of credit contraction, with a lessening of the lending 
capacity of the trading banks. A compulsory, rigid, and far-
reaching Exchange Mobilization Agreement was no less undesirable: 
The exchange market, within the limit of 
rates set by the central bank, should be 
free and open for Governmer.ts end traders 
alike to operate in, but, ~ending the develop-
ment of a better exchange ~echnique, this 
bank, along with its compe~itors, willingly 
undertakes to continue the present understanding, 
whereby it plays its part voluntarily in the 
servicing of Australia's overseas debt. 
It does, however, object to legislation 
which is suggestive of ultimately forcing 
exchange business into one channel and thus 
destroying the advantages accruing from the 
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free interplay of supply and demand, which 
in the final issue must always determine 
exchange policy. My concern lies in the 
possibility of a rigidity in the control of 
our exchange, which most certainly would 
react unfavourably upon the economic progress 
of Australia. (43) 
There were yet other participants in the banks' battle. 
For example, J.L. Webb of the Commercial Bank of Australia asserted 
that legislative restrictions which inhibited business would be 
highly dangerous in the light of the sensitive economic position 
presently prevailing in Australia. Flexibility and liquidity 
were necessary, as had been shown by the American example in which 
the freezing of funds by central bank action was largely responsible 
for the slow economic recovery of the United States' economy. (U;) 
The Melbourne Chamber of Commerce stressed the fact that the minimum 
deposit proposal would freeze part of the banks' funds and cause 
them to restrict advances ; in the result, there would be adverse 
consequences for investment, production, and employment. Fear 
.. 
was also expressed that the Treasurer would be able·to demand the 
-
1
·45) 
transfer of an unlimited percentage of deposits to the cenfra 1 bank': 
James Ashton of the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney si"-ilari; 
warned against any action that would create weakness in the 
existing banking strucutre, 1-1hich, hE claimed, had "stood th2 te5'.: 
f 
. 1 . d " ( 46) 
o experience over a ong pen o . 
By June and July 1938, it became increasingly evident :~at 
the banks were successfully convincing many people that legislat'.:~ 
would be unwise. Un 27 June, A.H. Lewis, Secretary to the 
·, 
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Commonwealth Bank, received a letter - perhaps from Reading -
which .revealed the magnitude of the effect of the trading banks' 
arguments upon the public: 
The Australian trading banks are trying to 
prevent the Government from introducing banking 
legislation of a kind likely to be helpful to 
the Commonweal.th Bank "by representing to the 
public that the amendments proposed regarding 
minimum ·deposits would force a deflationary 
policy upon them. I am satisfied that their 
arguments are not valid, nevertheless, they 
are being presented so widely and with 
sufficient ingenuity to persuade many people 
that the Government would be unwise to introduce 
the legislation it is contemplating. (47) 
On 17 June, The Bathurst National Ad~oaate printed an article 
about a protest meeting of the Bank Officers Association, at 
which criticism concerning bank legislation in general, and 
minimum deposits in particular, was the cardinal item of discussio 
Moreover, Reading sent a letter to McFarlane, Secretary to the 
Treasury, on 18 July which revealed the extent to which the 
was··being upset by the banks' arguments: 
~\'v) You are, no doubt, fully av1are that the pro~a:­
has been very intensive and widespread, and there 
is now evidence that the public mind is getting 
seriously disturbed by the fear that there wi 11 
be a serious curtailment of credit facilities. (49) 
Enclosed was a memorandum which had been prepared by Commonwealth 
Bank officials showing the nature of the opposition to the proposed 
banking legislation and the nature of the propaganda that was 
being used.t 50) The memorandum disclosed thnt the leading part in 
the organization of bank opposition had been taken by the Bank 
of New South Wales. ·Jn several public statements, Davidson had 
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outlined the basis of his opposition. The most complete 
statement, however, according to the memorandum, had been given 
of in a recent address by Davidson to the Sydney Junior Chamber 
Commerce and reported in Commerae on 6 June 1938.( 51) In that 
address, he had argued that the proposal to require trading banks 
to place ten per cent of their public deposits on reserve with the 
central bank would require them to seek additional cash to the 
amount required by such deposits - estimated by Davidson at thirty 
mi 11 ion pounds. Such a provision, he added, would have five undesir-
able consequences, namely: 
To cause a contraction in advances of from £30 to 
£45 million. To make necessary a reduction in bank dividends, 
affecting the valuation of bank and other shares 
on the Stock Exchange. 
To cause an increase in interest rates on 
advances and a fall of rates on deposits. 
To compel banks to reduce the number of their 
branches and of their staff, and 
To bring about a serious depression, involving 
lower turnovers, a fall in prices, and 
increased unemployment. 
A somewhat closer examination of this memorandum-reveais 
the form which the opposition was taking at this stage of the 
campaign.( 521 Ban\'. opposition was discussed .under five catagcTies: 
First, the reduc:ion of advances; second, the effect on the stock 
exchange; t~ird, the effect on branches and staff; fourth, the 
likelihood o= a ~eneral depression; 
of the Sound Fincnce League. 
and fifth, the activit~es 
The first matter concerned 
reports that som~ banks were· informing their customers that :he:. 
would be asked t: reduce their overdrafts if the banking 
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legislation were introduced. Indeed, there was evidence that 
some requests of this nature had already been made. According 
to the memorandum, most of the evidence of this type of propagan · 
was hearsay; however, the press had reported .that such statement 
were being made to customers, especially in Sydney and 
Various Commonwealth Bank branches in New South Wales reported 
cases where applicants for. advances from five different private 
banks had been advised that no new advances were being made. 
similar cases of credit contraction, due to the projected legisla 
were reported in Queensland, Victoria, and one case in Tasmania. 
But most of the examples of deliberate reductions in advances se 
to have occurred in New South Wales. For example, the Common-
wealth Bank branch at Inverell reported that a "customer 
Bank of N.S.W. approached us for accommodation and said he had 
been informed that his present bankers were not doing fresh advan 
business pending proposed banking legislation by the Commonwealth· 
Government. " 1he Commonwealth Bank at Moree issued the 
following report: 
Local newspaper reported [a] meeting of officials 
of· Trading Banks and passing of resolution 
opposing projected legislation. Our manager 
reports that following recent newspaper articles 
and [a] statement of Sir Alfred Davidson, local 
feeling is for continuance of [the] present 
system .... 
Specific cases reported confidentially as follows:-
Customer of Bank of N.S.W. - m~ed that Bank £600 
unsecured. Given two weeks to clear debt. 
Reason - owing to projected legislation it was 
necessary to drastically reduce credit to find 
sufficient funds to lodge with Commonwealth Bank. 
vlas informed that Bank of N.S.1-1. was taking similar 
action with numerous other advances. 
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Customer of National Bank - was told must not 
drc.vi further cheques and bank looked for 
reduction in overdraft. Reason - necessity 
to lodge large deposits with Commonwealth Bank. \53) 
Similar reports arose concerning branches of the Commercial Bank 
of Australia at Hurstville, the Commercial Banking Company of 
Sydney at Lane Cove, and the Union Bank at Randwick. 
The memorandum noted that the possibility of a reduction 
was causing widespread concern, especially in country 
The Federal Convention of Australian Graziers, for 
in advances 
districts. 
example, had carried a resolution opposing the introduction of 
minimum deposits on the grounds that it would affect the banks' 
ability to assist the financing of industry in general, and the 
grazing industry in particular. The Count:ry Life newspaper, 
the organ of the Graziers Association of New South Wales, included 
an article which opposed the introduction of minimum deposits on 
the basis of arguments similar to those which had been advanced 
by Oavidson.( 54 ) The article also expressed the fear that such 
action would prevent the financing of re-stocking of statiorrs 
which had been rendered necessary by the recent drought. .L.nd 
country newspapers in general revealed the extent of concern in 
country districts, which appeared to be widespread. 
The secc'ld problem the effect on the stock exc~ange -
revolved around thoe opinion, l'lhich had been expressed for sor:;e 
months, that ~ank~"9 legislation might cause a decline in the 
attractiveness of ':;ank shares; prices of such shares had, in 
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fact, already been moving downwards. This, the memorandum explain 
however, was partly due to factors causing a general fall in securi 
prices. ·But a statement that the weakness in bank shares might ca 
other share prices to decline was made in an article in Smith's We· 
which referred specifically to a statement made by Davidson in whic 
he opposed banking legislation. The article repeated the arg 
that the ten per cent minimum deposit had to be regarded as a 
. (55) asset and could be provided only from advances. 
The third form of propaganda the effect on branches 
and staff 
was based on the belief that the proposed banking 
legislation would cause banks to reduce the number of branches and 
employees. Concern was especially evident among bank officers. 
This was expressed in the 2 June lg3g issue of the Aust:raZian Banke:r 
the organ of the United Bank Officers Association, in an article 
entitled "New Menace to Bank Officers·'. 56 )According to the article, 
statutory minimum deposits could be met only from advances; the 
consequent loss of revenue by banks would involve a curtailment of 
expenditure on salaries, bonuses, promotions, and other benefits 
received by bank officers. In addition, many country newspapers 
were reporting meetings of bank officers in important country towns 
throughout New South Wales which had been called to discuss the 
proposed legislation; it was pointed out, for example, that: 
These meetings are being addressed by the President 
of the United Bank Officers Association who 
has repeated the arguments that a reduction of 
advances by about £45 million is likely and that 
this would precipitate a decline in business 
activity. The meetings have resulted in the 
organisation of opposition to the proposed 
legislation which has taken the form of statements 
to the press an,d of letters to Federal Members, 
a copy of one of which has been received by the 
Commonwealth Bank from the Hon.V.C. Thornpson.(57) 
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Widespread fear that the proposed legislation migh: lead 
to a general depression was the fourth mode of propaganda. This 
concern was reflected in discussion in many business organizations. 
For example, the journal of the Sydney Chamber of Commerce had 
for several months included the question of banking legislation 
among the list of matters discussed by the Council of the Chamber~SB) 
In addition, a statement warning that business might be adversely 
affected was issued by the Melbourne Chamber of Commerce~ 59 )And 
a committee of the Sydney Junior Chamber of Commerce was preparing 
a report on the Royal Commission~ 50J Moreover, the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants was addressed by Davidson on the likeiy 
effects of the proposed legislation; he stated that a decline in 
business activity, incomes, and employment would inevitably 
result. <51 ) Also, the Queensland Taxpayers Association· 
recorded opposition to the proposed legislation, on the grounds 
h 
. . h . 1 . . 1 ( 62) t at it mig t invo ve an increase in unemp oymenf. On the otht?" 
hand, certain Labor Party newspapers observed the opposition by 
the Bank of New South Hales to the Commoriwea l th Bank, and G.Ec 1 ared 
that Australia had been brought close to a financial crisis as c 
result of ar "internicine conflict between the Commonwealth Ban;: 
( 63) 
and the Bank of !;ew South Wa 1 es." 
Finally, the Sound Finance League conducted a strong 
campaign in opposition to the legislation. In circulars 
issued by this or?anization, the legislation was portrayed 2s ar 
attempt to incre~se central bank powers in order to impose f po1':y 
of credit co~trac:i6n upon Australia, and to place the centr!l 
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bank - and through it, the financial system as a whole 
political control. The contents of these circulars were brou 
together in a pamphlet, copies of which were said to be 
(6~' at the counter of branches of the Nationa 1 Bank. ' 
the League was reportedly supported in New South Wales 
the Bank of New South Wales, and in Victoria substantially by t 
National Bank. 
One final and important point deserves attention. 
of the publicity about the nature of the banking proposals was 
embarrassing to a government which was not politically hostile 
the private banks. Lyons apparently drew Davidson's attention 
to the dangers of the campaign which the latter was waging. 
policy of credit contraction occurring within the private bgnkin 
system was damaging to the government's prestige, and 
Davidson that if the campaign proceeded much further, the govern 
could be forced to in~roduce a banking bill in order to demonstr 
to the public that the government was not, in fact, run by ~he 
banks. In response, Davidson dismissed the notion of dellbera 
attempts to contract credit, pointing out that credit had become 
tighter due to decreasing export prices. But by emphasizing th 
danger of a crisis if minimum deposits were demanded at a time 
1·1hen credit was already tight, Davidson stuck by his principles 
and indicated, in no uncertain terms, that he would oppose 
. 1 . (65) leg1s at1on to the end. · An~ it would appear from the 
government's procrastination that Davidson was able to have his 
way. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
ATTEMPTS TO DRAFT LEGISLATION 
It is commonly·implied.that no serious attempt was 
the Lyons Governmen~. to impl~ment the recommendations of 
ithe Royal Commission; nothing, however, could be further from 
the truth~l) For the government - in particular R.G. Casey, 
the Federal Treasurer - and its advisers spent many trying months 
throughout late 1937 and during 1938 attempting to translate the 
-Commission's recommendations into legislation. The government's 
task was rendered especially difficult by the fact that it soon 
.became the target of opposing forces; while some encouraged i~ to 
proceed with the drafting of legislation, others were strongly 
·,against it. The final result - inertia - was due to the 
-interaction of these conflicting pressures whi c~ were brought to 
i bear upon the government. 
At the outset, it did appear that the forces working for 
,.change would prove stronger than those making for inaction. That 
the government, ultimately, was unable to succeed reflects the 
magnitude of the manifold influences exerted upon it to shelve 
proposals to regulate the private banking sector. Certainly, its 
intentions were impeded by the economic and political exigencies 
of the late 1930s; but, more importantly, it was forced in the 
event to succumb to vested interests namely, the private banks 
.-
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and to the will of the banks' friends in Cabinet, led principally 
by R.G. Menzies. In this respect, therefore, Lyons' death in 
April 1939, and his subsequent replacement b_v Menzies, was of 
critical importance. Thus, the government failed to incorporate· 
the principal recommendations into law until the advent of Curtin'. 
Labor Government to offic.e late in 1941 when it 11as achieved 
through the National Security Regulations; the Mortgage Bank 
Department of the Commonwealth Bank was created in 1943; but of 
supreme importance was Labor's introduction in 1945 of permanent 
legislation embodying most of the Royal Commission's recommendat-
ions. 
Early Attempts at Drafting 
The evidence suggests .that once it had received the Commission's 
recommendations for banking reform, the Lyons Government felt 
itself obliged to act upon them; consequently, Casey began to wor. 
towards this end soon .after the Commission submitted its Reporl2J 
It '"as his intention to introduce simultaneously ti-10 
The process of drafting the first bill the Common1·1ea l th Bank 
Bi 11, which was primarily concerned with the establishment of the 
Bank's Mo1·tgage 13ank Department was beguri a 1mo't in1medi ;;t.e~; 
and continued u~til the bill was introduced to the House of 
Representatives in November 1938! 31 The second, and 
more contentious bill knovm as the Trading Banks Bill 
contained proposals for minimum deposits and the new Mobilization 
Agreement. Al though Casey was himself particularly anxious to 
have the second bill i6troduced he was quite enthusiastic 
. ··'·"·"''I"'"·" 
239 
the Minimum deposits requirement it is clear that the forces 
seeking to obstruct its introduction were insurmountable; how-
ever, this is not to say that the prospects for legislation were 
always impossible. The origins of this bilL date back to 20 August 
1937 when Casey submitted a memorandum to Cabinet in which he 
asserted that the governme~t would have to take action along the 
general lines of the Commission's recommendations if the Bank was 
to be vested 1-1ith effective instruments. of credit contro1. i!h i le 
he agreed with the Commission that minimum deposits were necessary, 
he went somewhat beyond its proposals on the matter by stating that 
any 1egislation which 1·1as brought down should specify a certain 
percentage of trading bank liabilities that must be maintained on 
deposit with the central bank. He may not have been entirely 
certain that he had chosen the appropriate figure but, in th·e evenc, 
he suggested that the private banks should be required, at the 
discretion of the Bank: 
" to maintain with the Commonwealth Bank, up ·to 
a maximum of, say, 7 per cent, of their 
deposits ... [Also,] there should be a reserve 
power, to be exercised by the ... Bank, with the 
approval of [the] Treasurer, to oblige the 
Trading Banks to maintain a percentage of depos~ts 
with the ... Bank over and above 7 per cent and 
up to a given percentage should the London funds 
of the ... Bank fall below a given amount. (4) 
Casey's approval was also expressed for an extension of the 
Mobilization Agreement, more or less along the lines set out by 
the Royal Commission. 
By September 1937, the government was still undecided 
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on the issue of minimum deposits, despite Lyons' rather vague 
election promise that central bank control of the private banks 
1>1ould be strengthened if the recommendations of the Commission we 
enacted. (S) Since the central banking issues contained 
Trading Banks Bill are of more importance than the matters 
in the Commonwealth .Bank'Bi.11, this chapter addresses itself in 
main to the former bill. A Cabinet document reveals that the 
government wished to increase the powers of the Bank without 
impinging greatly upon the activities of the private banks; 
explains why government officials and Ministers - Casey in 
particular - took considerable time in their examination of 
proposal for minimum deposits, and its implications, before it \Vas. 
brought to Cabinet for a decision. (5) 
In September 1937, the Treasurer approached the 
Bank Board in an attempt to clarify his vie1-1s and to establish 
some consensus on the details of a minimum deposits provision and 
a fresh Exchange Mobil'ization Agreement_(7J , The appointment of 
Harry Sheehan, Secretary to the Treasury and a member of the !Jank 
Board between 1932 to 1938 - and who was himself inclined to 
support greater central bank control to the position of 
Governor of the Common1-1ea1th Bank in February 1938 facilitated c10se 
1 iaison between the Treasury and the Bank. Even before Sheehan's 
transfer to the Bank, however, the Board 
and Professor Giblin 
in particular - was generally favourable towards banking 
legislation. It agreed 11ith Casey that the Commission's 
ations could not be adopted unless several alterations were made. 
·" 
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To begin with, it strongly believed that, in conjunction with an 
effective Mobilization Agreement - by which the Bank would gain 
access to the surplus London funds of the trading banks - the 
Bank should also have the right to require ev.ery trading bank to 
keep with it a percentage of its liabilities to Australian 
depositors; that the percentage should be variable at the Board's 
discretion up to a maximum of ten per cent; but that the percent-
age should not be variable as between banks. If a new exchange 
arrangement could not be obtained, the Board was convinced that 
the maximum percentage should be much higher than ten per cent.( 8) 
Meamvhile, the Labor Party was bringing pressure to bear 
upon the government td' legislate. In reply to the Governor-
General's Speech delivered early in December 1937, Curtin criticized 
the government's failure to implement the Commission's main 
recommendations. Lyons retorted, however, that new banking 
l b f h . . d (9) proposals by the government wou d e art coming in ue course. 
In fact, by 15 December 1937, it seems that Cabinet had directed 
Casey to draft and re-submit his banking p;oposals to Cabine~~lO) 
Hhile it is unclear whether his recommendations concerned both 
minimum deposits and London funds, an anonymous ne1-1soa.oe1· article, 
dated 23 January 1938, hinted that the tvio issues v!Quld b": care-
fully discussed, both by Cabinet and Parliament. Furthermore, it 
announced that legislation designed to strengthen the Bank as a 
central bank would be introduced at some future date, though the 
preparation of banking legislation was likely to be a very slow 
process, for two reasons: 
.. First, the services of several Ministers 
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were required for missions overseas; and secondly, the drafting 
( 11) process itself was a comp] i cated and time-consuming task. 
The Ora ftsmen 
Of the several forces which favoured the introduction of banking. 
legislation, clearly the .. Commission's Report and its recommendat 
ions were of utmost importance; moreover, the significance of 
Casey's efforts and the influence exerted by the Labor Party, 
the Bank Boa rd though not very strong - must also be 
acknowledged. But the efforts of the government's advisers 
th ems elves cannot be over-emphasized and, in this 1·egai-d, the 
played by Commonwealth Bank and Treasury officials, together with 
W.T. Harris the Commission's secretary ~1ere most notable. 
It is evident that the Bank's economists, namely, 
L.G. Melville and H.C. Coombs 
effective central bank controls 
who shared a desire for more 
greatly assisted Casey in the· 
drafting of legislation. Melville, in particular, asserted th 
the Bank should obtain an extension of the existing 
Agreement and "the power to impose minimum deposits 
cent of ~he liabilities of the trading banks ,to the 
Mobilization 
up to 7'i per 
ruf)1 ic in 
nustrali~ and up to 10 per cent with the consent of the Treasurer. 
In addition, between late Februa1·y and early March 1938, Melville 
sought to expose tile weaknesses of the private banks' criticisms 
of these two proposals and, apparently, 
many of his arguments ''ere 
For a start, he demonstrated that, on four adopted by Casey. 
counts, the banks' 
objec.tions to the proposed Mobilization 
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were ill-founded. First, the banks had emphasized the fact 
that two Commissioners, namely, Mills and Abbott, had dissented 
from the majority recommendation that a new London funds 
arrangement should be established. Melville, however, explained 
that Mills and Abbott did in fact favour greater central bank 
access to London funds. eut the banks, by taking the Commissioners' 
dissent out of context, ·nad misinterpreted the Commissioners' 
position to suit their own ends. Second, the banks had advocated 
a free exchange market and hence, he argued, they contradicted their 
claim that the Bank should regulate the exchange rate as an 
instrument of credit control. Third, while the banks argued that 
an appropriate central bank policy would enable the Commonwealth•! 
Bank to obtain an adequate supply of foreign exchange, Melville 
replied that the Bank lacked the means to ensure the _volume of 
London funds it required. Fourth, the banks' assertion that ti\e 
Commonwealth Bank's external assets were increasing was not \ 
I 
substantiated by the relevant figures. (l 3 ) On the other I 
hand, Melville advanced five counter-argum~nts to the banks'_ , 
ci-iticisms of the recommendation for minimum deposits. !n -re~Jy 
to the banks' argument that they already maintained substant1a1 \ 
deposits with the Bank, he claimed that not all the private banks
1 
kept a sign~ficant 1~vel af deposits \vit!1 the Bank at a11 ti:~cs. 
Secondly, he undermined the ba~ks' warning that advances would 
j 
have to be restricted if minimum deposits were imposed, by statin~ 
that such action would be unnecessary in view of the fact tha: ~ 
, I 
the banks could borrow from the central bank. Third, wi1i1e th2 
f/u~\""-\\.1" \-t\,'-l/{ 
"--
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banks contended that the Commom~ea lth Bank had sufficient exi s tin 
powers to control the volume of credit, Melville did not hesitate· 
to point out the inadequacies of the Bank's current instruments 
of credit control. Fourth, the banks feared that a minimum 
deposits provision might be used for political purposes 
them; however, Melv1l le. was convinced that the minimum 
deposits scheme which was sought by the Bank could not be 
for that purpose. Finally, the banks had asserted that central 
bank aims could best be achieved if the Bank endeavoured 
their cooperation, but Melville knew - as did others that 
cooperation had not always been readily forthcoming in the past, 
and there was nothing to suggest that it would in the future! 14 } 
Melville later informed the author that 1>1hile he and the 
Bank Board In general both favoured and encouraged the drafting 
of legislation which would incorporate the Commission's principal 
recommendations, there were some Bank offi ci a 1 s who opposed the 
recommendations and the government's moves to 'draft legislation. 
The balance tended to lean towards government action, but, overa 1 l, 
it seems that the Bank Board did not exert very powerful pressures 
either for, or against legislation. Melville recalls that there 
was quite a degree of vacillation among the Commom1ea1th ba!1ke1'S. 
On some occasions, banking. legislation wcs considered necessary 
as a political expedient, yet at other times, the Board believed 
it would be unwise and dangerous to continue with the drafting 
procedure. (15) 
In fact, such hesitancy was characteristic of 
one Board member in particular - namely, Reading, the Board's 
• <' 
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Chairman - who played a rather peculiar part in the negotiations 
between the Treasury and the Commonwealth Bank. On the one hand, 
he was closely associated with the Treasury and the government and, 
for the most part, he cooperated with them; but on the other hand, 
he was not keen for action. And, apparently, he helped to delay 
the introduction of legislation, for he and Casey often found them-
selves at loggerheads 1~ith one another. Reading - and the 
Board as a whole for that matter - was not satisfied with the 
Commission's recommendation for variable minimum deposits, and he 
did not want the minimum deposit requirements to be set excessively 
high; he was, however, in full agreement with the Board that 
the trading banks ought to be required to keep deposits with the Bank, 
f . l . b · 1 . . h bl . ( 16 ) but only up to 7~ per cent o their ia 1 1t1es tote pu 1c. 
In any event, and despite Reading's procrastination, Phillip~ and 
Murdoch .- two Commonwealth Bank officials - moved to Canberra 
in 1938 on behalf of the Bank to join the government in directing 
the draftsmen; Phillips informed the author that he 1·1as generally 
satisfied ;;ith the Commission's recommendations, and that boffl. 
men pushed for banking legislation.ll 7J 
Above all, Roland Wilson, Commonwealth Statistician an;J_,.-. 
Economic Adviser to the Tre;.sur'(, l;ke Melville. seems to ~ave i 
been invaluable to Casey in the initial stages of drafting the 
legislation for minimum deposits and exchanoe mobilization. He 
had been deeply involved in advising the Tr~asury since February / 
1935, and he became the technical expert on the banking legislation. 
Indeed, his views became. those of "the Treasury" which hcd, fo1· some ti1ne, 
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apart from the clerks, consisted essentially of Sheehan and 
Wi1son himself. On 12 May 1980, he said he could not recall 
whether he was happy with the Commission's recommendations in 
their entirety, and he had been only mildly in favour of the 
Commission's establishmemt. Soon after the recommendations had 
been published, however, he was given the task of drafting 
legislation based on the Commission's Report; in fact, it seems 
that he devoted a great deal of time and effort to the drafting of 
both bills, which he personally hoped would be introduced. In 
addition, he mentioned that J.Q. Ewens, a parliamentary draftsman, 
similarly played an important part in the drafting process, though 
in a legal, rather than in an economic and financial sense.(lB) 
Similarly, Harris assisted Casey in the preparation of 
draft legislation and in the provision of counter-arguments to 
meet the private banks' criticisms. In reply to the Associated 
Banks' objection to compulsory minimum deposits, Harris informed 
Casey that their arguments lacked the strength of conviction. He 
cited an admission by the Midland Bank of Britain in 1932 that -
monetary management was necessary; he stated also that the banks 
had failed to act in concert to restrain the development of booms 
and, thus, a strong central bank was imperative. The private 
banks, he added, had misunderstood the Commission's intentions 
regardi.ng minimum deposits, for the Commission did not favour the 
imposition of a permanent obligation to keep fixed deposits with 
the central bank; rather, minimum deposits were to be imposed 
only in cases of emergency to ensure that the trading banks would 
L. 
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adhere to central bank policy. While the Associated Banks had 
argued that the private ban ks would cooperate with the Commom1ea lth 
Bank in the absence of minimum deposits, Harris contended that 
if that were the case, then the banks would have nothing to fear 
( 19) 
from the minimum deposit provision. Harris also assisted 
/Casey in the preparation of submissions to Cabinet; in fact, on 
J 25 March 1938, he told Casey that the case for minimum deposits might 
i I. be strengthened if reference were made to a statement of the ~oacmi 11 an 
\ 
Cammi ttee to the effect that centra 1 banks should have the p01·1er 
'--.tQ_impose minimum deposits upon the banking system; he also encouraged 
Casey to proceed v1ith the legislation by sending him a co1lection 
of excerpts from the banks' evidence, in which the bankers appeared 
. '?O) 
to concede the inadequacy of the Bank's existing pov:ers in practice\~ 
Renewed Attempts to Draft Legislation 
While the efforts of the government's advisers contributed significantly 
towards the drafting of the Trading Banks Bi-11, it is clear that 
much of the credit belongs to Casey, who·, together wit~ 
Wilson, spent long hours in informal and official consultation 1·1ith 
his advisers and with Melville and Reading in particular - in 
order to prepilre the draft clauses for submission to Cabine".. on 3 
March 1938. At that Cabinet meeting, Casey stressed the importance 
of introducing legislation 1~hich incorporated the Commission's 
most important recommendations, namely, the provision of a ne•,; (21) 
Mobilization Agreement and a system of minimum deposits. He 
explained that if the government accepted the Commission's 
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fundamental proposition that the central bank should be responsib 
for credit policy, then it would have to face the necessity of 
giving the Commonwealth Bank power to impose minimum deposits to 
enable it to fulfil its responsibilities. He maintained, furth · 
that if the strength of central banking was dependent mainly on 
compelling -trading banks. to lodge deposits with the Bank, the 
deposits should represent a high percentage of the 
with the ban ks. This percentage; however, could be greatly 
reduced if the trading banks were simultaneously required to provi 
the Bank with the London funds it needed 5oth to meet current 
government payments and to accumulate suitable reserves of London 
funds. But he now rejected the Commission's recommendation for 
variable deposits, on the grounds that the private banks were to 
make exceedingly large deposits of cash with the Bank; in fact, 
he suggested that Cabinet should permit the Bank to requisition 
ten per cent of the banks' deposits with the Treasurer's consent. 
Furthermore, he recommended that the draft schedule the so-
called "Undertaking" - should be approved. The banks, 
would not voluntarily sign a binding exchange arrangement. 
the Undertaking represented the minimum provisions which the Sank 
considered essential for an effective Mobilization Aoreement. 
fact, the Undertaking which stimulated much controversy 
1~as accompanied by a legal ai-rangement which ensured that the 
Mobilization Agreement was made binding, and that the Bank would 
be able to maintain an adequate supply of London funds in order 
to control the exchange rate. Casey also advised Cabinet to 
approve clauses which would require the banks to possess a licence 
before they could conduct banking business; the granting of 
·=~l'"'-''"' 
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such a licence was to be made conditional upon a bank's compliance 
with the terms of the Undertaking. 
The progression of events following the submission of 
Casey's memorandum to Cabinet is somewhat obscure as there are gaps 
in the State papers. Cabinet minutes of the meetings held on 3 
March when the submission was made and again on 4 March 1938, 
merely state that banking legislatjon was discussed; further details 
are lacking. (22 l However, since discussions of banking legislation 
continued periodically up to the end of May lg38, Cabinet must have 
pondered at length the Commission's most controversial recommendat-
ions. It is clear that Casey and Wilson continued to work very 
hard on the preparation of banking legislation; close contact was 
also maintained between the Treasury and the Bank; Casey and 
Wilson consulted \~ith the private banks; and Casey sought the 
views of overseas authorfties, such as Montagu Norman Governor 
of the Bank of England - on the subjects of minimum deposits and 
London funds on several occasions. Indeed, on 7 March 1938, 
Casey seemed optimistic that the banking legislation 1•1ould bE'_ 
introduced when he informed Norman of his belief that he had "1101>1 
broken the back of ... [the banking legislation,) although there is 
a great deal of bread and butter work still to be done. The 
Par1 i1::n0nt is in r·ecess un~il 27 il,p1~11, ~Y v1hich time I hoµE: t.i.:· 
have ... [the banking] measures ready to p1·esent to the public gaze ... (ZC:i 
Yet the situation was not as certain as Casey would have liked; 
indeed, on 11 March, he informed S.M. Bruce in London that he 
was "now fairly in the midst of the battle about the framing of 
this Banking legislatioh~"l 24 l 
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Casey's main dilemma was how to fashion a compromise 
the form of legislation which, while strengtheni~ng the central 
would steer between Labor's demands for bank nationalization and 
the obscurantist, hands-off attitude of the Bank of New South 
Meanwhile, Cabinet continued to concern itself with Casey's 
memorandum on draft banking· legislation. In fact, on 19 March 
1938, it seems that after Casey once again proposed that the draf 
clauses of the banking legislation should be approved, Cabinet 
discussed and agreed, in principle, to the general thrust of the 
draft Trading Banks Bill though the exact wording was probabl 
not decided upon at this meeting; an extract from the Cabinet mi 
simply declared that the "proposal submitted by [the] Treasurer 
was agreed to. " ( 25) On 21 March, two days after the Cabinet 
met, Casey mentioned in correspondence with G.S. KnD1>1les of ·the 
Attorney-General's Department that the legislation would be sub-
mitted to the House of Representatives in due course. (Z5 ) 
f.2'essures to _Postpone the Lei:)is1ation ~ 
Despite Casey's optimism, banking legislation designed 
the central bank was not introduced into Parliament. 
fo1· this are extre11Jely diverse for example, the drafting 
process itself l':as very time-consuming. But~ mC>re important1.Y, 
several factors served to undermine government confidence and 
hence impeded firm decision-making and legislative action. 
Hesitancy on the part of the government and the Treasury may have 
been due in part qs Phillips has suggested to tl1e fact 
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that ~entral banking was stil I a new and relatively under-
developed subject in Australia. 127 ) Yet one must dig much deeper 
to locate the major sources of government inertia. The 
government's resolve to take action was gradually weakened in the 
face of disagreement among the leading personalities involved; in 
~ particular,' Reading did not desire reform to the·same extent as Casey; and there was doubt and uncertainty within the Cabinet itself. 
Moreover, the significance of various economic events 
namely, drought and an important conversion loan together 
with the preparation for, and then the outbreak of war, meant that 
/banking legislation became increasingly an issue of secondary 
jhoncern. And, naturally, the impact of economic recovery 
'/1 ~f,from the Depression damped down calls for banking reform and', 
"f:: . 
) '.J hence, reduced the pressure upon the government to legislate. 
·rf·1Above all, the vigorous public and private campaigns of opposition 
'l 
'/)waged by the private trading banks - which 'received the support 
I i'' 
't\of other sections of the business community - were largely--
I 
responsible for the failure to introduce banking legislation. 
The banks were able directly to retard the possibility of banking 
l.egislation b,v gain·ing tile suoport of rnany members of the govern-
ing parties, both inside and outside Cabinet, including eventu~lly 
Casey himself. ,i\nd the conservative attitude of the Treasury -
especially after tbe replacement of Sheehan by McFarlane did 
not lend support to Casey when his legislative zeal began to 1·1ecr 
thin. Self-preservation was almost certainly the government's 
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main motive, since the prospect of legislation threatened the 
appearance of government unity as well as the substantial financ·· 
and political support provided by the banks. Thus, the process 
of legislation was stifled by the lack of motivation from ~1ithin 
the Treasury, the government, and Cabinet. But as Hilson, 
Coombs, Melville, and Philljps have all acknowledged, it was 
the private trading bank~ that held the strongest hand; a 1947 
Treasury working paper en tit 1 ed "Notes for Banking Bi 11 Debate" 
similarly suggests the weight of pressures brought to bear upon 
government by the banks: 
The Banks opposed [the] recommendations of the 
[Royal] Commission for strengthening Central 
Bank control. The Government of the day was 
influenced by the representations of the Banks 
and failed to bring down measures to give 
effect to any of the recommendations of 
the Banking Commission. ( 28) 
The Cc;,;.y; de G1•as De 1 i vered by the Banks 
By 7 March 1938, Casey believed that he had worked out a "fair" 
solution to what was required in the wa.v of banking legislation, 
and he was quite optimistic that legislation would be introduced.I 
Hol'1ever, ther? was much uncertainty 1vithi11 Cabinet regard~ng the 
dPtails cf th? prooosals w~ich were dr~t~ii1g loud p1-ctests 
frcrn the banks and Casey ~lmsclf expected a prolonged and 
turbulent campaign of opposition by the banks. Thus, at ti1e 
end of March 1938. he arranged a conference between the Treasurer, 
the Comnonwealth Bank, and the private banks in an effort to 
.;.:.;'!.;:+~·-~·'-1 
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bring the private bankers onside with regard to the proposed 
legislation. At the outset of the conference, Casey announced 
that, while the government did not favour all the Commission's 
recommendations, it had approved in principle the proposals 
regarding London funds and minimum deposits, though it disagreed 
with some of the methods suggested by the Commission for implement-
; ng them.( 30 ) He added tha:t the government sought to "thrash out" 
the details of the issues with the private banks in order to obtain 
the greatest possible degree of harmony between the banks and the 
Commonwealth Bank. The government felt that minimum deposits were 
needed, as the Bank's existing powers were not strong enough to 
induce the private banks to co11form with central bank policy. 
\.)hil e acknov1l edging the banks' objections to minimum deposits, he 
told them that their criticisms were unsubstantiated; for many 
countries had already seen fit to introduce this particular 
instrument of control; the Bank's power to impose minimum deposits 
was to be exercised only in an emergency; and the banks had 
exaggerated the consequences of imposing such deposits. He 
added that a binding Mobilization Agreement was imperative in orcer 
to ensure that the Bank gained effective control over London funds 
and, ultimately, over the exchange rate . In a rather desperate 
nttempt to bring the bankers a!"'ound to his po1nt ot ·.iiei·J, Case_.' 
warned that if t!ie banks continued to resist the government's 
proposals and actually thwarted its good intentions, the assumptio~ 
of a Labor government to office in the future might lead to the 
im;:ilementatioi: of decidedly nore drastic banking legislation. 
He believed himself th.at his proposals had been formulated witb 
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the real interests of the banks in mind, and he was optimistic th 
a large measure of agreement could be reached through the coopera 
ion of all parties concerned. The banks, on the other hand, 
not only refused to make any compromises v1ith .the government and 
the Commonwealth Bank, but they now became even more obstinate 
and hostile to the proposed.legislation. In fact, it is fair 
say that this conference was a disaster from the government's poi 
of view, so much so that it marked the turning point in the govern 
ment's attempts to translate the Commission's chief recommendation 
into law; henceforth, Casey had virtually no chance of introducin 
a Trading Banks Bill into Parliament, for the banks stepped 
representations and complaints to their friends in Cabinet. 
Anti-Legislation Forces Reveal Their Strength 
Despite the fact that the odds became increasingly 
him - amply demonstrated by the fact that he was unable to 
the tune during a seri'es of fo 11 ow-up meetings in April with the 
Bankers' Sub-Committee Casey continued his attempts to make 
some headway with the banking proposals. On 19 Ap1·il 1938, a 
draft bill which included minimum deposits and exchange 
mobi~~zat·iof, •,,,,r_.·: i;i··intt:· .. i·,J1~ the first time~ but l:hei"'e is no 
eviden(e ~~hat C~:~.iinet :.·~''.)roved the specific details of it. Ti1e 
bill spelled out an Ur~ertaking and a minimum deposits scheme, 
by <ihich the Bank \'las to be given the Power to require all the 
banks to deposit tl1e same percentage ten per cent of thei t· 
liabilities with it; if a bank failed to maintain the required 
deposits at the Commonwealth Bank, it was to become subject to a 
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penalty equivalent to six per cent per annum of the deficiency, 
. (31) for each week the failure to comply continued. 
The proposed banking measures began to worry Casey, 
hov1ever, and he sought the opinions of Professor T.H. Gregory 
of the London School of Economics and Si 1· Otto Niemeye·1· 
of the Bank of England in order to gain some re-assurance. 
Although their replies were not received until after the draft bill 
had been printed, both Gregory and Niemeyer supported Casey, 
especially on the issue of minimum deposits_( 32 l Justi fi ab1 
encouraged by this favourable response, Casey told Bruce on 3 Ma" 
1938 that his anxiety over banking legislation would 
soon be remedied, and that he was making progress towards a final! 
decision on each of the two most contentious issues the "oniy 
two problems worth bothering about in the Banking Business" (}}j 
However, he revealed that he expected much opposition from the 
private banks: 
I've s1·1eated blood to try to evolve·provisions 
that'll do most good and least harm - and to that 
end 1 have had multitudinous conferences with 
the Commonwea 1th Bank and the trading ban ks 
individually and collectively .... Whatever I come 
to will be greeted v1ith shrill cries of alarm 
and desoondencv from the so-called Trading • 
Banks .. They really are a most uninte1li9ent__L_.. ~ \ ~)" 
crowd. (34) ~ ~
i3ut by this stage, there 1,as not even the 1·emotest prissibility 
that Casey's hopes of introducing the printed bill would be 
fulfilled; and there are no documents to suggest that any later 
agreement was 1·eached, or that further action ~ias taken by tile 
government. Moreove~, there Is nothing to suggest that the 
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printed bill was ever su.bmitted to, or discussed by Cabinet; nor 
is there any evidence to indicate that Cabinet made any ne~·1 
decisions one way or the other on the matter at this time. 
In short, pressures for delay won the day and it is to 
these numerous and varied forces that attention will now turn. 
Political pressures in P~rliament, within the governing parties 
especially in the UAP - and in Cabinet, contributed in some 
to indecision and inertia. As early as 17 Nove;;;ber 1937, 
Casey informed Bruce that he expected the government might face 
some opposition to banking legislation in Parliament, especially 
135) in the Senate. 1 By 7 March 1938, he had become increasingl5• 
more aware of the unfavourable reception which the Trading Banks 
Bill would receive at the hands of many government Members of 
Parliament. As he explained to Norman, "there will be (fr'om 
entirely different points of view) high jinks in Pa1·iiament over 
its passage." (35 ) There ~1ere, in fact, elements within all 
three of the major politi~al parties which o~posed minimum 
and many staunch supporters of the UAP and· the Queens I and Co~try 
Party, in particular, had somewhat mixed feelings regarding the 
proposed legislation. Uncertainty 1-iithin the government ~1as 
demonstrated furtr~e~~ v1hen it refused to a·!loct:1te tiF;e in ~:·ar:~,1n1'.:nt -;-·.-r:o-:ciw~, 
for a discuss10!1 of the Commission's Repoi~t, despite the fact :hat 
permission to discuss its recommendations had been grarited in 
October 1938. (
3
7) Above all, Cabinet did not sha1·e Casev]s 
enthusiasm for establishing control over the moniOtary system, a d 
as the bankers' campaign intensif~ed, Cabinet 1·esponded by 
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solidifying its opposition. It failed to agree upon the 
extent to 1·1hich monetary contro·1 should be handed to the central 
bank, and the extent to which the Treasurer should be allowed to 
exercise ultimate authortty. There was, moreover, disagreement 
both 11ithin Cabinet and between the government and the Commonwealtr. 
Bank as to the exact form and nature of the ne11 Mobilization 
Agreement and the specif~c percentage of trading bank liabilities 
to be kept on deposit with the centra1 bank. It had been quite 
difficult to discover a way to make the Mobilization Agreement 
effective, and doubt was still harboured concerning the link 
between compliance with the Undertaking and the granting of 
licences to carry on banking businessP8 l Mel vi lie, Hilson, and 
ioombs all subscribe to the view that, apart from Casey - who imse~f began to lose enthusiasm - no one in Cabinet pushed ard for banking reform. Accardi ng to Coombs, "the goverrimen'.: 
went cakey" in response to private bank opposition, and \·Jilson 
agrees that the government simply wanted to get the Commission.'s 
Repo1·t and recommendations "off its back." (3'9) Although he 
was not a politician, Harry Sheehan, Governor of the Comrnon;realth 
Bank, had an intriguing understanding of the workings of politics 
and government; in this capacity, he was able to advise Casey 
in 2 manner which Melville 11as unable to do. On :s ~·.~aJ l93C~ :1-.: 
hi(11ighted the dou~ts surrounding bankin9 1t~9islatior1 "'!i1ic!l iJ2t'f: 
shared by Members of Pari iamen: - especially UAP representat-
i ves and the Cabinet - :~:enzies in ~articula( \•liV:l') !-;e 
vffote the fo1lm·1ing: 
!™ i~ 
258 
Apart from the position in the House, there 
is a good ground for keeping back the 
Trading Banks Bill. M~tasey will be 
pretty lonely in the Party on this Bill and 
will have a much better chance of securing 
satisfactory legislation if he waits until 
he has Mr.Menzies' support in Cabinet and 
in the Party Room. (40) 
In fact, not only did Menzies oppose the Commission's Report, but, 
according to Coombs, Melville, and Wilson, he was not well-disposed 
·---towards banking legislation in general~ 4 l)The Sydney Morning Herald 
lent further support to the view that Casey alone bore the burden 
of introducing legislation when it stated in a recent article•.that 
"Casey faced a largely indifferent Government. He never succeed 
in enlisting the real interest or any more than the token support 
of the Prime Minister or his Cabinet colleagues." (42 l Lyons, m 
tended to be a compromiser who lacked strong positive views on the 
banking issue. Yet it was just this sort of lack of consensus 
within the government which enabled critics, such as the private 
bankers, to play government members against one another with the 
result that nothing constructive was accomplished. Indeed, ~-
Lyons himself had close ties with the banks, stating as he did that 
he would stand behind the private banks so far as minimum deposit 
were concerned and that the government was opposed to political 
control of banking. On 23 July 1938, he announced that there 
was no immediate prospect of change as the Ministry was still 
undecided on several aspects of banking legislation. Again, 
as late as 9 August 1938, he repeated his earlier announcement that 
no decision on banking issues had yet been made and pledged his 
·, 
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gQvernment's support for the banks.( 43 ) In these statements, the 
Prime Minister signalled to the private banks that they had nothing 
to fear, for banking legislation concerning greater central banking 
po1'1ers would be sufficiently moderate to be acceptable to them. 
Just as the government became inert on the banking issue, 
so it seems that the Tre(?sury 1 acked any strong con vi cti on for the 
introduction of banking legislatioh. Melville explained that 
while the Treasury which was a traditionally conservative 
department - recognized the political necessity for banking r·eform 
in order to quell widespread criticism of the banking system, it V!l:S 
not convinced that such change vmuid be economically c:nd financially 
expedient. Treasury officials certainly cooperated with Casey, (44) 
but they did not go as far as to push actively for change. 
Casey himself acknowledged that there vias a shortage of stro.ng 
officials of senior rank in the Treasury: On 17 December 1937, he 
informed Bruce that there would be problems in locating a suitable 
successor for Sheehan, the former Secretary to the Treasury; i" 
fact, Sheehan's departure from the Treasury indirectly contrtbuted 
to the postponement of legislation, since his successor 
S.G. McFarlane - was hcrdly a reformer. (~,5) 
--~-.- .. .,,...--... -~-· 
Mcrv1as that all, for Casey and ~hlson also began 
to entertain doubts ~bout the desirability of the banking :neastces. 
Wilson, fer example, has remarked that, while the draft bill w~s 
the best that he and Casey could arrange with the private banks 
and "all sides concerned", he v1as still not completely satisfied 
with the draft, as some parts were not quite right. He acJdeC:, 
I 
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moreover, that the process of drafting, negotiating, and redraft! 
the bill was very time-consuming and that was partly responsible 
. ( 116) 
for the delay. · · But more relevant to an explanation of why 
the proposals were shelved was the fact that l~ilson, and even 
Casey himself, \•Jere not totally convinced of the effectiveness of 
minimum deposits as an instrument of credit control. Perhaps 
Wilson preferred more drastic controls. Indeed, he explained to 
C. Bai 11 i eu a prominent member of the Bankers' Sub-Committee: 
that except to afford the Commonwealth Bank 
a special weapon for use in the establishment 
and operation of an open market for Treasury 
Bills, compulsory Deposits, with the maximum 
proposed of 7~ to 10 per cent, would be of 
little use as an instrument of credit control.(47) 
Casey, however, continued to seek the opinions of bankers, 
Commonwealth Bank officials, and overseas experts. 
'Ii 1 son apt I y 
described him as being more of an efficient engineer than a 
politician; he was a man who was often influenced by the peopte 
to v1hom he had last spoke,n, and was a person,1·1ho sought all the 
objections to his proposals; the upshot of these traits wa~ 
his eventua 1 sympathy with the bankers, who frequently ha.d the 
last say. (4B) Thus, 'it seems tila t he dee ided it might not be 
advisable to require the banks to maintain seven and a half, or 
even 1en percent, of their ·1i2bi1ities on dep::"Jsit \·:ith the Ba;1k. 
expecially in view of the prevailing economic situation in 
Australia. On 13 April 1938, he admitted to Reading that he 
\'IC:S: 
,,.,j.;-", 
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rather anxious about the Minimum Deposits 
proposal in its present form - especially 
with a drought on and the big Conversion in 
prospect [~bout which more ~ill be said later] ... 
[the banks, he said,are] foolish enough to 
go like a bull at a gate in relation to it 
[minimum deposits] - and lay the blame for 
1 
the consequences on us. It doesn_, t need 
a great deal to start a definite set-back 
in Australia under the set of conditions that 
exist in .Australi.a and in the world outside -
and I do not wqnt any ·action of mine to 
[ preoipi tate it. \ 49) 
But there were other reasons why Casey was hesitant 
to push through his draft bill. It will be recalled that while 
the Bank Board generally favoured the recommendations of the 
Commission and banking legislation, since it desired stronger 
central banking power~~ it did not exert strong pressure during 
and it did not play a very significant part in - the drafting 
process, In May 1938, Casey accused the Bank of being too 
lethargic towards change, although Sheehan commented to Wilson 
that the accusation was "scarcely justified in view of the 
• generally honest efforts we have made ... it might be remembered 
that we are all out to help as far as we c~n." (SO) Indeed-; 
Sheehan often spoke to Casey on various banking issues and the 
former generally acted upon the government's instructions. Coombs 
has informed the a0thor that there was a considerable interchange 
of views betvieen the Treasury and the Commom-1ealth Bank at this 
\
time. Giblin, for example, favoured the imposition of variable 
minimum deposits, but because of his position on the Board, he 
could only voice his support in a confidential memorandum. (Sl) 
Yet M~lville, according ~o Wilson, was "scone hot" on the issue 
,. 
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of legislation, as 1-ias E.B. Richardson, Secretary to the 
(52) 
Commonweal th Bank. Coombs, too, accepted what Casey was 
trying to accomplish though he admitted that the Commission's' 
recommendations, 1<1hile they were "sensible", did not 
he would have liked. (53 ) However, while it is quite 
the Bank 1vas not a main for:ce for de 1 ay, it is true that, though 
some Board members desired change, others did not. Thus Casey 
was especially annoyed that he could not come to any 
with the Bank Board one way or another as to the details of his 
legislative proposals. More importantly, he, along with other 
members of government, began to lose faith in the capacity of 
- whose knowledge of< cen tra 1 banking was somewhat inadequate -
to use greater powers and administer the central banking system 
in a wise manner; Casey, moreover, may have agreed with other 
government officials that the Board was unable to look beyond 
the present, and that the Chairman's advisers were perhaps too 
theoretical at times. H seems that, alth<Pugh Reading 1<1as 
initially in favour of banking legislation as shown by fii s 
advice to Casey on 14 April 1938 to "di CJ your toes in" - his 
commitment v1aned, and he became increasingly obstructive as time 
passed; he began to display some sympathy towards various 
opponents of compulsion; and relations between himself and 
Casey deteriorated to some degree as they failed to agree on 
banking issues.( 54 ) Further evidence that Reading was not 
a fully-fledged reformer is amply demonstrated by the fact that 
he fought furiously against Chifley's banking measures in tl1e 
early 1940s. < .. 
.,,, .. _~. ;.. ·. 
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<Casey's Time Expires 
{In the final analysis, of all the forces making for delay, it was 
\Casey who failed to take a firm stand and to finalize the iss.ues at 
stake before practical difficulties and the-rise of more important 
problems overwhelmed the possibility of banking legislation. By 
mid-1938, he was swamped<.wi th pressing commitments. Even by the 
Easter break of 1938, National Insurance legislation had become of 
greatest concern to him, and this issue kept him fully occupied 
until June. Then he became involved in the preparation of ~e 
Budget, which was not completed until sometime in October. Above 
all, however, a defence scare in mid-1938 prompted Casey to devote 
increasing attention fa war preparations.(SS) Indeed, Casey's 
abiding interest in defence and international affairs was responsible 
to a significant degree for the postponement of banking legi.slation, 
v1hich rapidly became of secondary consideration to him. 
According to Wilson, the Trading Banks Bill, which was "going to do 
all sorts 
<' 
of good things slipped away, having become< less urgent, 
pushed further and further down. the agenda. " ( 55 ) --~d so was 
Early in May 1938, Casey decided to delay the legislation 
concerning the private banks and resolved instead to proceed with 
the Commonv1ea 1th Bank Bill ; however, difficulties concerning the 
pul i amentary timetable prevented its introduction until November. (57) 
Before taking a brief 1 ook at the fate of the Commonwea 1th Bank 
Bi 11 - which included the establishment of mortgage bank facilities 
- it is of interest to note that \.Ii l son made severa 1 further 
.,. 
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attempts to clear up the details of the provisions for exchange 
mobilization and minimum deposits with the Bank. 
it seems that neither party was keenly supportive and, in 
consequence, nothing was settled. In fact, on lB May 1938, · 
Sheehan admitted to Wilson that he did not think the new Mobili~ 
ion Agreem,ent was pract i ca] , · a 1 though he made it c 1 ear 
Bank would be receptive"to further negotiations.l 5BJ 
before any additional talks could be arranged, and just 11hen 
Casey was freed from his Budget responsibilities, an important 
and difficult loan conversion of £67 million required attention; 
consequently, the Trading Banks Bill was put off until the 
fol lowing year. Although Casey began to worry about this 
as early as April 1938, it was not actually open to 
until the period 9 November to 19 December 1938. 
remains, however, that its success was imperative. 
ment - and Casey in particular - hesitated to introduce the 
controversial Banks Bill ,for fear of destroying confidence among 
_, 
investors, both locally and overseas. 
. As Casey' explaiQed to 
Cabinet, "it seems very unwise to bring such legislation before 
the House during the time when the big Conversion Loan is being 
dealt 1vith. The volume of other business to be got through 
(. c \ during this session is also very considerable." ;),, In 
addition, Coombs suggested to the author that there may have 
taking place a change in public op1n1on: The measure of 
economic recovery achieved meant that fewer people 1·1ere advocal 
change, and this relieved some of the pressure on the governme 
(60) 
to act. In ·any event, by November 1938, the government 
_,,,,,_,j,;:; .• 
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had still not made up its mind on the minimum deposits issue. 
On the other hand, while the fate of the Commonwealth 
Bank Bi 11 v1as more successful so far as Casey was concerned 
on 15 September 1938 it was approved by Cabinet, after amendment, 
and was submitted to Parliament in November - it, too, met consider-
able resistance; indeed, ir did not proceed past the second 
reading in the House of Representatives on 6 December, and it was 
not debated in Parliament again. Before the bill was submitted 
to Parliament, Cabinet and elements within both the Country Party 
and the UAP had not settled al I the bill's details. On the 
one hand, the UAP was not strongly in favour of its introduction 
and, in fact, many members of the Party opposed the bill; the 
Country Party, on the other hand, generally pushed for the bill's 
submission to Parliament. The bill had originally incorporated some 
relatively unimportant proposals, but it did provide for the 
creation of a Mortgage Bank Department in the Commonwealth Bank; 
however, in view of all the controversy surrdunding the bill in 
its initial form, Sheehan advised Wilson tb inform Casey tha"t it 
would be better to introduce a revised bill, which included only 
the provision relating to the Mortgage Bank. (61 J \~hen this 
prnved impossible, it w2s decided to proceed v1ith the original 
bill, which included provision for: First, the creation of a 
Mortgage Bank Department in the Commonwealth Bank; second, the 
implementation of the Commission's recommendations relating to the 
Bank's constitution; and third, other minor amendments which 
were deemed desirable. Hov1ever, the impending war may have 
-' 
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caused disinterest in the proposals; and, more importantly, the 
opposition especially from the UAP proved insurmountable. 
While the proposed bill partly satisfied the demand for the 
establishment of an institution, or institutions, which would 
assist in ordinary home purchase and building finance, a section 
of the UAP.objected to the.proposed bill because it did not 
make provision for direct lending to homemakers; 
was divided, too, over the proposal to treat rural borrowers 
differently from urban borrowers.( 5Z) In 1940, Wilson 
commented on these criticisms by the UAP, saying as he did 
that he expected "fairly strong pressure from various sources to 
amend the bill in such a way as to throw a bigger burden on the 
Commonwealth Bank." \53 ! Not only was the UAP critical 
of the proposed legislation, but the bill's introduction pr~voked 
opposition from many other quarters, including the Bank of New 
South Wales, which resented the Bank's interference in such 
matters; even Melville did not campaign for the bill, as he 
said that it did not deal with the issue Qf greater central_ 
banking powers. (54 ; In addition, some members of the 
Party itself raised objections, since they feared that an 
extension of the Bank's functions would detract from its ability 
to assist primary industr_y; 
nor \·.!.?.S that all, for the Counti~y 
Party desired additional assurances that the Mortgage Bank 
Department would pro vi de cheap credit to its con st i tu en ts in rural (65) 
areas. Members of the Labor Party also expressed misgivings 
for they suspected that prnvisions for raising capital by 
(66) would create "investor,- control" of the institution. 
,,,,, .. j .• ,. 
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Similarly, the Commonwea I th Bank was not very en thus i as tic atin1,1t 
the establishment of the Mortgage Bank Department: It seemed 
to think that existing facilities were sufficient. 
part, the public responded with mixed feelings: 
For its 
Various pr1mary 
producers and their organizations favoured the proposed bill, but 
consi derab i e adverse. opi ni o_n was a 1 so expressed by the community; 
for example, the "Save tne People's Bank Campaign" 
opposition in correspondence with Casey. (57 ) 
The Last Round 
voiced their 
It wi 11 be re ca 11 ed that towards the end of l g3B, the introduction 
of the 
ingly, 
Trading Banks Bill· was postponed until the New Year. Accord-
on 15 December 1938, the government advised a deputation from 
the Australian Natives Association - a strong advocate of "banking 
l egisl at ion that it contemplated further action 
in relation to those parts of the Commission's Report which dealt 
\with the trading banks. It assured the de~utation that, although 
\the government's preoccupation with urgent war preparations-fiad 
~elayed a final decision on banking legislation, the. government 
a\knowledged the importance of the matter, which would continue 
tJ engage the government's attention. (5B) 
Thus, at the beginning of 1939, the draft Trading Banks 
Bill was reconsidered in an attempt to iron out the details of the 
proposals. New attempts we1·e made to satisfy, as much as 
possible, the banks' criticisms. But by February 1939, despite 
\.lil son's corres ponden~e with the Bank, and the considerable amount 
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of work done on the draft to prepare it for the April oarliamentar 
session, agreement on a minimum deposits provision h3d still not 
been settled. It was during February that Reading and Casey 
began to discuss, at great length, the financial measures that 
would be necessary in the event of the declaration of v1ar, for 
the likelihood of war was at this time very high; Reading's 
attitude towards controversial banking issues changed further as 
he now put the highest priority upon defence preparations. He 
informed Casey that while minimum deposits were relatively 
unimportant in viev1 of the latest overseas developments, he 
believed there might be unfortunate political repercussions if 
they were suddenly dropped by the government. But he revealed 
his true loyalty to the opponents of change by suggesting, as he 
did, that minimum deposit obligations upon the private banks 
should be made only nominal.( 59 1 Thus, the clauses in new 
legislation pertaining to this matter were drastically watered 
down: They now provided that the central bank might require 
the trading banks to keep notes plus depcs.i-cs at the Commonwea 1th 
Bank at any percentage up to seven and a lu~Zf of their deposit 
liabilities. And that was not all, for a trading bank if 
experienced any difficulty could allow the cash rEserves to 
fcl1 Jelm·; c.ny pe1~centagE: that ;night De p: .. escr·ibed~ c~thDugh it 
1-1ouid have to pay a penalty at the rate of six per cu,t oer annun; 
of any "deficiency". ( ?O) Here again, the banks were ? 11 owed some 
flexibility, in that 3 deficiency ~muld not be deemec' to occur 
until, on the average of the last thirteen weeks, the banks had 
failed to satisfy the .requirement.(?!) On the oth~r hand, 
,.,,,J.~ .. 
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Reading stressed the necessity for a mobilization arrangement in 
view of the Bank's lack of control over London funds. and Wilson 
was asked, accordingly, to draft ne\'I proposals. By 29 March 
1939, Wilson was indicating that, although the draft bill was in a 
very incomplete form, and there was much 1vork to be done, "ever~' 
effort will be made to have· the drafting completed at an early 
date." (72) Evidently, he consulted Phillips on several occasions 
while drafting this amended Mobilization Agreement; 
on 12 April 1939, Phillips sent Wilson a rough draft 
for example, 
of the proposed 
amendments to the Undertaking as it had been set out in a draft 
bill of 19 April 1938. (73 ) At this time, it is significant 
that the Mobilization Agreement issue seems to have become somewhat 
less controversial - except from the viewpoint of the private 
bankers in the light of its increased importance as the 1ike1i-
hood of war became more obvious; in fact, there was now a greater 
consensus between the Bank and the Treasury on the issue, and i~ 
seems that agreement was much closer at hand.' 
The Government Fails 
. --
Despite indications that progress was being made at last, the 
inherent i nstabi ·ii ty of the government vJas yet cne:ther -1::t;::c~~t2:!-: 
factor which diverted the government once more from taking act~:n 
on banking legislation. Apparently, Lyons - whose health was 
deteriorating rapidly had wanted to retire in 1937, but he 
v1as persuaded by strong Melbourne UAP backers espec;i.4lh 
by members of the buSi!)eSs and financial community to lead the 
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Party through the next election. Following the election, there-· 
fore, the question of who would be the new party leader assumed 
new importance as a matter of urgency. Rivals for the leadership. 
of the UAP began to compete for support; mo~t especially there 
emerged a power struggle between Menzies and Casey -
whose 
Personalities clashed sharply - and their antagonism towards 
another i ntens ifi ed as ti me 1 apsed.. When the government failed 
to proclaim the National Insurance Act, Menzies protested and 
displayed his disloyalty to Lyons openly by resigning from Cabinet 
in March 1939. In the subsequent Cabinet re-shuffle, Casey's 
status was raised; this was interpreted to mean that Lyons was 
contemplating his resignation and that Casey was his chosen 
However, anticipation of this event seemed to cause a split in 
Cabinet, and its meetings became ineffective and devoid of 
action. (74 ) 
When Lyons died in April, ministerial changes 
the emphasis of government policy away from banking legislation.~ 
Lyons was replaced by Menzies on 26 April 193~; i:he ne~1 Prime / 
Minister, however, had always been sceptic~] of the proposed-tank 1 g 
reforms. !1ilson informed the author that the change in Cabinet_ 
was important, since Menzies was never really interested in economi 
"unless it was going for him", and he had not been closely involved 
with banking legislation. (?S) 
He was, moreover, traditionally 
a friend of the ban ks; according to Sir James Elder Chairman 
of the National Bank of Australasia 
- Menzies was a successor 
"to whom we tender our assurances of cooperation tov1ard the 
achievement of the ideals he has propounded _,.(? 6 ) Of significance, 
too, were the changes ~~nzies made in the Cabinet, above all the 
I_ 
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demotion of Casey the only Cabinet Minister who had really 
pushed for banking reform to the position of Minister of 
Supply and Development. After serving only nine months under 
Menzies, Casey left Australia to become the first Australian envoy 
to Washington. Yet another source of Cabinet instability was 
the friction between Menzies and Page, who resigned from Cabinet 
in September 1939. This was due not only to poor personal 
relations between Page and Menzies, but also to internal dissensions 
in the Country Party over the terms on which it •..iould join a 
government under Menzies; this further weakened the advocates of 
banking reform. Furthermore, Casey's duties in respect to banking 
fell to the new Assistant Treasurer, P.C. Spender (Menzies himself 
being Treasurer, as well as Prime Minister); and it seems that he 
was not very interested in banking, especially with the outbreak of 
war so close at hand. (?7) No further action was taken on the 
Commonwealth Bank Bill, which was allowed to lapse in its existing 
form. In May l 93g, a Treasury document declared that the proposed 
bill had been introduced to please the Country Party, and iC;1as 
. . . (78) 
not regarded as an urgent necessity in certain quarters. Late~ 
in December 1939, Menzies declared that a Mortgage Bank Department 
was still favoured by his government, but, again, no action was 
ta ken. 
(79 i 
-\\~ Cchf\\ V\'J muV\- ~~YJ 
On the other hand, the Trading Banks Bill was not yet 
completely abandoned. In fact, several genuine attempts we1·e 
made to revive it - by 1.Jilson in particular. On l May 1939, 
F.R.E. Maulden of the Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics 
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explained to McFarlane that Wilson personally had been handling 
the details of the draft bill, and further inquiries were needed 
before the bill could be brought down.(80) A Treasury document 
dated 1 May 1939 entitled "Proposed Treasury Legislation: 
Banks Bill" also revealed that, although much work remained 
to be done before the bill could be introduced into Parliament, 
the new draft would be less radical; this is not surprising in 
view of the pressure still being exerted upon the government by 
the private banks. The Treasury Memorandum referred to the 
bill which had arisen from the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission; the main purpose of the bill was to regulate the 
banks, and the two important provisions which were to achieve thi 
objective were minimum deposits and the mobilization of London 
But, as it explained: 
These points are both very contentious. Alter-
ations are under consideration to "water down" 
the original intentions regarding minimum 
deposits and to provide for the mobilization 
of London funds. A good deal remains to.be 
done before a Bill could be got ~eady and 
consideration would need to be given to possible 
reactions of the Sydney trading banks to 
legislation affecting London funds. (81) 
By 30 May 1939, Wilson informed Phillips that Cabinet had 
banking proposals and had agreed with the general thrust of the 
projected draft Trading Banks Bill - almost certainly because 
the controversial issues had now been made more acceptable to the 
private banks. l32 J But even though a new draft bill was 
printed the same day, there is no evidence that the printed version 
was endorsed by Cabine1:. It included provision for an Under-
.l. 
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taking which was similar in some respects to that specified in the 
1938 draft, but with several amendments for example, the new 
draft was toned down in such a way that there was no provision for 
the licensing of banks. The minimum deposits scheme had also been 
watered down in a manner which afforded the private banks greater 
discretion: In short, the reserves to be maintained with the Bank 
were to comprise both notes as well as bank deposits; second, 
the percentage of deposit liabilities to be lodged with the central 
bank was reduced as compared to the percentage specified in the 
earlier draft; and third, the banks were to be permitted to reclaim 
their deposits with the Bank at any time: 
Each bank shall establish a reserve of deposits 
with the Commonwealth Bank and Australian notes 
[sic~ arid sha11·maintain_an average reserve of 
such deposits and Australian notes not less in 
amount than an amount representing such a percent-
age (not exceeding seven and one-half) of the · 
depostt liabilities in Australia of the first-
mentioned bank as is fixed by the Board of the 
Commonwea·1th Bank and notified to the first-
mentioned bank from time to time: 
Provided that: 
a) the Board of the Commonwealth Bank shail 
fix the same percentage in respect of all 
banks; and 
b) nothing contained in this sub-section shall 
be construed so as to empower the Commonwealth 
Bank to refuse to allow a bank to withdraw 
wholly or in part deposits lodged by it in 
pursuance thereof or otherwise. (83) 
These "diluted" proposa 1 s received a more favourable reception 
by the private banks than had earlier drafts, and indeed, the 
result was a somewhat greater degree of consensus between the Bank, 
the trading banks, and the government. Phillips, for example, 
... 
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sent Wilson various amendments to the draft bill, and the 1 atter 
was prepared to include them in the next printing of the bill. 
as Wilson revealed, on 30May1939, the fate of the bill was by 
no means certain as the government had not confirmed that it was 
still committed to the introduction of the bill into Parliament: 
I've adopted your suggestions for incorporation 
in the next print of the Bill. I'm in general 
agreement with your proposals but they involve 
changes in what was agreed to by the Bank, 
trading banks and Cabinet. Therefore, I want 
to have the Bill Printed in accordance with the 
forms (e.g. loans, advances) as they now stand. 
Your suggestions can then be considered by 
responsible authorities with the present draft 
in front of them. The Bill will have to be 
altered a number of times anyway. No doubt 
the banks will object to Your postscripts but 
I think there should be a possibility of 
discussing the matter further with them after 
the Government has re-announced its intentions 
of Proceeding with the Bill (if it does). (84) 
In any event, Wilson was intent on drawing up additional drafts 
the Trading Banks Bill; given time, the government may well have 
announced its renewed determination to proceed with banking 
legislation. 
According to Melville, if war had not broken out, 
the government would have introduced legislation concerning a ne~ 
Mobilization Agreement, though he is of the opinion 
deposits issue would not have been resolved. for it w2s still too 
controversial. (S
5
) Clearly, the outbreak of war pre-empted 
any possibility of further action; 
indeed, as early as June 1939, 
the approaching war began to dominate all government activity. 
Wilson, as Commonwealth Statistician, became deeply involved in the 
compilation of the National Register. 
In addition, he and other 
Treasury officials became absorbed in formulating war -time financial 
.•··~G•.j1'-.: 
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regulations, and peace-time banking legislation was pigeonholed as 
Parliament rose on 16 June 1939 and did not sit again until 22 
September, after war had been declared. In August, the 
establishment of full exchange control had rendered the Mobilization 
Agreement unnecessary, and the minimum deposits provision, as it 
appeared in the last version of the draft bill, was to be only 
nominal. It was not, 
regulations - and, in 
however, until the introduction of war-time 
fact, not until the 1945 banking legislation 
that the Royal Commission's recommendations were translated 
finally into law. 
Epilogue 
Despite the government's failure to introduce the proposed central 
banking legislation before the war, it appears that the Commission's 
recommendations were accepted with enthusiasm by many of the 
Commonwealth Bank's younger staff. This beoame obvious in 1938 
when the Bank offered to provide the initial funds for the establish- -
ment of private bank deposits with the central bank. On the 
surface, it appears that this move was intended to help the banks 
avoid any restriction of their advances; however, the trading 
banks detected a hidden motive behind it, namely , to lure the private 
banks into a position of dependence on the central bank. 
ever the reason, the private banks did not make use of the 
assistance offered to them, and true central banking policy 
What-
continued to be impeded by the lack of information on, and control 
over, the credit base. · 
! .· 
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With the outbreak of war in 1939, central banking was 
transferred from its experimental state to a war-time necessity, 
requiring as it did greater understanding of the banking and monet 
systems by the Bank's staff,- and. increased cooperation by the priv 
banks. By the end of this transition in 1942, the additional 
powers gained by the central bank in regard to minimum deposits 
London funds were decidedly greater than those which had been 
embodied in earlier draft legislation. While little resistance 
was offered to the enforced concentration of London funds with 
the Bank especially in the light of the precarious position 
prevailing in Britain in June t940 the private banks were 
somewhat less congenial on other matters, such as interest rates, 
and lending and investment policies. Just as the private banks 
doubted that the Bank would use these controls effectively, the 
government had its own misgivings, but it sought to clamp down on 
private bank autonomy in an effort to curb i~flationary pressures. 
The Treasurer, Arthur Fadden, favoured the. imposition of a s_pecial 
deposits scheme which would require the trading banks to lodge as 
special deposits with the central bank all assets in excess of 
those on a given day. The Bank would then lend corresponding 
amounts to the government, and these funds would be used to finance 
the war effort. While the government was contemplatinq whether 
the scheme would be carried out by National Security Regulations 
or by legislation, Reading was pushing for a Bank Board resolution 
in favour of a voluntary agreement with the banks.( 86 )The ~overnment. 
expressed its willingn~ss to compromise, and the private banks, 
under threat of National Security Regulations, reluctantly pledged 
:~., .• ~J;<.l 
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their cooperation and accepted the Bank's ultimate authority. 
In addition, the government decided on a firm Undertaking - based 
on voluntary cooperation - which was announced by Fadden in his 
Budget speech on 25 September 1941. But still, he declared-that 
he would not hesitate to invoke the National Security Act if it were 
necessary to prevent secondary expansion by the trading banks_{B7) 
However, the government was defeated on the Budget and was 
replaced on 7 October 1941 by the Curtin Labor Government, with 
(
Chifley as Treasurer. By early 1942, the powers advocated by the 
Royal Commission, together with additional regulations, had been 
awarded to the Commonwealth Bank under the war-time National 
Security Regulations. ·· The introduction of these regulations by 
\the Curtin Government occurred without much public discussion, 
and the private banks appeared to be reasonably satisfied that the 
new provisions were somewhat similar to the voluntary agreements 
which had been reached with the previous government. The 
regulations required the banks to comply with.' the advance policy 
specified by the central banks from time to time, and to make-
special deposits with the Bank: 
A bank shall 'lodge' in a Special Account with 
the Commonwealth ·Bank such part of its surplus 
investible funds as the Bank may direct, on a 
plan approved by the Treasurer. 'Surplus 
investible funds' are defined as the excess 
at any time of assets in Australia over their 
average amount in August 1939. 
A bank shall not withdraw from its Special 
Account except with the consent of the 
Commonwealth Bank. 
The Commonwealth Bank shall pay interest on 
Special Accounts at a rate designed to ensure 
that the profits of the bank are not Qreater 
than the aver~ge of the three pre-war' 
years. The rate was not in any case to exceed 
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a maximum rate fixed by the Treasurer from 
time to time. (88) 
In short, the regulations generally encompassed 
down by the Royal Commission and, thus, a centralized and fully-
contro11ed banking system ·was created. And, further, the 
Commission's recommendation for the establishment of mortgage 
bank· facilities was resurrected from its parliamentary rejection 
1938 with the creation of the Mortgage Bank Department of the 
Commonwealth Bank in 1943. 
After winning the general elections in 1943, the Curtin 
Governmen·t declared its intention to translate the war-time banking 
regulations into permanent peace-time legislation. (89 ) And by 
mid-1944, both the government and the Bank Board were anticipating 
the need for strong monetary control during the final stages·of 
the war and the early post-war period. In drawing up their 
proposals, Chifley and his Treasury advisers received the Board's 
opinions on many technical aspects of war-time experience. This 
experience had done much to "break the ice'" before the plunge-into 
the implementation of Labor's banking policy. This experience 
was further fuelled by Chifley's personal efforts as Treasurer. 
Sir John Phillips told the author that the Royal Commission's 
major impact was the education of Ben Chifley: It was this 
development that helped to produce the legislation of 1945 which 
finally incorporated most of the Commission's recommendations and 
formed the basis of Australian banking for the next forty years. 
Even so, it is Phillips' opinion that, although Chifley was a very 
-~ 
j, 
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strong force behind the legislation, much of it would .have happened 
anyway; and, of course, it was the war which established a precedent 
for peace-time"banking legislation. (90J 
Early in 1945,Cabinet made its policy decisions in regard 
to banking; consequently, on 9 March, legislation was intro-
duced by Chifley, backed by Labor majorities in -both Houses: There 
were two bills, a Commonwealth Bank Bill and a separate Banking 
Bill. Unlike Casey, Chifley wisely avoided consultations with 
the trading banks on any aspect of the legislation, and this served 
to limit their impact on the government's decision. Labor argued 
in the parliamentary debate that the Opposition, by opposing the 
government's legislation, was abrogating its earlier decisions to 
establish the Royal Commission and its attempts to draft le~islation.( 9l) 
It appears that the Opposition was no ranger politically obliged 
to feign attempts at banking reform and, therefore, its loyalty 
to the private banks was publicly renewed. ,This, in itself, did 
not greatly assist the private banks' cause, for the value o.f support_ 
from Menzies and Fadden was undermined -by statements they had made 
earlier. For example, Menzies had previously admitted the need 
for special post-war legislation regarding a special deposits 
scheme, which, he said, was an essential instrument for an Australian 
central bank. (92 ) The Country Party had likewise made a 
resolution at a conference held on 11 April 1945 in support of the 
powers sought by the Government.( 93 ) In addition, the banks 
failed to re-stimulate public support, which, at the tiine, was 
running in Labor's favour. Therefore, .with the House dividing 
·i, 
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on strict party lines, only minor ammendments were made to the tw, 
bank bi 11 s, which became Acts of the Commonwealth on 3 August 
The government had both the will and the numbers to push its 
legislation through. 
The bills themselves represented a radical departure 
from the earlier, pre-1939· situation of piecemeal central bank 
control which had, in the final analysis, depended on private bank". 
(94) 
cooperation. The measures afforded the Bank power to enforce 
policy, although it is true that the effectiveness of the 
legislation still depended to some degree on trading bank 
The general plan of the government had been to put into law the 
modified recommendations of the Commission on the subject of 
minimum deposits. 
The systelTI of va.riable minimum deposits along 
the lines recommended by the Commission was considered, but was rej 
in favour of continuing the war-time special accounts arrangement. 
In principle, this machinery of control was less radical than that 
recommended by the Commi~sion. As well, both the Commission and 
the 1945 legislation dealt with the control of London funds; -
whereas the government believed the Bank required full access 
to the London funds of the trading banks, the Commission intended 
the Bank to have access only to that portion of London funds it 
required. The Commission had recommended that the arrangement 
should be binding. In the legislation, however, not only was 
access to London funds made compulsory, but there was also a 
provision for exchange control. In this way, the government 
ensured that the Bank would maintain control of the exchange rate. 
-.. 
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The Commission stated that the power to alter foterest rates was 
a relatively ineffective means of credit control and, consequently, 
it did 
rates. 
not recommend any extension of Bank control over interest 
The 1945 legislation, nevertheless; granted such control 
to the Bank. Furthermore, ·the government went beyond the 
Commission's recommendations by retaining the war-time provision 
requiring the banks to follow the advance and investment policies 
laid down by the central bank. The Commission merely recommended 
that the Bank might equip itself with the means to identify economic 
trends so that it could advise trading banks as to the appropriate 
directions in which advances should be made. In addition, the 
legislative parallel to the Commission's recommendation for the 
greater availability of bank finance for small enterprises 
involved the establishment of the Industrial Finance Department 
of the Commonwealth Bank. The 1945 legislation, for the first 
time, also prescribed the Bank's essentia policy objectives to 
• 
be the maintenance of currency stability, the achievement of full 
employment, and the pursuance of the economic prosperity and 
welfare of the Australian people. Coinciding with these policy' 
objectives was the vestment of final authority of monetary and 
banking policy with the Treasurer. And a further insult to 
earlier private bank opposition was the provision, under the 1945 
Act, for a new General Banking Division, the aim of which was to 
pave the way for the Bank to pursue its commercial activities 
in a more competitive manner than in the past. 
. .. 
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Overal1, then, the year 1945 marked an important 
turning point for the Commonwealth Bank. It had 
a comprehensive central banking authority after a twenty year· 
struggle. While the influence of Chifley as Treasurer and the 
war-time National Security· Regulations may have been the catalysts, 
Commission's stimulation of interest in central banking the Royal 
helped in large measure to make reform inevitable. 
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